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Abstract 
Encouraging the uptake of energy efficient vehicles (EEVs) is an aspiration of 
critical importance in a day and age in which we are confronted with the 
increasingly dire consequences of human behaviour on our planet, and on 
the planet for generations to come. The transport sector is one of the highest 
contributors of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, whilst pollution 
from this sector is responsible for a large proportion of human deaths each 
and every year. Given the severity of these issues, it is more important than 
ever for policy-makers, and researchers alike, to endeavour to encourage a 
transition within the community towards more sustainable lifestyles. 
Transportation is key to this change. 
As a service that every human being uses, almost every day of his or her life, 
the transport sector presents a unique opportunity for behavioural change. 
Through efficient and targeted policies, consumers can be incentivised to 
make more sustainable transport choices and to consider the consequences of 
their own actions. Foremost amongst these initiatives is that of encouraging a 
transition towards energy efficient vehicles.  
This thesis has specifically been produced in order to shed further light on 
issues affecting this transition. It has been written with both policy-makers 
and researchers in mind, in order to equip them with the required 
knowledge and insight, in order to spur further research and development in 
this field. In particular for policy-makers, this document includes a series of 
recommendations based on prevailing findings in the current literature, in 
addition to the novel and significant findings of this research effort. These 
include the various lessons learnt from other government policies that have 
already been implemented in several regions around the globe. 
As a thesis by publication, this document consists of three research articles 
that investigate factors affecting the EEV market, specifically in terms of: 
consumer demand, vehicle usage and product pricing. A number of other 
demographic and economic factors have also been examined. 
Article I details the analysis of an incentive policy that was implemented in 
Stockholm, Sweden, to incentivise the uptake of EEVs – an exemption from 
the city’s congestion pricing scheme. Through this study, the demographics  
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of individuals who have purchased EEVs are identified and used to analyse 
the effects of this incentive policy. It was determined that the congestion tax 
exemption had a significant effect on increasing EEV demand. The question 
remained though: did this policy lead to a reduction in vehicle emissions? 
The second publication included in this thesis, Article II, focuses on this very 
point – specifically, how the same congestion tax exemption affected usage 
rates and direct emissions of EEV owners in Stockholm. As a result of this 
analysis, it was determined that although the incentive led to an increase in 
EEV usage rates, overall, it greatly reduced EEV owner emissions – by half. 
The final, and capstone article of this thesis, Article III, takes a much broader 
perspective on the issue of EEV adoption, by analysing a set of panel data for 
15 regions around the globe, between 2008 and 2012. Through the use of a 
unique method known as Error-Component Three-Stage Least Squares 
(EC3SLS) regression, a system of equations was modelled based on this panel 
data, with the intention of evaluating not only the effect of different types of 
government incentives on consumer demand and vehicle pricing – but 
additionally, to provide greater insight into how other economic and 
demographic factors influence the EEV market. A key feature of this model 
was the ability to treat both demand and pricing factors as endogenous. As it 
turns out, these endogenous relationships were found to be statistically 
significant, with substantial repercussions for the inference of policy effects – 
not only in this study, but also across the broader literature in this field. 
The final chapter of this thesis summarises the findings from each of the 
three articles listed above: their significance, the limitations of the study, as 
well as recommendations for future research. It concludes by providing a 
final series of recommendations specifically for policy-makers who aim to 
encourage the uptake of EEVs within their own jurisdictions.  
Ultimately, this thesis finds that many incentive policies have been 
tremendously successful in stimulating an uptake in EEVs, however, their 
impacts – both direct and indirect – have varied significantly, depending on 
their form. Overall, if we are to transition towards a more sustainable 
transport system, policy-makers must implement incentive programs to 
increase EEV adoption. It is hoped that this thesis can provide both the 
evidence and knowledge to inspire policy-makers to do so.  
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full-time courses) by the time of the Licentiate defence at KTH, and 
an additional 45 ECTS by the time of the PhD defence at KTH – a 
total of 12 full-time courses during the doctoral candidature; and, 
- Completion of four articles, all deemed suitable for publication, 
and submitted as part of a Thesis by Publication for KTH, whilst 
defended at a public forum, within four and half years from the 
start of the candidature at KTH i.e. by the 31st of December, 2015. 
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PROGRESSION IN DOUBLE PHD PROGRAM: 
This particular thesis represents the final piece of assessment submitted in 
order to fulfil the requirements of program IF49 – Doctor of Philosophy – at 
QUT. In turn, I have completed all other assessment required for this 
program. I have already defended my Licentiate of Engineering thesis at 
KTH, and have completed all compulsory coursework. I do, however, still 
have some additional work to complete before meeting the requirements of 
the Doctor of Philosophy program at KTH. This includes: 
- The completion of one additional article, investigating how 
phasing out an exemption for Energy Efficient Vehicles from the 
congestion price in Stockholm has affected the demand for EEVs; 
- Assisting with teaching masters courses offered at KTH; 
- Compiling and submitting a thesis, focussed on the Swedish case-
study, based around the three articles outlined in this thesis, in 
addition to the fourth outlined previously; and, 
- Publically defending this thesis in Stockholm, Sweden. 
The following coursework has been completed during this program: 
1. Advanced Information Retrieval Skills (AIRS), QUT; 
2. Systems Analysis, KTH; 
3. Theory of Science and Research Methodology, KTH; 
4. Transport Modelling*, KTH; 
5. Transport Policy and Evaluation*, KTH; 
6. Advanced Transport Modelling*, KTH; 
7. Literature Course in Transport Science (Sustainability), KTH; 
8. Statistical and Optimisation Methods for Engineers*, QUT; 
9. Sustainable Practice in the Built Environment/Engineering*, QUT; 
10. Topics in Transport Science (Parts 1 and 2),  KTH; 
11. Research Methods in Transport Science (Parts 1 and 2), KTH; 
12. Double Literature Course in Stated Preference Methods, QUT. 
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These courses equate to 92.5 ECTS or 148 cp at QUT i.e. just over 18 months 
of full-time course-based study. Note that the five courses marked with an 
asterisk (*) were carried out at Masters level, rather than PhD level, however, 
all twelve courses were completed during the PhD candidature; in parallel to 
my research projects. 
In addition to coursework, I have also undertaken teaching at KTH, as well 
as participated in, reviewed papers for and/or had work presented at: 
1. eddBE2011 Sustainable Wellbeing: International Conference on 
Engineering Designing and Developing the Built Environment for 
Sustainable Wellbeing (2011), at Queensland University of 
Technology, in Brisbane, Australia; 
2. Sustainable Transport and Development Workshop (2012) at the 
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, in 
New York, U.S.A.; 
3. The International Transportation Economics Association’s Annual 
Kuhmo Nectar Summer School in Transportation Economics (2012) 
at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), in 
Berlin, Germany; 
4. Sustainable Transportation Summer School (2012) at Aalto 
University, in Helsinki, Finland; 
5. Centre for Transport Studies (CTS) Lunch Seminar Series (2012, 
2013), at the Royal Institute of Technology – KTH, in Stockholm, 
Sweden; 
6. hEART Conference: the 2nd Symposium of the European 
Association for Research in Transportation (2013), at the Royal 
Institute of Technology – KTH, in Stockholm, Sweden; 
7. The 36th Australasian Transport Research Forum (ATRF) annual 
conference (2013), at the Queensland University of Technology in 
Brisbane, Australia; 
8. The International Transportation Economics Association’s Annual 
Kuhmo Nectar Conference (2014), as part of the TIGER Forum, at 
Toulouse School of Economics, in Toulouse, France; 
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9. The Royal Geographical Society’s Annual International Conference 
(2014), at Imperial College, in London, United Kingdom; and, 
10. AutoCRC’s 3rd Technical Conference: Driving Automotive 
Innovation (2014), at the Melbourne Convention Centre, in 
Melbourne, Australia. 
This portfolio of work has been carried out over approximately 45 months, 
just shy of four years in total, of which I have spent 24 months at QUT and 21 
months at KTH. The time spent in each country was split up over four 
separate periods spent in Stockholm, and another four separate periods spent 
in Brisbane, with each period averaging approximately six months. An 
overview of the staging of the program, including the various candidature 
milestones and research outputs, is included in Appendix B. 
LINKAGE BETWEEN PHD THESES AT QUT AND KTH: 
As documented above, this Double PhD Program requires the production of 
two separate PhD theses. This, in part, is due to the differing requirements of 
Thesis by Publication at each of the institutions. Whilst QUT requires a 
minimum of three articles, with at least one submitted to a peer-reviewed 
journal; KTH requires the completion of a minimum of four articles that are 
each deemed to be “publishable”. 
Whilst there is some overlap in the articles that are included in each of these 
theses, the target audience and focus topics of each document differ. Whilst 
the QUT document, this thesis, takes a broader, global view on the issue of 
incentivising the uptake of EEVs, the KTH thesis is more focussed on the 
Swedish experience, particularly in terms of the city of Stockholm, with some 
international comparisons made. 
As such, when reading the QUT thesis, it is important to note that details 
pertaining to the history and background of incentive policies in Stockholm 
and Sweden have largely only been described within the texts of each 
relevant article. Whilst a broad review of the literature relevant to this 
research topic is detailed in this specific PhD thesis, the KTH thesis will 
mainly focus on quantitatively assessing the success of the congestion tax 
exemption in Stockholm, and as such, will provide far more detail in regards 
to the specific policies implemented, and their background. 
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OTHER ACTIVITIES: 
In addition to the work carried out for the Double PhD program, it should be 
disclosed that I have also been working on a separate, but related project for 
the AutoCRC through QUT since January, 2014. This project, sponsored by 
the Malaysian Automobile Institute (MAI), involves developing, deploying 
and analysing a stated preference survey of consumer demand for energy 
efficient vehicles in Australia, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia; using this 
information to predict where the EEV market will be in these nations by the 
year 2030. Given this projects’ similarity to my PhD thesis, I was placed on 
the project in order to share my knowledge in the field with less-experienced 
PhD candidates and other team members. It is my plan to continue my 
academic career, after the PhD at QUT is finalised, working on this AutoCRC 
project, in addition to completing the remaining requirements of the PhD 
program at KTH. 
SUSTAINABILITY OF THE DOUBLE PHD PROGRAM: 
Given the significant level of travel involved in this program, and as 
consequence, the significant level of emissions generated, I am blatantly 
aware of the clear hypocrisy in researching sustainable transport whilst 
“unsustainably” transporting myself around the world. In order to address 
this issue I have tracked and monitored my emissions over the past four 
years. This procedure, as well as other efforts I have made in order to reduce 
and offset my personal carbon emissions, is documented in a short analysis 
included in Appendix C of this thesis. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
As one of the highest contributing sectors of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions globally, the transport sector has a significant role to play in 
reducing levels of pollution that are currently leading our world towards a 
drastically changed global climate, in addition to millions of respiratory-
related, pollution-induced morbidity and mortality cases. Transportation is a 
service that is encountered by most human beings, almost every day of their 
life. Given that individuals must make choices about this service on a daily 
basis means that transportation is key to encouraging behavioural change in 
the community that will lead us towards a more sustainable society. 
Implementing government incentives to encourage the uptake of energy 
efficient vehicles (EEVs) is just one means by which transport emissions can 
be minimised. How can a policy-maker know, however, how different types 
of incentives may affect the market; whether energy efficient vehicles will 
really reduce emissions; and how different demographic and economic 
factors, such as fuel prices, could affect the EEV market compared with 
government incentives?  
With these questions in mind, this thesis forms the capstone product of a 
study that has investigated the effects of several different types of 
government incentives on the demand, usage and pricing of EEVs in various 
markets around the globe. As such, this thesis is a highly recommended read 
for policy-makers wanting to encourage an uptake in EEVs within their own 
jurisdictions. 
The following chapter provides background to the research problem that this 
thesis deals with – that of how to best design targeted government incentive 
packages that efficiently encourage an uptake in EEVs with minimum 
distortion to the market. The background also includes the specific 
motivations for carrying out this research effort. Following this, the aims, 
objectives and research questions that have guided the direction of this thesis 
are detailed.  
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As this document has been submitted in the form of a PhD Thesis by 
Publication, a large proportion of the content included is in the form of peer-
reviewed research articles that have already been accepted or submitted for 
publication. This introductory chapter includes an outline of the specific 
research contributions of this collective research effort. The details of the 
included publications are also presented, along with a narrative of how the 
three articles fit together to answer the specific research aims, objectives and 
questions of this study.  
This thesis has been written for the purpose of providing additional 
information in regards to the relevant literature, motivations, theoretical 
underpinnings, as well as the overall project objective in completing each of 
the three articles that are included. As such, this thesis should be treated as a 
reference guide when perusing the three publications enclosed. 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH PROBLEM 
With an ever-rising public focus on the effect of human behaviour on the 
global environment; our contribution to the planet’s changing climate; and 
what this could all mean for our future and the future of generations to 
come, all sectors of society contributing to these dramatic changes have come 
under close scrutiny. As one of the highest contributing sectors of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and in turn, human-induced climate 
change, the transport sector has been at the forefront of this scrutiny.   
Road transport has been attributed with being responsible for 50% of the 3.5 
million deaths worldwide each year due to outdoor air pollution, leading to 
a global annual economic loss of $USD 1.7 trillion (OECD 2014). To put this 
into perspective, global road fatalities totalled 1.24 million deaths in 2010 
(WHO 2013). The reality of the situation is dire, with emissions-related 
morbidity and premature mortality cases appearing to continue to increase, 
with an average 4% rise in deaths between 2005 and 2010 (OECD 2014). The 
exceptions to this trend are a few European countries that have exhibited 
reductions in the number of pollution-induced respiratory-related deaths. It 
is claimed that these reductions are largely due to the introduction of much 
stricter motor vehicle emissions standards (OECD 2014) – highlighting the 
very real consequences of transport pollution (as shown in Figure 1); and the 
very real need for something to be done about it.  
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 Figure 1 – Motor vehicles travelling on an eight-lane highway in Beijing, China, on the 
29th of January, 2013. Source: Zhao (2013). 
In order to address public concern about the consequences of transport 
emissions on our environment and upon human health, many regions 
around the world have implemented significant programs in order to 
attempt to reduce emissions within the sector. Examples of such programs 
include: 
- Constructing the world’s largest underground metro system 
transporting over six million people each and every day in Beijing, 
China (Branigan 2014);  
- Implementing Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) in 160 regions around the 
world, including in the heavily-polluted cities of Mexico City, 
Bogotá, Istanbul and Johannesburg (Carrigan et al. 2013);  
- Establishing bike-sharing schemes in more than 600 metropolitan 
cities around the globe as of mid-2014 (Walker 2014);  
- Ensuring Sweden’s national motor vehicle fleet is independent of 
fossil fuels by the year 2030 (International Energy Agency 2013); 
and, 
- The Obama Administration’s aim, in the U.S.A., to have at least 
one million electric vehicles on the road in 2015 by investing over 
10 billion U.S. dollars in EEV consumer incentives, manufacturing 
subsidies, and research and development (Plumer 2012; 
Department of Energy 2011).  
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Notwithstanding these excellent examples, the implementation of such 
initiatives on a global scale is no easy task. Policy-makers face considerable 
challenges in trying to deliver sustainable transport systems. As of 2014, 
metropolitan cities account for 54% of the world’s human population, and by 
2050 this is predicted to increase to 66% (United Nations 2014). In turn, 
metropolitan cities account for approximately 70% of global greenhouse gas 
emissions – mostly coming from transport-related activities (International 
Energy Agency 2008). Residents in cities will always require mobility options 
in order to travel to and from work, education, shopping and for leisure. As 
such, policy-makers face the mammoth task of having to deliver a safe, 
reliable and affordable transport system that meets the needs of the current 
population, without sacrificing the planet’s environment to the disadvantage 
of future generations, and our own. 
One principal initiative of policy-makers to move the globe towards a more 
sustainable transport system is the attempt to transition vehicle fleets 
towards cleaner, more energy-efficient mobility alternatives, particularly in 
terms of personal vehicles (PVs). This task, however, is made particularly 
difficult by the fact that a motor vehicle is often one of the most expensive 
items an individual will own in their lifetime. In Australia, the value of 
motor vehicles is second only to property in terms of wealth amongst low 
and middle-income households (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011).   
As a consequence of vehicles being expensive assets for most individuals and 
households, turnover within vehicle fleets is slow, with some authors 
suggesting that a complete transition to alternative fuels/technologies could 
take up to 75 years (Belzowski and McManus 2010). A complete fleet 
transition to EEVs will likely take a number of decades, yet anthropogenic 
emissions must be minimised as quickly as possible in order to avoid the 
worst potential climate change-related effects. It is, therefore, more important 
than ever that policy-makers start to encourage a transition towards cleaner, 
more energy efficient vehicles today. 
Promisingly, a review of the current body of literature in this field exposes a 
diverse range and number of regions already involved in efforts to transition 
vehicle fleets towards cleaner, more energy-efficient models. These efforts 
can be found across both developed and developing nations, ranging from: 
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tax incentives for manufacturers of “eco-cars” in Thailand (Sanitthangkul et 
al. 2012); to increasing the psychological acceptance of electric vehicles (EVs) 
in Germany (Neumann et al. 2010); and the various financial and travel 
incentives implemented in the United States of America in order to 
encourage the adoption of hybrid vehicles (HVs) (Beresteanu and Li 2011; 
Bunch et al. 1993; Diamond 2009; Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011; Riggieri 
2011).  
There is still much work to be done, however, with many developed nations, 
such as Australia, lagging behind on this issue; failing to encourage the 
uptake of EEVs, and in the process of doing so, failing to reduce emissions 
from the transport sector. 
It is clear from the current literature in this field that no consensus yet exists 
in regard to which types of government incentive policies are most effective 
in terms of increasing demand for EEVs. There is also a lack of information 
pertaining to which types of consumer have purchased EEVs – based on data 
of actual consumer choices, as opposed to stated preference surveys.  
The need also exists for an analysis of the behavioural changes, and resulting 
changes in emissions, associated with EEV adoption, in order to address the 
often cited rebound effects, or Jevons Paradox, that is claimed to exist in 
markets transitioning towards more energy-efficient products.  
Finally, there are no known studies into the possible existence of an 
endogenous relationship between consumer demand and product pricing in 
the EEV market, and in turn, how such a relationship may impact upon the 
effectiveness of different types of government incentives. 
In a time when it is more important than ever that policy-makers are 
equipped with the evidence they require in order for them to have the 
confidence to implement programs that will lead us in the “right-direction” 
towards a sustainable society, there is a dire need for peer-reviewed, 
comprehensive analyses that address these gaps in the literature. 
It is exactly for this reason that this thesis has been produced, specifically 
with the objectives, aims and research questions stated in the following 
sections of this chapter. 
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1.2 OVERALL OBJECTIVES 
Given the lack of literature analysing data of the actual behaviour of private 
consumers in regard to purchasing and using EEVs, the intent of this 
research thesis is to: 
• Provide further evidence as to what types of individuals choose 
to purchase EEVs; 
• Investigate whether encouraging a transition towards EEVs is a 
“step in the right direction” after taking into account changes in 
user behaviour and, importantly, changes in vehicle emissions; 
• Provide a greater understanding of how consumers react to 
different incentive policies in terms of market demand, usage 
behaviour and product pricing;  
• Examine whether demand and price in the EEV market are 
endogenous; and, 
• Understand how different factors (including government 
policies, fuel prices and demographics) affect the EEV market in 
terms of marginal demand, aggregate demand and product 
pricing. 
By shedding further light on the mechanisms at play within the EEV market, 
and on how consumers react to different policy, demographic and economic 
changes - governments and policy-makers alike will be able to better design 
incentive schemes to be both targeted and efficient in practice, whilst 
minimising the extent to which such programs could lead to distortions 
within the EEV market. 
1.3 SPECIFIC AIMS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The specific aims of this research study are: 
• To determine which type of consumers have a higher propensity 
towards purchasing an EEV; 
• To assess the effect on marginal demand of the exemption for 
EEVs from congestion pricing in Stockholm; 
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• To examine the potential rebound effects of EEV adoption, 
including those in terms of changes in user behaviour and 
vehicle emissions; 
• To assess the effect on vehicle usage rates of the exemption for 
EEVs from congestion pricing in Stockholm; 
• To better understand the effect of different types of government 
incentives on the EEV market in terms of marginal demand 
(annual sales), aggregate demand (fleet penetration) and product 
pricing; 
• To investigate whether an endogenous relationship exists 
between consumer demand and product pricing in the EEV 
market; and, 
• To assess how effective government incentive policies are, in 
terms of inducing demand (and the respective effects on product 
pricing) for EEVs, compared with other demographic and 
economic factors, such as fuel prices, population density and 
inflation. 
In order to achieve the specified aims of this study, a number of targeted 
research questions were developed. These research questions provide a clear 
overview of the intended scope and direction of this investigation. The main 
research questions of this thesis are: 
RQ1. What types of consumers have chosen to purchase EEVs? 
(Article I); 
RQ2. How has the government incentive of an exemption from 
congestion pricing affected consumer demand for EEVs 
in Stockholm? (Article I); 
RQ3. Do EEV owners drive further than their 
demographically-similar conventional vehicle 
counterparts? (Article II); 
RQ4. How has the government incentive of an exemption from 
congestion pricing affected vehicle usage rates in 
Stockholm? (Article II); 
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RQ5. How have EEV ownership and the congestion tax 
exemption affected vehicle emissions? (Article II); 
RQ6. How do different types of government incentives affect 
the pricing, aggregate demand (fleet penetration) and 
marginal demand (annual sales) for EEVs? (Article III); 
RQ7. Are EEV demand and price endogenous? (Article III); 
and finally,  
RQ8. How have demographic and economic factors, such as 
fuel prices, affected EEV demand and pricing, compared 
with government incentive policies? (Article III). 
1.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis, and its included publications, makes a number of significant 
contributions to both the field of energy efficient vehicle research; as well as 
to the public policy arena. The following section of this chapter provides an 
overview of these specific contributions.  
1.4.1  EEV consumer demographics 
As will be outlined in the literature review of this thesis, although a number 
of studies analysing the stated preferences of consumers towards EEVs do 
exist; the number of studies focussing on revealed preference data i.e. actual 
consumer choices, is far scarcer. As such, Article I makes a significant 
contribution in this area, providing insight into the demographics of 
individuals who have actually chosen to purchase an energy efficient vehicle, 
specifically using the case study of Stockholm County during 2008.  
The results of this study are not only useful to other researchers investigating 
which individuals have the highest propensity towards purchasing EEVs, 
but also provide valuable feedback to policy-makers in Stockholm as to 
which individuals have been most affected by the various programs initiated 
in that region, in efforts to encourage an uptake in EEVs. These findings also 
have a strong relevancy to a much wider audience of policy-makers around 
the globe, who may also be interested in gaining a better understanding of 
which types of consumers are most likely to purchase an EEV, in order to 
better design and target future incentive programs. 
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1.4.2  EEV usage behaviour and rebound effects 
It is interesting to have a discussion about encouraging the uptake of a 
specific product, with the intention of achieving a particular outcome – in 
this case being that of reducing emissions through the adoption of EEVs – 
without a strong body of evidence existing to support such a transition. In 
the case of EEVs, their prevalence in the market is a relatively new 
phenomenon; the amount of data pertaining to actual EEV usage rates is 
limited. In turn, the number of studies into EEV usage is also scarce. 
Article II takes advantage of a unique dataset that includes real annual usage 
rates of an entire population of vehicles, in Stockholm County, during 2008. 
Through this study, the technique of propensity score matching is applied to 
compare usage rates between different vehicle owners, particularly between 
EEV owners and demographically-similar non-EEV (conventional vehicle) 
owners. This method minimises the number of potentially confounding 
factors that could also lead to differences in usage rates, so that any 
remaining difference can largely be attributed to the specified treatment. In 
the case of Article II, the treatments of EEV ownership and commuting across 
the cordon boundary are both used. 
As a result of this process, valuable insight into the behaviour of EEV owners 
is gained, including in terms of rebound effects spurred by reduced per-
kilometre operating costs (increased fuel efficiency), reduced environmental 
impacts and the reduction in the operating costs of commuter trips due to the 
exemption from congestion pricing. The study finds that emissions are 
indeed reduced, with the occurrence of relatively minor rebound effects, 
providing policy-makers with the additional evidence they require in order 
to support programs that will encourage further uptake of EEVs. 
The results of this study will be important to other researchers investigating 
this topic in the future, given the current gap that exists within the literature, 
as this investigation will form a useful case study for comparative purposes. 
1.4.3  Interaction between EEV demand and pricing 
Although research has been conducted into the interaction between demand 
and pricing in some markets, it is a relatively unknown quantity in the EEV 
literature. As such, this thesis, particularly through Article III, sheds further 
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light on this particular relationship, and examines whether EEV demand and 
price are endogenous. This procedure is carried out through a unique 
method of analysing systems of equations based on panel data, known as 
Error-Component Three-Stage Least Squares (EC3SLS) regression. This is 
also novel in the EEV literature, and the wider field of transport, and as such, 
forms a significant contribution to both the theoretical and practical 
applications of this method. 
The findings of Article III have significant repercussions for policy-makers, 
in exposing the true mechanisms at play within the EEV market. These 
results allow for a better understanding of not only how government 
incentives directly affect EEV demand and pricing, but also expose the 
indirect effects caused through the endogenous relationship that is found to 
exist between demand and price. 
1.4.4  Case study of Stockholm, Sweden 
As alluded to previously, the publications in this thesis - particularly Articles 
I and II - make a considerable contribution towards policy discussions in 
Stockholm, and more generally, in Sweden. Both papers provide evidence as 
to the effects of one of the principal incentive policies introduced by the 
government to encourage the uptake of EEVs i.e. an exemption for EEVs 
from Stockholm’s congestion pricing scheme. 
The results of these analyses provide policy-makers in the region with 
additional information to evaluate the success of past programs, whilst 
equipping them with additional insight for efficient design of future policy 
initiatives in this field. 
Equally, this thesis’s contribution to the case study of Stockholm, strengthens 
its prominence as a global leader in terms of encouraging the uptake of EEVs, 
leading to additional interest in this case study that will hopefully encourage 
other policy-makers to embark upon similar policy journeys – including in 
terms of congestion pricing – in their own regions. 
1.4.5  Public policy arena 
Last, but certainly not least, among the most significant contributions of this 
research thesis are the findings specifically relevant to the public policy 
arena. The main purpose of this document is to equip policy-makers, from 
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around the world, with additional insight into the effects of different types of 
government incentive policies on the demand, usage and pricing of energy 
efficient vehicles.  
Whilst evidence is provided through a specific case study, in terms of 
Articles I and II, the final publication, Article III, considers a broader 
perspective of the EEV market by analysing revealed preference data from 15 
different regions around the globe, over five years between 2008 and 2012. 
This particular study is a significant contribution to the public policy arena, 
as it provides additional insight into the effects of different types of 
government incentives – different being in terms of how and when they 
affect the consumer – on EEV marginal demand (annual sales), aggregate 
demand (fleet penetration) and pricing. Article III goes further by comparing 
the effects of different incentive policies in the EEV market, with that of 
economic and demographic changes, such as variations in fuel price, 
inflation and population density. 
Equipped with this insight, policy-makers around the globe can not only 
better understand the potential impacts of different types of incentives on 
both consumer demand and pricing; but design efficient, multi-faceted 
programs, that act in a carrot-and-stick approach, taking advantage of both 
the positive effects of some types of incentives (“carrots”) and the positive 
effects of other factors such as increases in fuel prices (“sticks”) to maximise 
inducements for consumers to adopt EEVs.  
It is particularly important that policy-makers are equipped with such 
knowledge, given the fact that vehicle fleets take a long time to turnover, and 
yet the world is currently faced with the dire need to reduce anthropogenic 
emissions, through initiatives like encouraging the uptake of EEVs, as 
quickly as possible, in order to avoid the worst possible climate change 
scenarios and minimise the related health effects of this pollution. 
1.5 ACCOUNT OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS LINKING 
RESEARCH ARTICLES 
As this is a PhD Thesis by Publication, the main body of this paper is 
comprised of three articles that have been submitted or accepted for 
publication in journals. The details of the three included articles are listed in 
Table 1, whilst the standings of each journal are detailed in Table 2. 
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Table 1 – List of research articles forming chapters in this thesis 
Chapter: Title of article: 
4 
Whitehead, Jake, J. P. Franklin and S. Washington. 2014. "The impact of 
a congestion tax exemption on the demand for new energy efficient 
vehicles in Stockholm." Transportation Research Part A: Policy and 
Practice, 70: 24-40. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2014.09.013. 
5 
Whitehead, Jake, J. P. Franklin and S. Washington. 2015. "Transitioning 
to energy efficient vehicles: an analysis of the potential rebound effects 
and subsequent impact upon emissions." Transportation Research Part A: 
Policy and Practice 74: 250-267. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2015.02.016.  
6 
Whitehead, Jake, S. Washington, J. P. Franklin and J. Bunker. 
Submitted. "The Impacts of Incentive Policies on Energy efficient 
vehicle Demand and Price: An International Comparison." 
Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment. 
 
Table 2 – Impact of journals in which the presented papers are published or under review 
Publication: 
2013 
Impact 
Factor 
2013   
5-Year 
Impact 
Factor 
2013 
SJR 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 2.525 2.855 2.433 
Transportation Research Part D: Transport and 
Environment 1.626 2.040 1.255 
 
1.5.1 Chapter Linkage 
Although each article included in this thesis represents an independent, 
stand-alone research piece, these studies have been arranged in a logical 
order, as chapters of this thesis, with a cohesive narrative written throughout 
the document to tie the three publications together.  
Further details in regards to the relationship between each article, 
particularly in terms of the overall research design and methods employed, 
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are provided in Chapter 3. Here, an overview of the chapter linkage is 
provided. 
Referring to Figure 2, it can be seen that the three main EEV market 
components considered in this thesis are: 
• Energy Efficient Vehicle Demand (Marginal and Aggregate); 
• Energy Efficient Vehicle Usage (and associated emissions); and, 
• Energy Efficient Vehicle Pricing. 
Although there is some overlap between the factors analysed, each chapter 
includes a unique perspective on the issue at hand.  
 
Figure 2 – Overview of the linkage between research articles (thesis chapters). 
Beginning with Article I (Chapter 4), the main thrust of this study is to 
understand the demographics of different individuals who have chosen to 
purchase an EEV (RQ1); and the effect of a specific government incentive on 
EEV demand (RQ2), using the case study of Stockholm, Sweden. This 
chapter includes the use of discrete choice models to analyse and estimate 
both of these relationships. Article I documents the unique opportunity of 
utilising detailed, individual-specific data to assess both EEV consumer 
choice and the effect of an incentive policy in a specific regional market. 
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Building on Article I’s analysis of the case study of Stockholm, and given the 
literature gap previously identified, it seemed necessary to investigate the 
effect of the uptake of EEVs (RQ3) and a congestion tax exemption (RQ4) on 
vehicle behaviour, in addition to the associated changes in vehicle emissions 
(RQ5) due to these two factors.  
As such, Article II (Chapter 5) employs propensity score matching (PSM) to 
control several potentially confounding demographic factors and compare 
the usage rates of different groups’ demographically-similar vehicle owners. 
These groups varied in delineation depending on the approach taken. In all 
cases, vehicle owners were divided based on their owner home location 
relative to the congestion pricing cordon boundary. The first PSM approach 
used the treatment of EEV ownership to compare usage rates between EEV 
and non-EEV owners. The second PSM approach uses the treatment of 
commuting across the cordon boundary to compare the usage rates of 
owners crossing the boundary with those that did not.  
Through these two approaches, the differences in usage rates could be 
attributed to the relevant treatment i.e. owning an EEV or commuting across 
the cordon boundary. It was not possible to fully isolate the effect of the 
congestion tax exemption on usage rates through these two approaches. This 
led to the adoption of a third approach, utilising results from the prior two 
PSM approaches to assess the effect of the congestion tax exemption on EEV 
owner usage rates. The specifics of this procedure are described further in 
the methodology section of Article II. 
This chapter not only sheds further light on the successes of encouraging an 
uptake of EEVs on reducing emissions, but also reveals some of the 
unexpected consequences of encouraging such a transition within the vehicle 
fleet. Given this analysis is also based on the same case study, in the same 
year, it sits complementary to the analysis of consumer preferences and 
demand for this region that is detailed in Article I. 
Finally, in contrast to Articles I and II, the final research piece, Article III 
(Chapter 6), involves a much broader analysis of the global EEV market, 
using aggregate-level data. After such specific analyses of one region, it was 
deemed necessary, in order to produce a well-rounded thesis that could be 
used to evaluate the success of different government incentives for EEVs, 
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that the final research piece should analyse more than just Stockholm. In the 
first two articles, only one incentive type was included, and as such, Article 
III met the desire of allowing for analysis of different types of government 
incentives through the inclusion of 15 metropolitan regions (RQ6). 
Given the panel dataset was personally collected for this study, the model 
developed in this investigation could include a number of factors previously 
not considered in Articles I and II (RQ8), and also allowed for analysis of 
novel relationships, including that of the possible endogenous relationship 
between EEV price and demand (RQ7). Although both prior articles made 
significant contributions to the literature in terms of the effects of one type of 
government incentive; both failed to capture the effect of this policy (and 
other types of incentives) on EEV pricing – as vehicle price was not included 
in the dataset used there. As such, Article III fills this void by analysing 
additional relationships that were not captured in Articles I and II.  
As the capstone product of this thesis, Article III details the wider, “big-
picture” effects of government incentives and other demographic factors on 
EEV demand and pricing; all of which provide numerous valuable insights 
to policy-makers considering the implementation of similar programs in 
their own cities, regions and countries. Given the overlap in analysis of 
consumer demand between Articles I and III, the findings of these two 
studies are also compared in the conclusions of this thesis (Chapter 7). 
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis continues by providing further details concerning prior research 
in this subject field (Chapter 2) including in regards to what constitutes an 
EEV; previous studies into EEV consumer preferences, demand and usage; as 
well as details pertaining to the findings of literature investigating the effects 
of different government incentives on EEV demand, usage and pricing. 
Chapter 3 includes the research design and methods adopted in this thesis, 
including a conceptual overview of the basis of the research project; and 
summaries of the datasets, methodological background and theoretical 
underpinnings for each of the three included articles. 
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Chapters 4, 5 and 6 include the three articles described above, with 
discussion of the linkage between each, discussed in the article summaries 
provided at the beginning of each of these chapters. 
Finally, Chapter 7 provides an overview of the conclusions of this research 
project, including those in terms of the implications of the findings; their 
significance; limitations of this study; suggestions for future work; and final 
recommendations for policy-makers. 
Three additional appendices are also included in this thesis detailing: the 
Double PhD Agreement between QUT and KTH (Appendix A); a timeline of 
the candidature (Appendix B); and to finalise the thesis, a discussion and 
evaluation of the environmental impact of the Double PhD program 
(Appendix C). 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter provides an overview of several bodies of literature that are 
directly relevant to the topics discussed in this thesis. Firstly, Section 2.1 
details the broader motivations for transitioning towards a sustainable 
transport system, including the environmental and health impacts of the 
current system, and the unique opportunities presented by this sector to 
encourage behavioural change in the community. Section 2.2 continues by 
providing an overview of the energy efficient vehicles analysed in this thesis; 
and the relative consequences of each of these technologies on the 
environment. 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 feature a review of the previous studies into EEV 
consumer preferences, demand and EEV usage. Section 2.5 follows on from 
this by providing a description of the different types of measures and 
incentives available to policy-makers in order to encourage the uptake of 
EEVs. This section also includes a comprehensive review of existing 
literature that has analysed the effects of different government incentives on 
the demand, usage and pricing of EEVs. To conclude this literature review, 
the findings of studies into the effects of changing fuel prices on EEV 
demand and pricing are detailed – principally to compare with the effects of 
government incentives on these market factors. 
2.1 EMISSIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE, HEALTH IMPACTS AND 
THE ROLE OF A SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORT SYSTEM 
As stated by many renowned academics and global leaders, climate change 
is the greatest moral challenge of our time. The majority of climate scientists 
agree that there is at least a 95% probability that anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions are affecting the planet’s environment, and that these effects 
will ultimately culminate in global climate change (Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change 2007). Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have affected the planet’s 
environment and, as a result, have degraded many of the natural systems 
that human welfare is dependent upon (Ryan and Turton 2007).  
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Putting climate change effects aside for one moment, regardless of the extent 
to which these issues may affect our society in the future, human-generated 
air pollution alone is also having a significant and real effect on human 
health, and has been doing so for many years.  In Australia alone it has been 
estimated that up to 4,500 morbidity cases and 2,000 early deaths each year 
are attributed to outdoor air pollution, with the majority of these emissions 
in urban areas coming from motor vehicles (BTRE 2005). In 2000/2001, it was 
found that the 82% of nitrogen oxide levels in South East Queensland and 
55% of PM10 particulates in Sydney’s CBD were produced by motor vehicles 
(BTRE 2005). For purely selfish reasons of wanting to protect our own health, 
even ignoring the body of evidence documenting the environmental impacts 
of transport emissions, we should be severely concerned about the very real 
consequences of fossil fuel powered transport. This should particularly be 
the case in a country like Australia – where there are 717 vehicles per 1000 
persons as of 2013 – being one of the highest levels of motor vehicle 
ownership in the world (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013).  
The severity of environmental degradation and emissions-related health 
effects has led academics, policy-makers, NGOs and industry to try to find 
innovative methods and programs to reduce emissions as quickly as 
possible. Such actions are critical if the world is to minimise the chances of 
the worst potential climate change scenarios coming to fruition; reduce the 
impact of air pollution on human health; and as a by-product of this process, 
achieve a sustainable society. But what exactly would a sustainable society 
look like?  
The Brundtland Report, ‘Our Common Future’, eloquently put it as – a 
society that ensures that the activities of the present do not degrade or 
negatively affect the natural systems that support the present, and that will 
support the future needs of society (United Nations 1987). Lying precisely 
within that definition, however, is one of the principal challenges to 
achieving a sustainable society – that of having the foresight to understand, 
and care about our actions of today and what the consequences of these 
actions will be in the future. These consequences will likely be upon 
individuals other than ourselves – although in many cases they may be 
related to us i.e. our children and grandchildren (Schmuck and Schultz 2002).  
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How exactly we change the psychological outlook of humans of today, 
driven by consumerism, to consider the consequences of their actions on 
future generations, is a topic that I will leave to those far better equipped to 
address. I will say, however, that I am of the opinion that humans change 
their behaviour far more easily if they are given the opportunity, in 
conjunction with the supply of proper information, to make the decision to 
do so themselves, rather than being told what they can or cannot do. This is 
exactly where policy-makers have a role to play in treading the fine line 
between inducing behavioural change through government policy, whilst 
avoiding spurring further inequality and disadvantage in society.  
In order to achieve a sustainable society, policies to induce behavioural 
change need to be implemented across a number of sectors, including: 
energy production, agriculture and transport. The transport sector needs to 
play a particularly important role in this ambition, given it is the third 
highest contributor of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The transport sector 
in Australia accounts for approximately 14.4% of emissions (University of 
Melbourne 2010). In the UK and USA, it is even greater at 23% and 28% 
respectively (Dittmar 2009). Transportation is also believed to be the fastest 
growing source of GHG emissions, largely due to rising average global 
income which is contributing to increased average global rates of travel 
(Aldred and Woodcock 2008). Emissions from the sector are also expected to 
triple 2007-levels by the year 2030 (Woodcock et al. 2007). These figures 
demonstrate the dire need for a sustainable transport system. So what is a 
sustainable transport system?  
According to the Centre for Sustainable Transportation (2005) – 
“a sustainable transportation system is one that: allows the basic access needs 
of individuals and societies to be met safely and in a manner consistent with 
human and ecosystem health; with equity within and between generations; is 
affordable, operates efficiently, offers choice of transport mode, and supports a 
vibrant economy; limits emissions and waste within the planet’s ability to 
absorb them; minimizes consumption of non-renewable resources; limits 
consumption of renewable resources to the sustainable yield level; reuses and 
recycles its components; and minimizes the use of land and the production of 
noise.” 
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Easy right? The definition above outlines the complexity of the problem at 
hand, but it is likely that the complexity of a world drastically changed 
through the effects of climate charge would be arguably much greater.  
One of the primary reasons I decided to embark on this journey of writing 
two PhD theses in the field of transport, is that I see this sector as key to 
inducing behavioural change in society. Transportation is a basic human 
requirement that almost every individual in society encounters on a daily 
basis – whether it is in order to go to work, for education, to visit friends and 
family, or simply to collect resources. Given this daily impact of forced 
decision-making in order to fulfil the aforementioned desires and needs, it is 
a sector that presents a unique opportunity to shape individual behaviour.  
Transport presents the opportunity for policy-makers to present individuals 
with sets of alternative options, each and every day, which ultimately 
educate and open their eyes to the effects of their choices – i.e. their 
behaviour – not only upon their own situations, but also upon others in 
society and upon the environment. By adopting a “carrot-and-stick” 
approach of rewarding those choices that benefit society, and penalising 
those choices that negatively affect others, individuals can be encouraged 
towards more sustainable alternatives. This is by no means an easy 
challenge, but it is an avenue through which policy-makers may be able to 
help encourage the transitions required for the world to establish a 
sustainable society for the humans of today, and for those of tomorrow.  
Keeping this approach in mind, the articles enclosed in this thesis largely 
focus on how policy-makers can induce behavioural change to encourage a 
transition towards a more sustainable transport sector. Specifically, the focus 
is on how to incentivise the uptake of energy efficient vehicles, as well as the 
potential expected, and sometimes the unexpected consequences of such 
initiatives.  
The following section of this literature review continues by discussing what 
defines an Energy Efficient Vehicle (EEV), along with details pertaining to 
the different types of EEVs that are analysed in the three articles included in 
this thesis.  
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2.2 ENERGY EFFICIENT VEHICLES 
Green vehicles, clean vehicles, low-emission vehicles, energy efficient 
vehicles – these are just a few examples of the variety of terms used to 
market and label different groups of vehicles that, as a whole, are considered 
to have a lesser impact upon the environment compared with conventional 
internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs). Often the precise term used, 
and the group of vehicles that such a term pertains to, depends largely upon 
the jurisdiction in which it is set. Given the rapid development of this 
market, there are also numerous examples of vehicles that once were 
considered ‘green’ but are quickly being overtaken by far more efficient 
vehicles with little or no tailpipe emissions. 
One of the challenges when comparing the environmental impact of different 
types of vehicles often lies in how the fuel source is produced and/or from 
where it is sourced. For example, in Sweden, ethanol vehicles are generally 
regarded as ‘environmentally-friendly’ and previously attracted various 
government subsidies and incentives. On face value, this claim appears true 
given that the use of ethanol has been found to reduce CO2 emissions by 34% 
compared with petroleum (Fuhs 2008). Though, given Sweden sources a 
percentage of its ethanol from Brazil – a country that has come under close 
scrutiny for clearing large areas of Amazon rainforest to produce biofuel 
(Gao et al. 2011) – the overall sustainability of this fuel source has come into 
question. 
Similarly, in regard to electric vehicles, although most consumers would 
assume such vehicles would have no emissions, often these vehicles have 
higher lifecycle emissions due to the high-energy input required to produce 
electric batteries (Samaras and Meisterling 2008; Delucchi and Lipman 2001). 
Ultimately, the emissions related to the use of electric vehicles largely 
depend upon what the predominant source of electricity production is in the 
region in which it is being used and charged. In one study, Ou, Yan and 
Zhang (2010) find that GHG emissions would only be reduced by 3-36% 
through the adoption of electric vehicles in China, compared with 
petroleum-fuelled vehicles, given this country’s high dependency on coal for 
electricity production. In saying this, given the growing transition towards 
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renewable energy sources, electric vehicles at least have the potential of 
being close to emissions-free in the near future. 
This thesis does not attempt to determine which vehicles are most 
‘environmentally-friendly’, nor does it attempt to identify which vehicle 
types are best for policy-makers to promote. I leave this task to others, such 
as Contestabile et al. (2011). This thesis instead focuses on the effects of 
specific government incentives that have been used to encourage the uptake 
of different types of vehicles – designated in each jurisdiction as EEVs – and 
that may be used again in the future to encourage the uptake of types of 
vehicles that are considered to be most energy-efficient at the time. For the 
sake of clarity, the following section of this review includes an outline of the 
vehicle types designated as EEVs in the three articles included in this thesis. 
2.2.1 Low CO2 petrol and diesel vehicles 
In Article I, low CO2 petrol/diesel vehicles are included in the statistical 
analysis, separate from conventional petrol/diesel vehicles. This particular 
decision was made as these vehicles were considered, at the time of the data 
analysis year, by some public agencies as ‘green’ vehicles. In fact, they even 
attracted a government purchase subsidy for a number of years, however, 
were not exempt from the congestion tax in Stockholm. In order to fall into 
this category, these vehicles were defined as petrol/diesel models that 
emitted less than 120 grams of CO2 / kilometre (Kågeson 2005) – see Figure 3 
for an example of a current low CO2 vehicle in Sweden.  
 
Figure 3 – An example of a low-emission diesel vehicle in Sweden, the Volvo V40 D3; 
emits 114 grams of CO2 per km. Source: Volvo Sweden (2014). 
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The main motivation behind incentivising the uptake of these vehicles was 
that they were seen as the easiest to market to consumers as they could 
continue to use familiar fuel sources that were widely available, but with the 
benefit of reduced tailpipe emissions. Ultimately, however, these vehicles 
still produced GHG emissions, released harmful particulates into the 
atmosphere and relied completely on fossil fuels for propulsion. 
2.2.2 Flexi-fuel ethanol vehicles 
Flexi-fuel vehicles running on Ethanol, like the vehicle shown in Figure 4, 
were the main focus in both Articles I and II of this thesis. These vehicles 
were regarded as one of the most efficient alternatives to conventional 
petrol/diesel models in Sweden in 2008, and allowed for reduced emissions 
with the flexibility of consumers being able to use petrol/diesel if ethanol 
was not available (Pädam, Berglund and Örtegren 2009).  
One of the pitfalls of this vehicle type is that policy-makers cannot truly 
know which fuel source consumers are using, and such vehicles may 
ultimately be no better for the environment than conventional vehicles if 
ethanol is not used. As discussed in Article II, this was particularly the case 
during some months of 2008 in Sweden, where the price difference between 
ethanol and petroleum was so minor that consumers were financially better 
off selecting petrol when filling up their vehicles. Pacini, Walter and Patel 
(2014) state that, on average, the price of ethanol needs to be 68% of petrol, in 
order for it to be the more economical choice. 
 
Figure 4 – An example of a flexi-fuel ethanol vehicle, the Saab 9-3 BioPower; emits up to 
70% less CO2 when running on ethanol compared to petroleum. Source: RACQ (2009). 
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2.2.3 Hybrid-electric vehicles 
Hybrid-electric vehicles use both petroleum and an electric battery to 
operate. The precise mechanism by which these two fuel sources interact in 
order to drive the vehicle does vary depending upon the exact vehicle 
design. In some cases, both fuel sources (and the respective engines) operate 
in parallel in order to propel the vehicle. One fuel source may also be the 
predominant driver, with the other source supporting operation.  
One of the most common hybrid-electric vehicles on the market, and that 
happens to be present in all three datasets used across the included thesis 
articles, is that of the Toyota Prius – see Figure 5.  
 Figure 5 – An example of a hybrid-electric vehicle, the Toyota Prius; emits 89 grams of CO2 
per km. Source: Toyota Australia (2014). 
The Toyota Prius comes in a few different variations, but predominantly has 
been sold as a series-parallel hybrid. This term means that the vehicle has 
both a petroleum-fuelled engine and an electric motor. Both can operate 
simultaneously, or independently of each other, varying depending on what 
is most efficient for the driving situation (Riggieri 2011). The majority of 
Toyota Prius vehicles do not require plugging in to charge, as the petroleum 
engine charges the battery. This means that the vehicle still requires 
petroleum, however, it is much more fuel-efficient than a comparable 
internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV). A plug-in variant is, however, 
also available – with plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) also included in 
the analysis detailed in Article III. 
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In recent years, battery electric vehicles (BEV) – see Figure 6 - have become 
more widely available in the market. Given such vehicles are relatively new, 
sales, usage and pricing data of these models is also limited. As such, this 
variant of EEVs is not included in the analyses presented in this thesis. 
 Figure 6 – An example of a battery electric vehicle, the Tesla Model S; nil tailpipe 
emissions. Source: Tesla Motors (2014). 
2.3 CONSUMER PREFERENCES AND DEMAND FOR EEVS 
Interest in preferences of consumers towards EEVs, and in turn the demand 
for these vehicles, is not new. Papers dating back to the early 1980s (Beggs, 
Cardell and Hausman 1981; Calfee 1985; Hensher 1982; Mannering and Train 
1985) and in the 1990s (Bunch et al. 1993; Golob, Kim and Ren 1996; Ewing 
and Sarigöllü 1998) have analysed consumer preferences for “green” 
vehicles. The body of literature is wide, including analyses across various 
nations including: Norway (Dagsvik et al. 2002), Denmark (Mabit and 
Fosgerau 2011), United Kingdom (Batley, Toner and Knight 2004), Germany 
(Hackbarth and Madlener 2013; Ziegler 2012), U.S.A. (Brownstone et al. 1996; 
Bunch et al. 1993; Hess et al. 2012; Musti and Kockelman 2011), Canada 
(Ewing and Sarigöllü 1998) and Australia (Beck, Rose and Hensher 2013). 
Despite this broad range of analyses, one feature lacking is an analysis of 
revealed preferences (RP) i.e. actual choices of consumers.  
The majority of articles cited above use stated-preference experiments in 
which respondents have been asked to make several choices in a series of 
hypothetical situations. Through this process, these decisions could be 
analysed, generally using discrete choice models, to understand which 
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attributes have the greatest impact upon the utility of each vehicle choice. In 
turn, the discrete choice model results could be used to determine which 
individuals were most likely to purchase a “green” or energy efficient 
vehicle. Although such an approach has numerous advantages, such as the 
possibility of including alternatives i.e. vehicle types, that currently may not 
exist on the market; there is always some concern around the reliability of 
respondents making choices in the present about future decisions. This is 
particularly the case when these choices may involve alternatives not 
currently available, or alternatives that the respondent may not know much 
about. 
One of the key reasons as to why revealed preference (RP) studies in this 
field are rare is largely due to the lack of available data. It is particularly the 
case, that outside of North America and Europe, the analysis of consumer 
choices in relation to EEVs is scarce. It is this specific gap in the literature, 
that part of this thesis aims to fill through contributions in both Articles I and 
III. 
Returning to focus on the aforementioned SP-based analyses, both Hackbarth 
and Madlener (2013) and Ziegler (2012) investigated the preferences of 
consumers in Germany, particularly in relation to alternatively-fuelled 
vehicles (AFVs) in 2011 and in 2007-2008 respectively. In both studies it was 
found that consumers that were younger and had higher environmental 
preferences were most likely to purchase EEVs. Furthermore, they found that 
men were more likely to purchase hydrogen-fuelled vehicles compared to 
women. 
In another analysis of consumer preferences for AFVs, this time focusing on 
new vehicle owners in Denmark during 2007, it was found that if cost and 
performance attributes between AFVs and conventional vehicles were 
equivalent, consumers would chose AFVs due to environmental preferences 
(Mabit and Fosgerau 2011). Such preferences were also present in an analysis 
of consumers in Norway (Dagsvik et al. 2002). In contrast to the previously 
mentioned German studies, however, both of these Nordic analyses found 
that females were more likely to purchase a hydrogen or electric vehicle 
compared to males. 
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Consumers in the U.K. (Batley, Toner and Knight 2004) and in Canada 
(Ewing and Sarigöllü 1998) are most sensitive to the initial cost of EEVs, as 
well as performance factors. Vehicle driving range, in particular, has been 
found to be a significant performance factor in regards to consumer 
preferences towards EEVs (Bunch et al. 1993). 
Other studies have found that car ownership, particularly in terms of owning 
more than one vehicle, is a significant determinant in increasing the utility of 
purchasing an EEV (Campbell, Ryley and Thring 2012; Graham-Rowe et al. 
2012). This is expected as, given the limitations of some EEVs, households 
with a “backup” alternative would be more willing to purchase the 
perceived, more limited EEV.  
Using the revealed preference data, two studies have also found a negative 
relationship to exist between inner-city residency and EEV ownership 
(Campbell, Ryley and Thring 2012; Choo and Mokhtarian 2004). This lies in 
stark contrast to evidence presented by “new urbanist” proponents, that 
individuals living closer to the inner-city tend to have higher environmental 
preferences, support environmental political parties, and in turn, live more 
sustainable lifestyles, including through the use of more fuel-efficient 
vehicles (Kahn 2007; Bhat, Sen and Eluru 2009) and owning less vehicles in 
total (Flamm 2009). 
In a revealed preference (RP) study analysing data from Colorado and 
Washington in the U.S.A., it was found that individuals seek to gain status 
by demonstrating austerity in the context of increasing concerns about the 
environment. The authors present this theory as “conspicuous conservation” 
(Sexton and Sexton 2014). Based on this framework, the paper shows that 
consumers are willing to pay $USD 430 to 4,200 more for a Toyota Prius 
(dependent upon where the individual resides) in order to obtain green 
status from this product. 
Finally, a survey of American vehicle owners in June, 2014, about their 
thoughts on EEVs, revealed that the number one consideration for 
individuals who had bought these vehicles was that of environmental impact 
– being more predominant amongst females than males (Sivak and Schoettle 
2014). They also found that initial purchase price was the greatest barrier to 
adopting an EEV. 
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Overall, we can see from this wide-ranging review of studies in this field that 
numerous authors have already investigated which consumers are most 
likely to purchase an EEV, and in turn, which vehicle attributes or features 
they are most attracted to. In saying this, it does appear that the majority of 
these findings are based upon hypothetical stated-preference experiments. 
Although the SP approach is generally considered suitable for analysing 
consumer preferences, given the limited numbers of EEVs on the market, 
there is still some doubt around the reliability of individuals to accurately 
report their preferences for a future decision on these products.  
As such, more evidence is required from analyses of the revealed preferences 
of consumers residing in regions where EEVs are more popular, in order to 
assess some of the findings of these SP studies. This thesis aims to contribute 
to this assessment of SP findings by analysing revealed preferences of users 
in Stockholm (Articles I and II) and in 15 metropolitan regions around the 
globe where EEVs have become increasingly more popular and widely 
available (Article III). 
2.4 EEV USAGE RATES AND POTENTIAL REBOUND EFFECTS 
The previous section of this thesis documented various studies analysing 
consumer preferences and demand for EEVs, however, analyses of how 
consumers actually use EEVs is far scarcer. Similar to the reasons behind the 
limited number of RP-based analyses of EEV consumer demand, analysis of 
EEV usage is constrained by a lack of real-world data. This is not surprising 
either, particularly given the purchase and usage of EEVs is a recently new 
phenomenon. It is also important to consider that vehicle users are generally 
hesitant at the best of times to report vehicle usage rates – especially if it will 
have an effect upon their insurance rates, registration fees, etc. 
After analysing consumer demand for EEVs in Stockholm in Article I, I was 
interested to know how individuals who purchased these vehicles in turn 
drove i.e. how far they travelled each year - Annual Kilometres Travelled 
(AKT), and in turn, what effect this transition had upon emissions. Upon 
analysis of the literature in this field, I found only one other study 
investigating EEV usage, and the potential rebound effects of purchasing this 
type of vehicle - Afsah and Salcito (2012). In the case of this thesis, when I say 
rebound effect, I refer to an increase in usage – or the Annual Kilometres 
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Travelled – upon the purchase of an EEV. This increase in usage would be 
expected, generally due to the increased fuel-efficiency of the vehicle, 
however, it is also the case that in Stockholm, rebound effects could be 
present due to behavioural changes induced by the exemption for EEVs from 
the city’s congestion tax. 
Several studies have investigated the rebound effects of transitions towards 
“environmentally-friendly” products, including in the case of: space heating, 
residential lighting and white goods (Gillingham et al. 2013; Greening, 
Greene and Difiglio 2000; Schipper and Grubb 2000). Such rebound effects 
are widely known to exist, and as such, this is a point rarely debated. What is 
argued, however, is the magnitude of these rebound effects and the extent to 
which such effects offset the desired reduction in energy consumption. It is 
this point that is particularly pertinent to understand when analysing the 
effectiveness of policies that have been implemented in order to encourage a 
transition towards more energy-efficient products. 
William Jevons first noted the concept of rebound effects in 1865 – this is also 
why such effects are often referred to as Jevons Paradox. In his book he 
speculated that advances in engine technology not only increased the 
efficiency at which coal was burnt, but also made this fuel source economical 
for many other uses – in turn leading to an overall increase in coal 
consumption (Jevons 1865). An example of how this mechanism could work 
in terms of the EEV market is shown in Figure 7. If a consumer originally 
owned a conventional vehicle that cost them $10 per 100 km to drive and 
drove 150 km per week on average, given the increase in fuel-efficiency from 
purchasing an EEV, according to the Jevons Paradox, a rebound effect would 
occur where the decrease in travelling cost would result in increased travel. 
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 Figure 7 – An example of Jevons Paradox using the situation of an individual who has 
purchased an EEV after owning a conventional vehicle. 
Brookes (1979) and Khazzoom (1980) both proposed a similar concept to the 
Jevons Paradox, suggesting that policies which promoted increased energy 
efficiency would ultimately lead to an overall increase in energy 
consumption, and in turn offset the intended reduction in energy usage of 
the incentive policies. This concept is often referred to as the “Khazzoom-
Brookes Postulate” (Gillingham 2011). 
Although rebound effects have been found to occur in various other sectors, 
it is still unclear whether such effects are present in the EEV market. It is also 
unclear, if such effects are present, to what extent they have offset the 
intended reduction in emissions through the adoption of these vehicles. 
Gillingham et al. (2013) suggested, in an opinion piece published in Nature, 
that the rebound effects of adopting energy-efficient products are 
“overplayed” and, although they do exist, research has shown that increases 
in usage have only offset energy/emission reductions by 5-30%. Overall, 
they suggest that energy usage is still greatly reduced through the adoption 
of more energy efficient products. 
Although not specific to EEVs, the effect of increased fuel economy upon 
annual kilometres travelled (AKT) has been investigated in a few studies. 
One of the forerunners in this field, Green (1992), found in his analysis of 
vehicle use in the U.S.A. that rebound effects from increased fuel efficiency 
have been consistently between 5% and 15%. In a similar, but more recent 
analysis of rebound effects due to increased fuel efficiency in the U.S.A., 
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Small & Van Dender (2005) found that the increases in fuel efficiency 
between 1966 and 2001 led to a 5-22% increase in AKT, that declined in 
magnitude over time.  
The only other known study that has focused on rebound effects in terms of 
EEVs, responds to the so-called “Prius Fallacy” – a notion that the adoption 
of energy efficient vehicles leads to increased energy usage that ultimately 
completely offsets any energy consumption savings, and in turn, emissions 
reductions (Afsah and Salcito 2012). The authors of this analysis use data 
supplied by Gillingham (2011) to compare the AKT of Toyota Prius owners 
in California, U.S.A, with that of all other vehicle owners in the state between 
2002 and 2009. Although detail is limited in regards to the exact method 
adopted in order to perform this comparison, and whether exogenous factors 
were controlled for or not, this study finds no major difference in usage rates 
between the two groups of vehicle owners. This finding was somewhat 
unexpected, particularly given the body of evidence suggesting that at least 
some level of rebound effect is found to occur in similar product transitions.  
The findings of this paper are particularly relevant when considering the 
findings of the analysis of EEV usage rates in Stockholm, Sweden, during 
2008 (Article II). 
Taking a broader view of how vehicle usage (AKT) is analysed in other 
articles, Golob et al. (1990; 1996; 1989) adopt structural equation models 
(SEM) to jointly examine car usage and ownership. In their papers they 
analyse the causal relationships between AKT and car owner characteristics. 
Although these papers do not specifically analyse EEVs, they provide 
valuable insight into factors that may have an effect on car usage, and that 
were considered in the analysis documented in Article II. Upon review of 
these papers it can be seen that the factors of: owner age, income, number of 
children and home location, are all particularly significant in terms of the 
rates of vehicle usage, and as such, have been controlled for in the analysis 
documented in Article II. The method adopted in this article in order to 
control for these potentially confounding factors, known as Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM), will be described in further detail in Section 3.3.2. 
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2.5 INCENTIVISING THE UPTAKE OF EEVS: TYPES & EFFECTS 
So far I have examined evidence underlying the motivation for policy-
makers to encourage a transition towards EEVs; discussed literature 
examining which consumers are most likely to purchase these vehicles and 
the characteristics they prefer; as well as highlighted the fact that as with any 
transition towards a more energy-efficient product there may be rebound 
effects, but that such effects generally do not offset the full reduction in 
energy consumption. Assuming these underpinnings are sound and that 
encouraging a transition towards EEVs is a desirable motive for policy-
makers, let’s now investigate exactly how a government might do this; what 
different types of incentives have been implemented; and, importantly, 
discuss evidence from other studies as to how government incentives have 
affected consumer demand, annual usage rates and product pricing. 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, hand-in-hand with heightened awareness 
around the consequences of anthropogenic emissions, governments have 
instigated numerous programs in attempts to curb GHG emissions, promote 
energy independence and ultimately lead the world towards a more 
sustainable society. Such moves are particularly true in the transport sector, 
including in regard to the composition on vehicle fleets.  
There are many means by which a government could encourage a transition 
towards EEVs. These include, but are not limited to: 
- Industry Regulations: where policies are introduced to influence 
the business decisions of automobile manufacturers, which 
indirectly affect consumers; 
- Marketing Campaigns and R&D: where governments actively 
promote cleaner vehicles, and invest in the research and 
development of new automobile technologies;  
- Fuel Taxation and Regulation: where “dirtier” fuels are taxed at 
higher rates than cleaner alternatives – which may in turn attract a 
subsidy. Regulations can also be introduced to force fuel retailers 
to supply alternative fuels; and, 
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- Direct Consumer Support or Government Incentives: where 
incentives are introduced in order to provide monetary, and other 
benefits, to consumers who purchase EEVs, in order to offset any 
perceived limitations or disadvantages of owning such vehicles. 
One example of regulation of automobile manufacturers is that of the 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in the U.S.A., which 
have been the predominant means by which the American government has 
mandated minimum fuel economy standards (Klier and Linn 2012). Under 
these laws, the sales-weighted mean of the fuel economy of an automobile 
manufacturer’s fleet of current models for sale must be greater than a 
government set standard, otherwise the manufacturer must pay a penalty. 
As of 2007, with the establishment of the Energy Independence and Security 
Act ("Energy Independence and Security Act"  2007), manufacturers have 
also been able to trade credits among each other in order to avoid these 
penalties. Although this policy was originally introduced in order to reduce 
the nation’s dependency on foreign oil, it in turn has also had a significant 
effect on improving the average fuel-efficiency of the vehicle fleet (Anderson 
et al. 2011). 
Siriwardena et al. (2012) investigated the effects of the Maine “Clean Car” 
campaign in the U.S.A. – a program initiated in 2004. The program had two 
main components: the use of eco-labels informing consumers of the 
environmental impact of vehicles at the point-of sale; and eco-marketing of 
EEVs through mass media. In this case study, both efforts were found to 
have a significant impact on EEV sales. 
In terms of fuel taxation and regulation, there are numerous examples of 
such taxes existing in many regions around the world, with many 
governments collecting this revenue to fund road infrastructure and to 
restrain growth in fossil fuel consumption (Speck 1999).  Such measures have 
been cited by some as the most powerful, widespread climate policy 
implemented to date (Sterner 2007). Equally, however, fuel taxation can be 
controversial, with many studies documenting the potential distributional 
equity effects of such initiatives. This is particularly true if the revenue raised 
through such measures is not used to subsidise alternative mobility options 
(Blow and Crawford 1997; Santos and Catchesides 2005; Speck 1999). Later in 
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this thesis I compare the effects of fuel price increases with those of incentive 
policies, in terms of both consumer demand and pricing of EEVs – see Article 
III. 
Governments can also use regulation to promote the supply and use of 
renewable fuels. The “pump law” in Sweden, implemented in 2005, meant 
that service stations of a certain size were required to supply at least one 
renewable fuel (Pädam, Berglund and Örtegren 2009). This regulation has 
contributed to the current situation in Sweden where 5% or 200,000 of the 4.2 
million vehicles in the nation run on a renewable fuel, and approximately 
1,400 of the country’s 2,000 service stations supply at least one renewable fuel 
(McCormick, Bomb and Deurwaarder 2012). 
Despite the numerous alternative methods by which governments can 
encourage an uptake in EEVs, the main focus of this thesis is on direct 
support incentives that have been implemented in attempts to offset the 
perceived and sometimes real disadvantages of owning an EEV. The broad 
body of literature in this field suggests that there is no “one-size fits all” 
approach. It is apparent though, that the most successful countries in this 
field, such as Sweden and the U.S.A., have implemented various policies 
across the spectrum of categories listed above, in multi-faceted, carrot-and-
stick approaches. Such multi-faceted efforts have often been found to be 
much more effective than implementing singular programs in terms of 
climate policy (Robalino and Lempert 2000). 
I have chosen to focus on government incentives in this thesis, with these 
measures forming the “carrot” in a policy-maker’s multi-faceted effort, with 
other forms of policy, such as regulation and taxation, taking on the role of 
the “stick”. Some would also argue that a successful multi-faceted approach 
should in fact include carrots, sticks and sermons/tambourines; with 
sermons or tambourines being widespread eco-marketing and advertising 
campaigns (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung 2010; Azevedo, Delarue and 
Meeus 2013). Notwithstanding that, I am no expert in either sermons or 
tambourines, nor are they the focus of this thesis, yet what is clear is that a 
combination of these three types of policies (carrots, sticks and 
sermons/tambourines) is recommended for policy-makers wanting 
comprehensively encourage an uptake in EEVs. 
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2.5.1 Types of government incentives 
Government incentives to encourage an uptake in EEVs have been 
implemented in many shapes and forms. In fact, one of the greatest 
challenges to undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the effect of incentive 
policies on the EEV market arises due to the shear breadth and range of 
incentives that have been implemented around the globe. In order to 
simplify the matter, I have categorised government incentives based upon 
how and when they affect consumers. These incentives appear across all 
three articles included in this thesis, with this categorisation specifically used 
in the analysis documented in Article III. The government incentive 
categories are as follows: 
Type A: One-off subsidies or credits against purchase price         
(cash rebates, income tax credits); 
Type B: Purchase cost reductions   
(reduced/exempt from sales tax, import duty, registration tax); 
Type C: Running cost reductions  
(reduced/exempt annual vehicle tax, emissions tax); and, 
Type D: Usage-based benefits  
(exemption from road tolls; congestion charges; parking fees). 
The first three categories – A, B and C – are monetary incentives that reward 
consumers financially for purchasing an eligible EEV in different ways and at 
different times during ownership of the vehicle. At first glance, categories A 
and B may appear very similar, and in fact they are. Both types of incentives 
apply during the initial purchase of the vehicle. The major differentiating 
factor between the two being that Type A incentives involve transferring 
funds to the consumer that can offset purchase costs – but that can also be 
used to consume other goods. This is in comparison to Type B incentives, 
which, whilst reducing the purchase price of EEVs, do not involve the 
transfer of funds from the government to the consumer. Type C incentives 
also have a monetary worth, but instead of targeting purchase costs, instead 
attempt to subsidise longer-term running costs, such as registration fees.  
Finally, Type D incentives are completely different to the other three 
incentive categories. Although they do generally have a monetary value, 
 36 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
these policies instead target vehicle owner behaviour and reward individuals 
for using EEVs. This reward could come in the form of an exemption from a 
congestion tax or road tolls, free parking and, in the case of Norway, even 
free ferry rides. It is this type of incentive that is the main focus of Articles I 
and II.  
Equipped with a rich source of data, from a country that is well-renowned 
for its government support for EEVs i.e. Sweden – the ambition of these 
studies was to understand not only how this type of incentive has affected 
consumer demand (Article I), but given such incentives also induce 
behaviour change, whether such incentives have negatively affected vehicle 
usage and created rebound effects to potentially offset the intended 
reductions in emissions (Article II). A much broader view of the four types of 
policies, and the effects of such incentives across the globe, is undertaken in 
Article III. 
In the case of all four types of incentives, it is important to understand how 
such measures have affected demand, usage and pricing of EEVs. The 
following sections of this thesis will discuss the existing body of literature 
pertaining to these issues. 
2.5.2 Effect of government incentives on consumer demand 
The following section of this thesis details a number of analyses, based on 
revealed preference data, which have investigated the effects of government 
incentive programs on EEV demand.  Given the challenge of varying 
definitions of what an EEV is across different jurisdictions, it is also difficult 
to accurately compare analyses of the effects of different policies that may 
apply to different types of vehicles. The majority of the publications listed 
here focus on the effects of incentive policies in the U.S.A. and Sweden, 
involving hybrid-electric and/or flexi-fuel ethanol vehicles. 
An analysis of the hybrid-electric market in Texas, U.S.A., revealed that the 
implementation of either a doubling of fuel prices or a cash rebate (Type A 
incentive) would have a negligible effect upon the share of EEVs (Musti and 
Kockelman 2011). In the same analysis, however, the authors found that the 
share of EEVs could be increased by 10% if a “fee-bate” was instead 
introduced, where vehicle owners were charged or subsidised annually, in a 
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carrot-and-stick approach, depending upon whether their vehicle was 
deemed fuel-efficient or not (Type C incentive). 
In a separate analysis of quarterly state-level hybrid-electric vehicle sales in 
the U.S.A. between 2000 and 2006, Gallagher & Muehlegger (2011) also found 
that “fee-bate” programs (Type C incentive) are more effective in terms of 
increasing the share of EEVs, compared with sales tax waivers (Type B 
incentive). As one of the only studies to attempt to quantify the effects of 
different types of incentives, they conclude that the type of government 
incentive offered, and how it affects the consumer, is just as important as its 
monetary value. They also found that sales tax waivers (Type B incentive) 
had a greater effect on EEV demand compared with upfront subsidies such 
as income tax credits (Type A incentive). Chandra, Gulati and Kandlikar 
(2010) analysed similar data of EEV sales in Canada between 1989 and 2006 
and found that sales tax waivers (Type B incentive) had a substantial effect 
on the share of EEVs sold, attributing 26% of sales during the program to 
these policies. 
In contrast to Musti and Kockelman (2011), Martin (2009) found that income 
tax credits (Type A incentive) had a greater impact on demand in 
comparison to the doubling of fuel taxes. Supporting this finding, Beresteanu 
and Li (2011) found that 20% of EEV sales in 2006 could be attributed to the 
federal income tax credit (Type A incentive). In yet another analysis of EEV 
sales in the U.S.A., this time using cross-sectional data between 2004-2009, 
Diamond (2009) found that, in general, monetary incentives have increased 
consumer demand. 
In contrast to all of these studies focusing on EEVs in the U.S.A., Riggieri 
(2011) found in her analysis of new EEV registrations between 2001 and 2005, 
that financial incentives (Types A, B and C incentives) had little-to-no effect 
on demand for EEVs. What did lead to an increase in the share of EEVs, 
however, was that of behavioural, usage-based benefits, such as exemptions 
from High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes (Type D incentive).  
Turning our focus to Sweden, an analysis of the national purchase rebate 
(Type A incentive) in this country using a Nested Logit model found that this 
incentive led to a 12% increase in EEV sales in 2008 - predominantly ethanol 
flexi-fuel and low CO2 petrol/diesel models (Lindfors and Roxland 2009). In 
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this paper, the authors also focus on data for Stockholm and find that the 
effect of an exemption from the congestion tax (Type D incentive) was at 
least twice as large as the rebate effect (Type A incentive) i.e. a 24% increase 
in sales during 2008. Similarly, in another analysis of monthly EEV 
registrations in Sweden, using both time series and cross-section OLS 
regressions, it was found that the exemption from the congestion tax 
increased EEV sales by 23% in 2008 (Pädam, Berglund and Örtegren 2009). A 
survey conducted in Stockholm during 2008 supported these findings, with 
EEV owners listing the congestion tax exemption as one of the most 
significant reasons to purchase an EEV (Birath and Pädam 2010). 
Finally, looking at a much broader study, Sierzchula et al. (2014) used 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyse  EEV sales data, combined 
with economic and demographic factors, at the national level for 30 countries 
in 2012. Through this analysis they found that financial incentives and the 
local presence of production facilities were significant and positively 
correlated with EEV adoption rates. One unfortunate limitation of this study 
was the fact that incentives were aggregated to a single parameter in the 
model, not allowing for comparison between different incentive types. Given 
data was collected at the national level, it also did not allow for comparison 
between regions, as is undertaken in my final publication – Article III. 
The overall conclusion from this body of literature is that, in general, 
government incentives do appear to increase EEV demand. The form of the 
incentive appears to be significant, however, there is some debate regarding 
the specific effects of different policy types and exactly which types of 
incentives have the greatest impacts. No doubt some of the variation in 
findings is due to analyses focusing on different regions, different time 
periods and the use of different data sources. 
Whilst a number of papers cite financial incentives (Types A, B and C) as 
having the greatest impact upon EEV demand (Beresteanu and Li 2011; 
Chandra, Gulati and Kandlikar 2010; Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011; Musti 
and Kockelman 2011) other studies have attributed other, usage-based 
government incentives (Type D) to increased EEV sales (Birath and Pädam 
2010; Lindfors and Roxland 2009; Pädam, Berglund and Örtegren 2009; 
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Riggieri 2011). One of the main ambitions of this thesis is to shed further light 
on the different impacts of different types of government incentives. 
2.5.3 Effect of government incentives on usage rates 
Understanding that government incentives have increased EEV demand is 
one thing, but how do policy-makers know whether such programs will 
indeed reduce emissions as intended? The second article in this thesis focuses 
exactly on this point – how EEVs have been used in comparison to 
conventional vehicles, and how a government incentive may have induced 
behavioural change.  
To the best of my knowledge there is only one existing study that comes 
close to analysing the effects of government incentive policies on EEV usage 
i.e. Annual Kilometres Travelled (AKT). Small (2012) analysed the effect of 
“fee-bates” on passenger vehicle usage and found that the policy produced 
minimal rebound effects in terms of AKT. 
Given this gap in the literature, it is not possible to provide an overview of 
how different types of incentive policies around the globe have affected EEV 
usage. As mentioned in Section 2.4, there is some evidence of minor rebound 
effects in regard to the adoption of fuel-efficient vehicles (Gillingham 2011; 
Small and Van Dender 2005; Greene 1992), however, exactly how much of 
these differences in usage can be attributed to government incentives is 
difficult to state.  
The lack of published studies focusing on this topic might be due to financial 
incentives (Types A, B and C) being far more predominant in regions around 
the world, compared with government incentives that would typically 
induce behavioural or usage changes (Type D). One of the motivations 
behind Article II of this thesis, was to help contribute towards filling this gap 
in the literature, and provide another case study to that of Small’s (2012) 
paper, for future comparisons. 
In this section of the thesis, due to the lack of EEV analysis, I have instead 
included an overview of the findings from a similar sector, that of Solar 
Photovoltaic (PV) panels.  
In a study of Solar PV consumers in San Diego and southern Orange County 
in California, U.S.A. between 2007 and 2010, McAllister (2012) found that, 
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consumers who received subsidised Solar PVs only increased energy 
consumption by 2 to 3% on average. In fact 64% of consumers reduced 
energy consumption by 12% to 15%, whilst 36% of consumers increased 
energy consumption by 16% to 20%. In a separate study of Solar PV owners 
living in the U.S.A. who received some form of government incentive, the 
rebound effect in terms of energy consumption was non-existent, with only 
high-income owners found to increase energy usage by approximately 5% on 
average (Rai 2011). 
Turning to a study closer to home, Havas et al. (2012) analysed the effect of 
the Alice Solar City (ASC) program on the energy consumption of Solar PV 
users. The ASC program, deployed in the central Australian city of Alice 
Springs, was one the country’s most significant investments in sustainable 
energy trials at the time. Again, in this study, they found no rebound effects 
to have occurred in terms of energy consumption. 
Of course it is difficult to draw precise parallel conclusions between the Solar 
PV industry, incentives for these products, and their counterparts in the EEV 
market, however, the overall conclusion from these studies, and those 
documented in Section 2.4, suggests that Gillingham et al. (2013) was right in 
suggesting that rebound effects are generally “overplayed”. It is one of the 
ambitions of this thesis to check whether this assertion also holds true in the 
case of EEVs. 
2.5.4 Effect of government incentives on product pricing 
Analysing the effect of government incentives on product prices is not a new 
topic, and is one that can be found to be of interest across many different 
markets. The consequences of such a mechanism existing are not only that 
the incentives’ benefit may not fully go to the consumer for which it was 
intended, but that it may also lead to other market distortions, which may 
further exacerbate the problem of what the incentive policy was trying to 
address. In the following section of this thesis, a few general examples of 
literature analysing this topic have been included, with evidence in both the 
affirmative and negative for such a mechanism existing.  
Kirwan (2009) analyses the effect of agricultural subsidies in the U.S.A., a 
policy that has been in place since 1973 in order to increase farmers’ incomes. 
This particular policy has been heavily scrutinised, with much speculation 
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around just how effective it has been in terms of delivering its intended 
benefits. These doubts in the policy’s efficacy largely are due to the fact that 
non-farmers own and rent out over half of all the farmland located in the 
U.S.A. As such, standard economic theory would predict that any incentives 
or benefits would be accrued entirely by those individuals who own the land 
- given they are able to adjust the rental rates to absorb any government 
funding. Contrary to these assertions, Kirwan (2009) finds that 75% of the 
policy’s benefit is captured by the farmers, whilst the other 25% is captured 
by landowners. 
Focusing on the previously mentioned solar PV market, de la Tour and 
Glachant (2013) analyse the effect of feed-in-tariffs for solar generated 
electricity on the demand for and prices of solar PV panels. Using weekly 
price data in Germany, France, Italy and Spain from 2005 to 2012, their 
analysis suggests that although prices have increased, these changes were 
largely due to a silicon shortage in 2009, rather than the tariff incentive.  
Similarly to de la Tour and Glachant (2013), Podolefsky (2013) analyses the 
effect of the solar investment tax credit (ITC) scheme in the U.S.A. between 
2007 and 2012. The ITC was initially setup as a demand side incentive in the 
form of a tax break worth 30% of the systems’ installed price. This was 
originally capped at $USD 2,000, but was later removed to be unlimited in 
2009. Conversely to the two prior studies, Podolefsky (2013) found that when 
comparing the prices of equivalent systems between residences that were 
and were not eligible for the ITC scheme, only 17% of the benefit of the 
incentive was passed through to the eligible consumers, whilst the other 83% 
was absorbed in the form of price increases by solar PV installers. 
Another relevant case study is that of the vehicle retirement scheme in Spain, 
known as Plan2000E, analysed by Jimenez, Perdiguero and García (2011). 
Plan2000E was initially introduced in order to create jobs by boosting the 
production of vehicles in the country - in particular, fuel-efficient vehicles. 
The scheme comprised of a 2,000 EUR subsidy, paid to consumers for 
scrapping their old, polluting vehicles, and was co-financed by the local 
vehicle manufacturers (1,000 EUR), national government (500 EUR) and an 
NGO (500 EUR). Interestingly, when they compared the changes in prices 
before and after the scheme was introduced, they found that after controlling 
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other factors, manufacturers increased their vehicle sale prices by 1,000 EUR 
– the exact same amount they provided to support the scheme initially, 
meaning that consumers only received 50% of the benefit - 1,000 EUR. Li, 
Linn and Spiller (2013) also evaluate a similar “cash-for-clunkers” scheme in 
the U.S.A., but instead only analyse the effect of this incentive program on 
consumer demand, not on vehicle prices.  
Busse, Silva-Risso and Zettelmeyer (2006) conducted an interesting study 
into the pass-through rates of automobile manufacturers’ promotional deals. 
They analysed sales data in California and compared the pass-through rates 
of direct customer promotions with that of dealer promotions – the latter 
being a rebate paid from the manufacturer to the dealer for every vehicle 
sold. They found that although consumers received about 70-90% of the 
value of the promotion on average when looking at direct customer 
promotions, on average only 30-40% of the value of the incentive was passed 
on for dealer promotions. One factor they believed contributed to this 
difference was that dealer promotions received much less advertising and 
were not well known, allowing the dealer to take more advantage of this 
subsidy as opposed to public promotions. This study is one example of how 
different incentives, depending upon their design and the mechanism by 
which they take place, can affect product prices differently. 
The final case study I have included in this section is - to the best of my 
knowledge - one of the only studies that has investigated the effect of an 
government incentive on EEV pricing. In this study, Sallee (2011) analysed a 
sample of 15% of the Toyota Prius transactional sales in the U.S.A. between 
2002 and 2007. Contrary to expectations under a standard, competitive tax 
incidence model, where capacity is strained, he found that government 
subsidies did not affect the price paid for a Toyota Prius during this period. 
The conclusion of this study is particularly interesting, given one would 
expect there to be at least some effect of government incentives on EEV 
prices. The author’s explanation for this discrepancy is his belief that Toyota 
purposefully did not absorb the value of the government subsidies, in order 
not to erode future demand for their vehicles.  
Although this may indeed be true, it appears more likely that this 
discrepancy is due to the nature of data analysed. During the period of 
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analysis, the government subsidy was originally worth $USD 2,000, which 
later increased to $USD 3,400 after 2005. Looking at the factory options 
during this period for the Toyota Prius, an individual could spend up to an 
additional $USD 6,400 (24% of the base model price). Given that the 
transactional data Sallee (2011) analysed only included the ‘actual’ vehicle 
sale price, but no details regarding what factory options were selected, it 
would be very difficult to distinguish changes in prices due to an absorption 
of the government subsidy, particularly given it was worth half the cost of all 
potential factory options for the vehicle at the time. This issue could be 
overcome by using dealer-listed vehicle prices, as was done in the analysis 
detailed in Article III. 
These case studies illustrate a range of different findings, across various 
markets, where the effects of incentives on product prices have been 
analysed. There is evidence to support both in favour of and against such a 
mechanism existing, suggesting that these effects are market and situation-
specific. It appears that the way in which an incentive affects the consumer, 
and the specific conditions attached to gaining the benefit, may also prove to 
be significant in terms of determining who ultimately benefits. 
The third article of this thesis uses a set of panel data, including 15 
metropolitan regions across the world, to understand whether government 
incentives have affected EEV prices in these regions, or not - as suggested by 
Sallee (2011). 
2.5.5 Effect of fuel price changes on EEV demand and pricing 
Although fuel price changes are separate from incentive policies, given the 
prevalence of this factor’s effects in the literature, and the presence of 
variables capturing fuel prices in the model used in Article III, a brief 
overview of the effects of fuel price changes on both EEV demand and 
pricing have been included here. It is particularly relevant to compare the 
effects of fuel prices changes with the effect of government incentives, as fuel 
taxation is seen as an alternative measure by which policy-makers can induce 
a shift towards more fuel-efficient vehicles. As mentioned previously, fuel 
taxation has also been cited as the single most powerful climate policy 
instrument that has been implemented to date (Sterner 2007). 
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In the previously mentioned study by Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) of 
vehicle sales in the U.S.A., they found compelling evidence to suggest that 
demand for EEVs rises as fuel prices increase. Beresteanu and Li (2011) also 
found that EEV sales in the U.S.A. would have been 37% lower in 2006 if 
petroleum prices had stayed at 1999 levels. This is in contrast to other 
studies, such as Riggieri (2011), who have suggested that fuel prices have not 
affected EEV demand – at least not to the same extent as government 
incentives. A survey of new EEV owners, conducted in Stockholm, Sweden, 
during 2008, found that fuel cost savings from EEV ownership had the 
greatest impact on EEV demand, equal to that of the incentive of being 
exempt from the city’s congestion tax (Birath and Pädam 2010). 
In terms of the effect of fuel price changes on EEV pricing, a few studies have 
indirectly addressed this issue. Langer and Miller (2009) found in their 
analysis of vehicle sales from four major automobile manufacturers in the 
U.S.A. between 2003 and 2006, that a US$ 1 increase in petrol price (per litre) 
would lead to a 10.7%1 increase in the price gap between least fuel efficient 
and most fuel efficient vehicles. In general, they also found that increased 
fuel prices led to lower vehicle prices, except for in the case of EEVs, such as 
the Toyota Prius.  
In a similar study, Busse, Knittel and Zettelmeyer (2009) analysed vehicle 
sales between 1999 and 2008 at 20% of U.S.A. automobile dealerships. In this 
study they found that a US$ 1 increase in petrol price (per litre) would lead 
to 9.7%2 decrease in the price of an average car, but would increase the price 
of a Toyota Prius by 17.2%3.  
Finally, Beresteanu and Li (2011) analysed vehicle sales from 22 metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSAs) in the U.S.A. between 1999 and 2006, and found that 
if the petrol price was still at 1999-levels, in 2006, the Toyota Prius would 
have been 7.0% cheaper. Taking into account this price difference, and 
converting to fuel price to per litre, this translates to a 24.8% increase in the 
price of a Toyota Prius due to a US$ 1 increase in the petroleum price. 
                                                
 
1 Reported as a 2.8% increase in price gap for a US$ 1 per gallon increase in petrol price. 
2 Reported as a 2.6% decrease in vehicle price for a US$ 1 per gallon increase in petrol price. 
3 Reported as a 4.5% increase in vehicle price for a US$ 1 per gallon increase in petrol price. 
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All three of these studies provide strong evidence to suggest that fuel price 
increases lead to an increase in EEV prices and that these price increases are 
largely due to a shift in demand towards more fuel-efficient vehicles to 
reduce exposure to the increased petrol prices.  
What is of particular interest, in light of these studies, is a comparative 
analysis of the effects of incentives on demand and price, relative to the effect 
of fuel price changes. This very issue is addressed in Article III of this thesis. 
2.6 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE AND IMPLICATIONS 
The literature review included in this thesis has documented a wide range of 
publications all uniquely relevant to the topic of this thesis – understanding 
the consequences of government incentives upon the demand, usage and 
pricing of energy efficient vehicles. The beginning of this chapter explores 
evidence of the consequences of transport emissions – environmental and 
social – and exposes just how critical it is that policy-makers enact programs 
that can curb emissions as soon as possible. This is particularly true within 
the transport sector, so that we can move towards a more sustainable society 
and minimise the known, damaging impacts of transport emissions.  
Such a transition, however, is not without its challenges. As discussed in 
Section 2.1, vehicles are expensive assets, and individuals own them for long 
periods of time, meaning that a complete transition to an energy efficient 
vehicle fleet will take a number of decades. Taking this into account, as well 
as the fact that the transport sector is such a high contributor to GHG 
emissions, policy-makers need to initiate programs as soon as possible to 
encourage the uptake of EEVs.  
Section 2.2 of the literature review contained a brief overview of the different 
types of EEVs considered in this thesis in order to provide the reader with a 
better understanding of the different technologies underpinning the vehicle 
types considered in each of the three included articles. 
Following this overview, Section 2.3 included a review of the body of 
existing literature that has examined consumer preferences and demand for 
EEVs. Although some authors have reported conflicting evidence in regards 
to some demographics’ factors, such as gender, generally it appears that the 
individuals with the greatest likelihood of adopting an EEV are generally 
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younger individuals who have higher environmental preferences and/or 
support an environmental party. It also appears that the vehicle 
characteristics that are most important to individuals, when considering 
whether to purchase an EEV or not, are the purchase cost, and performance 
factors such as driving range. It is within this field that the first literature gap 
has been identified. Although a large number of studies have examined 
consumer preferences for EEVs through stated preference surveys, there is a 
lack of analysis of revealed preference data. Article I of this thesis aims to 
contribute towards filling this gap by analysing the demand for EEVs in 
Stockholm, Sweden, using revealed preference data. 
Although energy-efficient products are generally considered to be 
“environmentally-friendly”, there are some opponents to this notion who 
claim that the adoption of energy-efficient products leads to rebound effects 
where consumers in fact consume more energy than they had previously - 
due to the increase in energy efficiency. Given the body of literature 
supporting the uptake of EEVs as a means of reducing transport emissions, it 
seemed pertinent to provide evidence to support the validity of this 
initiative. Unfortunately, however, this is another area of research where 
published studies are scarce. Section 2.4 detailed the only identified study to 
have examined the rebound effects of EEV adoption – and this study 
happens to claim that these rebound effects are negligible. In Article II of this 
thesis, again using revealed preference data, the usage of EEVs in Stockholm 
has been compared with conventional vehicles, in order to examine whether 
rebound effects are present, and if so, the extent to which these increases in 
usage have offset the intended emissions reductions. 
Finally, the main body of this chapter, Section 2.5, discussed literature 
detailing how different regions have encouraged an uptake in EEVs and the 
effects of these initiatives. This included detailing the different types of 
policies that governments can adopt in order to encourage a shift to more 
energy efficient vehicles. Although the main focus of this thesis is on 
government incentives, this section of the literature review does admit that 
the most successful regions, in terms of EEV uptake, have adopted multi-
faceted approaches, that have included not only “carrots” (government 
incentives), but also “sticks” (fuel taxation; manufacturer regulation) and 
“sermons”/”tambourines” (eco-marketing campaigns). 
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Specifically looking at government incentives, these policies have been 
categorised into four types based upon how and when they affect the 
consumer (Section 2.5.1). Using these categories, literature detailing the 
effects of these different types of incentives was then documented. These 
effects were split into demand (Section 2.5.2), usage (Section 2.5.3) and 
product pricing (Section 2.5.4). 
The effect of government incentives on EEV demand appears to vary greatly 
depending on the region in which it is applied, and the way in which it 
affects the consumer. Although there are again a number of conflicting 
findings in the literature, the overall consensus appears to be that 
government incentives do increase the demand for EEVs. Some researchers 
find that monetary incentives have the greatest effects (Types A, B and C), 
whilst others claim that it is the reverse, and in fact incentives that induce 
behavioural and usage changes have the greatest impact on EEV demand 
(Type D).  
In Article I, the effect of a usage-based benefit – an exemption from the 
congestion tax for EEVs (Type D) – on consumer demand is analysed using 
revealed preferences. Article III also details an analysis of revealed 
preference data, however, at an aggregate level, and examines how different 
types of incentives, categorised into the four aforementioned categories, have 
affected both marginal demand (annual sales) and aggregate demand (fleet 
penetration) in various metropolitan regions across the globe. Both of these 
articles contribute towards providing additional evidence, from other case 
studies, as to how different types of incentives have affected consumer 
demand for EEVs. 
Section 2.5.3 of the literature review continued, by examining literature 
detailing the effect of incentives on product usage. Again, this is another area 
lacking publications in terms of the EEV market, so examples from the solar 
PV market have instead been included. Similar to the findings of Section 2.4, 
it appears that rebound effects of these transitions do seem to have been 
“over-played” – as one author has put it – by their opponents, however, 
analysis of EEV usage is still required. The analysis detailed in Article II is 
designed in such a way that an attempt has been made to separate the 
rebound effects of increased fuel efficiency, from the rebound effects caused 
 48 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
due to the congestion tax exemption incentive. In this sense, this is one of the 
first articles to attempt to analyse the effect of a government incentive on the 
usage of EEVs. 
After analysing the effects of incentives on both demand and usage, it was 
important to review the effects of such programs upon product pricing. 
Again, although literature examining such effects in the EEV market is 
limited to only one study – which again happens to find no effect – there is 
evidence in other fields suggesting that incentives can increase product 
prices. This evidence was reviewed in Section 2.5.4 and frames part of the 
research design detailed in Article III. In this particular study, aggregate 
panel data across a number of global metropolitan regions has been used to 
not only understand the effect of incentive policies on product pricing, but 
also the interaction between product pricing and consumer demand. The 
aim, in doing so, was to shed further light on the “big picture” mechanisms 
at play in EEV markets where government incentives are or have been active 
– in contrast to the more detailed, case study-level analyses of Stockholm 
consumers undertaken in Articles I and II. 
Finally, the literature review of this thesis concludes in Section 2.5.5 with an 
analysis of the effects of fuel price changes on both EEV demand and pricing. 
Although this may at first seem odd given the focus of this thesis is upon 
government incentives, it was seen as pertinent to this study’s topic given 
fuel taxation is often cited as an alternative to “carrot” policies (incentives) in 
order to encourage the uptake of more fuel-efficient vehicles. Numerous 
studies have also examined fuel price effects, thus presenting the 
opportunity to compare these effects with those identified in this study. 
Again this is another field that appears to have some level of debate in terms 
of the exact mechanisms at play. Some researchers claim that incentives have 
a greater impact on demand than fuel price changes; however, others also 
state the opposite. What is clear is that fuel price increases appear to lead to 
increased pricing of EEVs, and in many cases decreased pricing of 
conventional vehicles. Article III of this thesis includes fuel price variables in 
order to analyse the effect of this factor on both EEV demand and pricing, 
with the ambition of comparing the magnitude of these effects, with the 
effect of government incentives.  
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Overall, this comprehensive literature review has provided a broad overview 
of the existing publications and factors pertinent to the thesis’s central focus 
of understanding the consequences of government incentives on EEV 
demand, usage and pricing. The findings of this review have been used to 
identify key gaps in the literature that require additional contributions, 
whilst informing the research design of the three independent analyses 
documented in the three articles included in this thesis. The following 
chapter of this thesis continues by detailing the conceptual overview of the 
methodological approach of this study, as well as the specific methods 
adopted in each of the three included articles.  
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The following chapter of this thesis has been included in order to equip the 
reader with a broader understanding of the methods adopted in each of the 
three included articles, as well as the motivations and background to each of 
these methods. This chapter has been written with the intention of being a 
reference guide for readers of the articles, with in-depth methods, formulas 
and modelling-specific content left within the articles themselves. Each of the 
articles involves the adoption of distinctly different methodological 
approaches, principally because each article has a different set of aims and 
research questions. As such, this chapter has been divided into three sections 
– one for each article. 
Before stepping through the methods adopted in each article, a conceptual 
overview of the research design of this thesis is first provided in Section 3.1. 
This conceptual overview steps through the aims and contributions of each 
article; the methods involved; factors considered; the principal modelling 
framework; and the research questions answered. 
Following on from this overview, three separate sections detail the design 
and methods undertaken in each of three articles. Methodological details 
have been provided within each of the articles, given each of these 
publications are stand-alone pieces, however, given the methodological 
details included in articles have been targeted specifically for the audience 
for which they have been written, in some cases, the articles lack additional 
background information required for understanding by a wider audience. 
These additional details are provided in this chapter and shed further light 
on the linkage between these three independent research pieces. 
3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW 
As mentioned above, given this thesis consists of three independent pieces of 
work, it is important to provide a conceptual overview of the overall research 
design in order to understand the linkage between the three articles and how 
each publication addressed the aims and research questions of this thesis. 
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Figure 8, overleaf, has been provided to give visual context to the overall 
connection between the three articles. As can be seen, the overall research 
design is made up of two sub-sections: individual owner-specific analyses of 
a case study region – Stockholm, Sweden (Articles I and II); and an aggregate 
“big picture” analysis of multiple metropolitan regions (Articles III).  
The division of this thesis into these two sub-sections was partially dictated 
by the structure of the Double PhD program, however, it was also structured 
in this manner in order to have the opportunity to investigate the effect of 
government incentives at both the micro – individual-specific level, as well 
as at the macro – aggregate level. Both forms of analysis came with their own 
challenges, but also presented their own unique opportunities in terms of 
what factors and phenomenon could be investigated. 
Beginning with Article I, the main purpose of this publication was to assess 
how a specific government incentive policy affected consumer demand for 
EEVs, using extremely detailed revealed preference data at the individual-
specific owner level. The details of this dataset are outlined in Section 3.2.1. 
As can be seen in the diagram for Article I in Figure 8, this study investigates 
the effect of a government incentive i.e. an exemption for EEVs from 
Stockholm’s congestion tax, on marginal demand. It also captures 
demographic preferences for EEVs, identifying those individuals with the 
highest demand/likelihood of purchasing such a vehicle. 
Through this analysis, both research questions 1 and 2 of this thesis are 
addressed, by detailing demographics details of individuals who actually 
purchased EEVs, and how demand in Stockholm was affected by the 
congestion tax exemption in 2008. Both of these findings - particularly given 
that the study is based on revealed preference data - are significant 
contributions to the field; shedding further light on the characteristics of 
individuals who have actually purchased an EEV; and how a usage-based 
benefit (incentive Type D) can affect market demand. 
Building on Article I, using a different sub-section of the same master dataset 
(see Section 3.3.1 for more information), the main purpose of Article II was to 
use detailed revealed preference data to investigate the behavioural effects of 
purchasing an EEV – do owners change their usage behaviour? Do Type D 
incentives lead to rebound effects? And overall, how does an uptake in EEVs 
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actually affect emissions? As shown in Figure 8, Article II involved building 
on the structure of Article I, using demographics to quantify the effect of EEV 
ownership and the congestion tax exemption on owner usage rates, and in 
turn, assess how these behavioural changes ultimately affected vehicle 
emissions.  
Complications within the dataset led to the use of Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) to compare the usage rates between demographically-similar vehicle 
owners. Further details pertaining to the specifics of this method are outlined 
in Section 3.3.2. Assessment of the effect of the congestion tax exemption on 
vehicle usage is also detailed in Section 3.3.3. 
Article II specifically attempts to answer research questions 3, 4 and 5 of this 
thesis, providing results to fill significant gaps in the literature that need to 
be addressed. This included: whether rebound effects exist in the EEV 
market; whether incentive policies contribute to these effects; and ultimately, 
what the overall effect of a transition in the vehicle fleet towards EEVs has on 
emissions? 
Articles I and II, as a combined pair, analyse the effects of a single 
government incentive on vehicle owners residing in a specific region. Both 
analyses involve the use of large datasets, at a fine level of detail, and as 
such, provide valuable insight into specific preferences and behaviours of 
vehicle owners at the individual level. These two articles, however, fail to 
capture the wider effects of different government incentives across the globe. 
This is precisely where Article III’s purpose is fulfilled. Although the detailed 
analyses of Stockholm provided interesting results and lessons for policy-
makers, given the overall ambition of this thesis is to provide an overview of 
the effects of different incentives – Article III was designed to investigate the 
“big picture” and analyse these effects over various regions and time periods 
- addressing research question 6. 
Additionally, Article III was designed to investigate another issue that 
appeared to be absent amongst the literature – whether incentive policies in 
the EEV market have affected the pricing of vehicles; and how EEV demand 
and pricing, in turn, interacts. It was recognised, as demonstrated by the
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 Figure 8 – Conceptual overview of the three articles included in this thesis (by publication) including Research Questions, Data and Methods 
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inclusion of research question 7 - that this interaction is largely ignored in 
current studies, and could provide valuable insight into the ‘true’ effects of 
different types of incentive policies on EEV demand. 
The final ambition of Article III, in answering research question 8, was to 
analyse how other demographic and economic factors, such as fuel price 
changes, have affected EEV demand and pricing, and to compare these 
effects with those of incentive policies. Fuel price changes were of particular 
interest given fuel taxation is seen as a viable alternative mechanism to 
encourage the uptake of EEVs. 
As shown in Figure 8, the structure of the model in Article III is rather 
complex, and includes many more factors than the models in Articles I and 
II; factors which are both exogenous (solid lines) and endogenous (dotted 
lines). Given the inclusion of endogenous variables, an instrumental variable 
approach known as Error-Component Three Stage Least Squares (EC3SLS) 
regression was undertaken in order to analyse the collected data. An 
overview of the data analysed in Article III is provided in Section 3.4.1, 
whilst further details regarding the background and selection of EC3SLS are 
included in Sections 3.4.2 to 3.4.4.  
Overall, Articles I, II and III each have their own unique and significant 
contributions to the literature in this field. These studies use revealed 
preference data of actual consumer choices to analyse the effects of 
government incentive policies, at both the micro- and macro- levels, on EEV 
consumer demand, owner usage behaviour and product pricing. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, readers can refer to each article 
for more detailed and targeted descriptions of the methods included, with 
this chapter purely acting as a reference guide for further details pertaining 
to the background, motivations and linkage between these methods, and in 
turn, between the three included articles. 
3.2  RESEARCH DESIGN OF ARTICLE I 
Article I involved the analysis of private individuals in Stockholm County, 
Sweden, who had purchased a new vehicle in 2008 (described further in 
Section 3.2.1). This data was used to construct three multinomial logit (MNL) 
models that were designed to capture both demographic preferences 
 56 Chapter 3: Research Design & Methods 
towards EEVs and the effect of a congestion tax exemption for EEVs on 
consumer demand. The background to discrete choice modelling is detailed 
in Section 3.2.2. These logit models were in turn used to simulate different 
policy scenarios in order to quantify the effect of the congestion tax 
exemption on consumer demand for EEVs. In order to check the accuracy of 
the findings of this simulation, a secondary analysis was performed, 
comparing the differences in marginal demand for EEVs, at the aggregate-
level, between 2004 and 2008 in Gothenburg, Sweden’s second largest city, 
with that of Stockholm. Further details pertaining to the policy analysis of 
Article I are included in Section 3.2.3. 
3.2.1  Summary of dataset 
The data analysed for this article was part of a much larger master database, 
supplied by Sweden’s Bureau of Statistics (SCB), consisting of all vehicle 
registrations in Sweden between 1998 and 2008, merged with demographic 
characteristics of each vehicle owner. The subset of this dataset, analysed in 
this paper, consisted only of new vehicle registrations for private owners 
who lived and worked within Stockholm County in 2008. The subset of data 
contained 28,502 unique observations, of which just under 19% were EEVs 
exempt from the congestion tax. This subset was created using STATA 10. 
Several vehicle characteristics were available for each observation including: 
make, model, manufacture year, fuel type, fuel consumption, emissions, 
weight, etc. In terms of owner demographics, each observation has details 
pertaining to: Age, Disposable Income, Gender, Home Location, Work 
Location, Number of Children, etc. 
A predominant number of exempt EEVs in this dataset were flexi-fuel 
ethanol vehicles, however, a number of hybrid-electric vehicle observations 
were also present. Non-exempt EEVs were also present in the dataset i.e. low 
CO2 petrol/diesel vehicles, and have been treated as separate alternatives to 
conventional vehicles in the model, for comparative purposes. For further 
descriptive analysis of the dataset, please refer to Article I in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis. 
3.2.2  Background to discrete choice models 
Discrete choice models have been developed over many years, primarily in 
the fields of economics and cognitive psychology (Train 2009; Motakis 2002). 
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Choice models involve analysing the discrete choices of a decision-maker 
who is choosing between a set of mutually exclusive alternatives 
(Washington, Karlaftis and Mannering 2011). The decision-maker can be a 
person, a household, a firm or any other decision-making unit, and the 
alternatives represent a set of competing products, services and/or actions. 
There are certain conditions that must be met in order for a model to fit 
within the discrete choice framework, and various additional conditions that 
apply depending upon the type of choice model that is chosen by the 
researcher. The basic conditions of the discrete choice framework are: 
1. The alternatives must be mutually exclusive i.e. choosing one 
option, means not choosing any other option; 
2. The choice set of alternatives must be exhaustive i.e. all possible 
alternatives/options must be included; and, 
3. The number of alternatives must be finite i.e. it is possible to 
count the number of alternatives in the choice set (Train 2009). 
A principle underpinning to a choice model is the assumption of utility-
maximising behaviour by the decision-maker, first described by Thurstone 
(1927). As such, these models are also known as Random Utility Models 
(RUMs) and are derived as follows: a decision-maker n, must choose 
between a set of J alternatives. The decision-maker receives a profit, gain or 
utility from choice j, which is labelled as Unj . This utility is not known to the 
modeller/researcher, but is known to – or at least perceived by - the 
decision-maker. In terms of Article I, it is assumed that when a consumer 
chooses to purchase a certain vehicle type, they are maximising an 
unobserved utility function - unknown to the researcher but known to the 
decision-maker (Train 2009).  
The utility function can be separated into two parts: the observable Vnj   and 
the unobservable εnj , where Unj =Vnj + εnj . In the case of Article I, the 
observable portion is made up of different owner-specific demographic 
factors. The precise form of each of the utility functions for each alternative 
in the choice set is specified by the researcher, and is often dictated by the 
factors available in the dataset under analysis.  
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The utility functions are subsequently used in a logit model to estimate the 
probabilities, amongst the sampled decision-makers, of choosing each 
alternative in the choice set. For details regarding the logit model 
specifications used in Article I, please refer to Chapter 4.  
Estimating a logit model returns ! coefficients for each variable specified. 
These parameters can then be analysed and interpreted in order to determine 
the characteristics and attributes most important/belonging to individuals 
who made certain choices – in the case of this study – the demographics of 
individuals who chose to purchase an EEV. For more information regarding 
Discrete Choice Modelling techniques, please refer to two excellent textbooks 
that have had a great influence on the modelling techniques used in this 
thesis, that of Train (2009) and Washington, Karlaftis and Mannering (2011).  
The estimation of the logit models included in Article I was first carried out 
in Biogeme (Bierlaire 2003), and then verified in STATA 10 using 
bootstrapping (1000 repetitions) to provide 95% confidence intervals for the 
reported results. 
3.2.3 Assessing the effect of a congestion tax exemption on 
consumer demand 
Although characteristics of individuals purchasing EEVs could be identified 
from the estimated models in Article I, the effect of the congestion tax 
exemption was less clear. In order to quantify the effect of this policy, certain 
assumptions needed to be made about how the incentive affected different 
individuals in the data sample. Based on the characteristics available in the 
dataset analysed, the vehicle owners with the highest likelihood of being 
affected by the congestion tax, and in turn, the exemption from this policy, 
logically were those individuals commuting across the cordon-pricing 
boundary for work.  
Although other vehicle owners could have also been affected by the tax 
exemption for trips other than commuting, such as for shopping, the only 
group of owners definitively affected by the policy, that could be identified 
from this dataset, were the commuters crossing the cordon boundary.  
To assess the policy effect on vehicles taking other trips across the cordon 
boundary would require the use of cordon crossing data, however, this was 
not available at the time of publication. Recently though, such a dataset has 
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in fact been acquired. This new dataset will be analysed and compared with 
the findings of Article I, in a future research effort as part of the reciprocal 
PhD Thesis written for KTH, as part of the Double PhD program. 
In order to isolate the policy effect on demand, the analysis required a 
separation of vehicle owners into the “treated” i.e. those crossing the cordon 
boundary, versus the “non-treated.” In order to separate individuals into 
these two categorises, whilst taking into account the direction of travel (given 
home location could have a significant effect on consumer preferences) the 
owner sample was split into four groups based on their home and work 
locations. These four groups were: 
A. Owners living and working within the cordon; 
B. Owners living within but working outside the cordon 
(commute across the cordon); 
C. Owners living outside but working within the cordon 
(commute across the cordon); and, 
D. Owners living and working outside the cordon. 
Two variables were included in the logit models in order to allow for this 
grouping: 
• Living within the cordon boundary (or not); and, 
• Commuting across the cordon (home-work trips). 
Based on the inclusion of these variables, it could be assumed that the 
estimated coefficient for “commuting across the cordon boundary” – hereby 
referred to as the CAB variable – captured the utility benefit/disbenefit of the 
congestion tax, and the related exemption for EEVs. On the basis of this 
assumption, the base policy scenario (actual situation) of the congestion tax 
and exemption being in place, was compared with a simulated policy 
scenario, where the congestion tax (and associated exemption) were removed 
i.e. CAB coefficient set to equal zero. The differences in choice probabilities of 
alternatives between the two scenarios were then compared, with changes in 
consumer demand attributed to the effect of the congestion tax exemption, 
and the associated exemption for EEVs. 
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3.2.4  Secondary analysis of policy effect on consumer demand 
As noted in Article I, it is possible that the CAB variable in the logit model 
captured other geographic effects, and represented an inflated policy effect. 
In order to test this counter-hypothesis, a secondary analysis was also 
undertaken in Article I. This secondary analysis involved comparing 
aggregate demand for EEVs in Stockholm with Sweden’s second largest city 
– Gothenburg – between 2004 and 2008. Since Gothenburg did not have a 
congestion-pricing scheme at the time, it was assumed that this city acted as 
a “placebo”, with any differences in demand between the two cities 
attributed to the introduction of the congestion tax, and the related 
exemption for EEVs. These results were ultimately used to check the results 
of the principal analysis. For more details regarding the specific method 
undertaken for the secondary analysis, please refer to Article I in Chapter 4 
of this thesis. 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN OF ARTICLE II 
It is rather surprising, given the number of publications focussing on EEVs, 
to dsiscover the sheer lack of research into the effects of encouraging an 
uptake of these vehicles on owner usage rates and behavioural changes. 
Given this gap in the literature, and the overall premise of this thesis being to 
provide policy-makers with greater insight into the consequences of 
encouraging an uptake in EEVs – and, in turn, how best to do so – it was of 
equal importance to ensure that such an effort (encouraging uptake of EEVs) 
would be a step in the right direction towards a more sustainable transport 
system. As such, Article II focuses on analysing the usage rates of EEV 
owners (and other vehicle owners) in Stockholm County during 2008. 
Undertaking such an analysis was not without its challenges. Given that in 
2008 EEVs were relatively new to the mass market in Sweden, information 
pertaining to actual EEV usage rates was scarce. Due to data collection issues 
by the national motor authority, it was also not possible to compare 
individual owners’ usage rates before and after purchasing an EEV. 
Referring back to Figure 8, although the model design for Article II appears 
to be a logical sequel in addition to the model used in Article I, due to the 
collection issue referred to above, usage rates of the new vehicle owners 
included in the dataset of Article I could not be used in Article II’s analysis. 
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As such, an alternative method was developed, based on a different subset of 
vehicle owners who had reported annual usage rates i.e. Annual Kilometres 
Travelled (AKT), in 2008. 
The subset of data for Article II consisted of a substantial sample of EEV 
owners (approx. 1000 vehicles) in parallel to a large sample of conventional 
vehicle owners (approx. 90,000 vehicles). Given the large number of 
observations available in this dataset, a method was designed to compare 
usage rates between vehicle owners in order to quantify any rebound effects 
from transition to EEVs and the implementation of the congestion tax 
exemption for EEVs. An overview of the dataset used in Article II is 
described in Section 3.3.1.  
The comparison of usage rates between vehicle owners was not 
straightforward. One of the principle concerns of comparing between EEV 
and conventional vehicle owners was whether there would be systematic 
differences between the samples i.e. self-selection effects, which could lead to 
systematic differences in vehicle usage. As such, the method of propensity 
score matching (PSM) was adopted in order to allow for comparison of the 
usage rates between essentially “demographically-identical” owners.  
Of course, the matching can only control for the demographic or vehicle 
characteristics that are included in the model. As such, some differences in 
usage rates may still be attributed to other factors not included in the PSM 
procedure, such as political preferences. In saying this, given the number of 
potentially confounding factors included in the PSM procedures – all of 
which have been cited by others, such as Golob et al. (1990; 1996; 1989), as 
significant factors in determining vehicle usage (see Section 2.4 of this thesis) 
– there was a high degree of confidence that any differences in usage rates, 
after using PSM, could largely be attributed to the treatment factors applied 
in each matching procedure.  
The two treatments employed in this study were that of: EEV ownership 
(EEV owners compared with non-EEV owners) and commuting across the 
cordon boundary (owners crossing cordon compared with those that did 
not). The basis for these treatments is explained further below. Further 
details pertaining to the specifics of this method are detailed in Section 3.3.2. 
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Separate to the typical demographic characteristics that could affect usage 
rates, in the case of Stockholm, there were three predominant factors that 
were hypothesised to have an effect on vehicle owner behaviour: 
- EEV Ownership (Treatment 1): owning an EEV meant fuel cost per 
kilometre was reduced, in addition to emissions reduction, which 
may have led to increased usage (Jevons Paradox); 
- Commuting across the congestion pricing cordon (Treatment 2): 
individuals crossing the boundary were not only affected by the 
congestion tax, but likely also had different usage needs; and, 
- The Congestion Tax Exemption for EEVs: a policy that led to a 
reduction in the operating costs of commute trips and thus may 
have induced further usage. 
The difficulty with these three factors was that whilst the first two could be 
specified as treatments in the PSM procedure, the congestion tax exemption 
applied to EEV owners crossing the cordon boundary, and it was not 
immediately apparent whether a better match would be achieved by 
comparing the usage rates of these owners with: A.) EEV owners not 
crossing the cordon, or B.) non-EEV owners crossing the cordon boundary. 
With this in mind, three separate methodological approaches were adopted 
in order to estimate the effects of these different factors: 
1.) Compare the annual usage rates of demographically-similar 
vehicle owners with the main difference being whether they own 
an EEV or not (Treatment 1);  
2.) Compare the annual usage rates of demographically-similar 
vehicle owners with the main difference being whether they 
commute across the cordon boundary or not (Treatment 2); and, 
3.) Compare vehicle owner usage differences, using a combination 
of the results from Treatments 1 and 2, in addition to a 
comparison between those owners affected by the congestion tax 
exemption, crossing the boundary and EEV ownership (EEV 
owners commuting across the cordon boundary) and those that 
are not (non-EEV owners not commuting across the cordon 
boundary). 
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More information pertaining to the details behind each of these three 
approaches is provided in Section 3.3.3. The results from Approach 3 were 
subsequently used to calculate the difference in emissions due to the 
transition to EEVs, and any offsets due to the specified rebound effects. The 
methods behind these calculations are described in Article II – see Chapter 5. 
3.3.1 Summary of dataset 
As mentioned previously, in an ideal world, the logical extension to Article I 
would have been to use the same dataset in Article II and analyse vehicle 
usage rates of new EEV owners in Stockholm during 2008 – compared with 
the usage rates in their previously owned vehicles. This was not possible, 
however, as the national motor authority in Sweden does not mandate the 
collection of annual vehicle usage data for the first few years of new vehicle 
ownership. As such, the vast majority of new vehicles, included in the 
dataset analysed in Article I, did not have real annual usage figures. 
In order to overcome this limitation, an alternative method was proposed, by 
which the usage rates of demographically-similar vehicle owners in 
Stockholm, would be compared. Although not as accurate as analysing panel 
data, such a method allowed for a robust comparison between usage rates, 
whilst controlling for a number of potentially confounding factors. 
To carry out this analysis, the dataset in Article II was reconfigured to 
include all owners living and working in Stockholm County in 2008, who 
owned a vehicle that was manufactured in the year 2000 or later, and who 
had reported actual annual usage rates. This resulted in a dataset with just 
over 90,000 observations; approximately 1% of which were EEVs exempt 
from the congestion tax. Summary statistics of this dataset have been 
detailed in Article II – see Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
3.3.2  Analysing vehicle usage and controlling for self-selection 
using propensity score matching 
Propensity score matching is a method through which the differences in 
behaviour between different groups of individuals, defined by a treatment 
attribute, can be compared - controlling for potentially confounding factors 
that could also affect individual behaviour. In terms of Article II, this process 
involved comparing the annual kilometres travelled (AKT) of different 
groups of vehicle owners; with the treatment factors being EEV ownership 
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and commuting across the cordon boundary. The result of the PSM 
procedures is the calculation of the Average Effect of the Treatment on the 
Treated (ATET); in other words, the effect of the treatment or policy on the 
group to which it applies. 
 A much simpler approach to comparing behaviour between two groups 
would be to simply calculate the difference in mean behaviour between the 
groups. One would expect, however, that some differences in demographics 
between treatment groups could influence any differences in behaviour and, 
by simply comparing the means of each group, the difference in behaviour 
could not be solely attributed to the treatment. By adopting PSM, these 
potential self-selection effects and confounding factors can be controlled for, 
by comparing each treated observation with demographically-similar “non-
treated” observations. 
In doing so, in Article II, this process meant that vehicle owners being 
compared were of similar age, number of children, income, gender, home 
location, vehicle size (proxied by weight), etc., with the only specified 
difference being whether they owned an EEV or not (Treatment 1); or 
commuted across the cordon boundary or not (Treatment 2). As mentioned 
previously, PSM can only control for the demographics/characteristics that 
are supplied and that are available in the dataset, therefore, some other 
factors may still influence differences in usage rates, however, this method at 
least minimises the number of potential confounding factors.  
Propensity score matching is a relatively common method that has been 
employed in a wide range of studies, in many different fields. In terms of 
transport research, one study that adopted PSM is that of Cao, Xu and Fan 
(2010), in which they examined the effects of home location upon annual 
distances driven. By controlling for demographic differences, this study was 
able to determine that house location significantly affects driving behaviour.  
This is just one simple example of how PSM has been used in the transport 
sector to identify factors influencing vehicle usage.  
PSM was specifically adopted in Article II to:  
- Calculate differences in usage rates of EEV owners, compared with 
demographically-similar conventional vehicle owners, to 
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understand whether this transition had resulted in any rebound 
effects i.e. Jevons Paradox (see Figure 7, Section 2.4); 
- Calculate the difference in usage rates of congestion tax-exempt 
EEV owners to understand whether this policy induced any 
specific rebound effects; and, 
- Use these differences in usage rates to calculate the change in 
emissions, and by how much these emissions reductions were 
offset due to the estimated rebound effects.  
The specification of the propensity score, used for this analysis, as well as the 
subsequent matching technique selected, is described in greater detail in 
Article II.  
The process of developing the propensity score and subsequently matching 
based on this score, was carried out using STATA 10 and the two functions, 
“pscore.ado” and “attk.ado”, supplied by Becker and Ichino (2002). These 
functions were selected due to ease of implementation, and for consistency in 
results. The outputs of these functions were also verified with the use of 
“psmatch2.ado”, a similar function used for matching, which was supplied 
by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).  
3.3.3  Assessing the effect of EEV ownership, crossing the cordon 
boundary and the congestion tax exemption for EEVs on 
vehicle owner usage rates 
In order to quantify the effect of EEV ownership; crossing the cordon 
boundary; and the congestion tax exemption for EEVs, on vehicle usage, the 
sample of vehicle owners analysed in this study needed to be further divided 
into groups that were (and were not) affected by each of these factors. This is 
similar to the process undertaken in Article I in order to isolate the effect of 
the congestion tax exemption on consumer demand.  
Using the method of PSM, there were three possible avenues by which 
the sample of vehicles owners could be separated into affected/unaffected 
groups. These three approaches were required, given the three factors that 
could affect vehicle usage did not apply to mutually exclusive groups. This 
was particularly true in terms of the congestion tax exemption that affected 
individuals who owned an EEV and commuted across the cordon boundary.  
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The first approach, similar to Article I, involved splitting owners into four 
groups based on their home and work location: 
A. Owners living and working within the cordon; 
B. Owners living within but working outside the cordon 
(commute across the cordon); 
C. Owners living outside but working within the cordon 
(commute across the cordon); and, 
D. Owners living and working outside the cordon. 
Using the treatment of EEV ownership (Treatment 1), the ‘rebound 
effect’ of owning an EEV on annual usage was calculated separately for each 
of these four groups. This meant that the result – Average Effect of the 
Treatment on the Treated (ATET) – represented how much further/less EEV 
owner’s drove, compared with conventional vehicle owners. ATETs could 
then be compared between Groups B and A, and Groups C and D, with the 
only difference between each of these pairs being commuting across the 
boundary (or not). As such, any differences in annual usage (comparing 
ATETs) could be attributed to the effect of the congestion tax. 
The limitation of this first approach was that it relied on the assumption 
that the treatment of EEV ownership affected EEV owners crossing/not 
crossing the cordon. This, however, may not have necessarily been the case, 
particularly when comparing between individuals who live and work in the 
city – Group A (possibly rarely using a vehicle) – and those who also live in 
the city but work outside the cordon – Group B. As such, a second approach 
was also undertaken. This involved respecifying propensity scores based on 
an individual’s likelihood of commuting across the boundary (Treatment 2). 
Similar to Treatment 1, the sample of vehicle owners were divided into the 
following four groups (E, F, G and H) for comparative purposes: 
E. EEV owners living inside the cordon; 
F. Conventional vehicle owners living inside the cordon; 
G. EEV owners living outside the cordon; and, 
H. Conventional vehicle owners living outside the cordon. 
This time, the ATETs obtained for each of the four groups, after PSM, 
represented how much further vehicle owners commuting across the cordon 
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boundary travelled, compared with owners not crossing the boundary, 
controlling for demographic differences. In turn, the calculated ATETs could 
be used to compare between EEV and conventional vehicle boundary 
crossing commuters (Group E versus Group F; Group G versus Group H) to 
obtain an estimate of the effect of the congestion tax exemption on the usage 
of EEV owners who commuted across the cordon boundary. 
Again, however, the weakness in this second approach was that it relied on 
the assumption that the treatment of crossing the cordon boundary affected 
both EEV and non-EEV owners; however, this again may not have been the 
case in reality. As such, a third and final approach was adopted. 
The third approach to quantifying the effects of the three specified factors 
involved combining the results from both Treatments 1 and 2. Additionally, 
PSM was also used to compare usage rates between the two most different 
vehicle owner categories in the sample i.e. EEV owners crossing the cordon 
boundary versus non-EEV owners not crossing the cordon boundary. In 
doing so, the differentiation in factors affecting different groups meant that 
that each effect could be isolated. Specifically: 
- Usage rates of EEV owners crossing the boundary compared with 
conventional vehicle owners crossing the boundary (Treatment 1) 
– the differences being both EEV ownership and the effect of the 
congestion tax exemption; 
- Usage rates of EEV owners crossing the boundary compared with 
EEV owners not crossing the boundary (Treatment 2) – the 
differences being both crossing the cordon boundary and the effect 
of the congestion tax exemption; and, 
- Usage rates of EEV owners crossing the boundary compared with 
conventional vehicle owners not crossing the boundary – the 
differences being EEV ownership, crossing the cordon boundary 
and the effect of the congestion tax exemption. 
As such, comparing between the three ATETs, each of the three factors could 
be isolated in terms of their effect on EEV owners commuting across the 
cordon boundary. In turn, the effects of the first two factors could also be 
calculated for other EEV and conventional vehicle owners. This analysis 
sheds further light on the potential rebound effects of incentivising EEVs. 
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Please refer to Article II in Chapter 5 of this thesis for more details regarding 
this analysis. 
3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN OF ARTICLE III 
The final article included in this thesis, Article III, involves the use of 
methods and data that are quite different from Articles I and II. Whilst the 
previous two studies focused on the specific case study of Stockholm, Article 
III involves the analysis of a much broader set of panel data across a number 
of regions around the globe. The specifics of this dataset, as well as some 
descriptive statistics, have been provided in Section 3.4.1. 
The main focus of the first two articles was to investigate policy effects in one 
region at the individual-specific level. Whilst both studies provided valuable 
insight into consumer demand and vehicle usage effects, they did not 
investigate the effects of different types of government incentives on 
consumer demand; and also look at the bigger picture of how the EEV 
marketplace responds to incentive policies – particularly in terms of price 
and demand interactions. These topics of interest are also lacking in the 
current literature, and as such, Article III aims to fill this gap, taking the place 
of the capstone study of this thesis. It provides a well-rounded conclusion to 
this thesis’s investigation into the effects of different types of government 
incentives on the EEV marketplace, with findings relevant to both countries 
with under-developed EEV markets, like Australia; and for more advanced 
regions – such as Sweden and the U.S.A. 
In terms of analysing different types of incentive policies, Article III 
aggregates policies into four categories: 
Type A: One-off subsidies or credits against purchase price         
(cash rebates, income tax credits); 
Type B: Purchase cost reductions   
(reduced/exempt from sales tax, import duty, registration tax); 
Type C: Running cost reductions  
(reduced/exempt annual vehicle tax, emissions tax); and, 
Type D: Usage-based benefits  
(exemption from road tolls; congestion charges; parking fees). 
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Through the inclusion of these four categories, incentive types previously not 
considered in Articles I and II, were evaluated as part of the analysis in 
Article III. This also allowed for a comparison between the estimated effect 
on consumer demand found for the Type D incentive (congestion tax 
exemption) in Article I and the effect of this type of incentive in Article III. 
As shown previously in Figure 8, the conceptual model for Article III is 
rather complex in comparison to models shown for Articles I and II. One of 
the benefits of having multiple regions, over a number of years, was that 
different effects and factors could be considered. This dataset was specifically 
constructed in order to suit the planned model structure – a system of three 
equations. 
The three dependent variables of the system of equations were: Marginal 
Demand (annual sales), Aggregate Demand (fleet penetration) and EEV Price 
Premium. The third parameter was constructed specifically to capture the 
effects of different factors, including policies, on the normalised price 
difference between a common EEV – the Toyota Prius – and its comparable 
conventional vehicle equivalent – the Toyota Corolla. The exact calculation of 
this variable is shown below: 
 
Figure 8 also highlights the inclusion of both exogenous (solid lines) 
and endogenous (dotted lines) variables in the model. These variables were 
included through a system of three equations, with some dependent 
variables (marginal demand and price premium) input as endogenous 
variables in other equations.  
Endogeneity is a very real effect that can be active in the market place, and to 
ignore an interaction between price and demand can lead to biased and 
erroneous parameter estimates, and in turn, incorrect conclusions. 
Surprisingly, however, particularly in terms of the EEV market, there are no 
known studies investigating the potential for endogeneity between price and 
demand in conjunction with the presence of different government incentives. 
EEV Price Premium = A − B( )B
where:
A = Dealer-listed Price of Toyota Prius
B = Dealer-listed Price of Toyota Corolla
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Article III utilises a unique panel dataset to investigate these issues and to 
contribute towards filling this gap in the current literature. 
Given the restrictions on the length of papers submitted in the target journal 
of this article, some information, including various descriptive statistics and 
background to method, did not fit within the final manuscript. As such, these 
items have also been placed in this section of the thesis. Please use this 
section as a reference guide when reading Article III in Chapter 6. 
3.4.1 Summary of dataset 
The dataset analysed in Article III was collected over the course of 18 
months, with the assistance of numerous helpful individuals and agencies, in 
several regions across the globe. Unfortunately, data pertaining to EEV sales 
at the regional level is rare in many countries and/or can only be acquired 
for a high fee. As such, the dataset included in Article III represents the best 
effort to collect as much freely available data for as many regions as possible.  
Although the current dataset consists of observations for 22 regions, over 
varying time periods between 2007 and 2013, given the requirements of the 
modelling technique chosen for this study, a balanced panel dataset was 
required. This meant that the final dataset analysed was reduced to 15 
metropolitan regions around the globe, over a 5-year period between 2008 
and 2012. A summary of the average variable values across the 15 regions for 
each year can be seen in Table 3.  
As expected, Gross National Income per capita, Disposable Income per capita 
and Population Density all increased, year-to-year, within the time period 
analysed. The average inflation rate, in contrast, fluctuated; whilst the 
average price of petroleum per litre generally increased year-to-year.  
In order to provide some greater insight into some of the trends observed in 
this dataset, a number of critical values have been extracted from Table 3 and 
plotted in Figure 9. As can be seen in this figure, both marginal demand 
(MD) and aggregate demand (AD) for EEVs has gradually increased, on 
average, year-to-year. This is in contrast to the EEV Price Premium, which 
appears to have fluctuated significantly during this time period.  
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Table 3 – Summary statistics for average variable values over the 15 metropolitan regions 
for each year between 2008 and 2012. 
Summary of variable averages across 
regions for each year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Gross National Income Per Capita (US$) 47,198 44,160 46,757 49,658 52,236 
Disposable Income Per Capita  
(US$) 53,082 52,563 54,764 56,662 57,023 
Population Density  
(10,000 persons/square kilometre) 0.665 0.682 0.693 0.706 0.715 
Inflation (%) 3.557 0.661 1.736 2.631 1.827 
Average Yearly Petroleum Cost 
(US$/litre) 1.483 1.645 1.848 1.789 2.082 
Endogenous Variables 
Marginal Demand  
(% EEV Sales Annually) 1.110 1.080 1.265 1.998 2.876 
Aggregate Demand  
(% EEV in Fleet) 0.352 0.408 0.487 0.595 0.794 
Price Premium  
(Normalised Price Difference of         
Toyota Prius: Toyota Corolla) 
135.7 138.4 145.9 139.9 136.4 
Incentive Policies 
Policy Type A (%) 46.67 46.67 40.00 46.66 46.66 
Policy Type B (%) 33.33 30.00 6.00 6.00 26.66 
Policy Type C (%) 40.00 40.00 66.67 66.66 60.00 
Policy Type D (%) 26.67 33.33 80.00 80.00 80.00 
At first glance, it is hard to distinguish from this figure as to whether 
different incentives have affected EEV demand and pricing. It appears that 
Policy Types C and D may be associated with higher MD and higher AD. 
Type B incentives may be associated with lower Price Premiums. The effect 
of Policy Type A incentives on either demand or pricing is unclear. 
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Figure 9 – Summary of average trends for dataset of 15 metropolitan regions across the 
globe between 2008 and 2012. 
Figure 9 demonstrates the complexity of trying to investigate the effects of 
different incentives on both EEV demand and pricing. In order to properly 
identify these effects, the panel structure of the dataset needed to be fully 
exploited. The following section of this chapter provides further background 
to the issues behind analysing panel data and how it should be treated. This 
is followed by a description of methods used to analyse systems of equations, 
such as the model detailed in Article III, where endogenous variables are 
present. Finally, this background information ties into the motivation for 
selecting Error-Component Three-Stage Least Squares (EC3SLS) regression 
for this study, and the theory behind this technique. 
3.4.2 Panel data 
Traditionally, it has been the case that econometric and statistical models 
have been estimated using time-series or cross-sectional data. It is 
increasingly so, however, that data based on cross-sections of individuals, 
firm or other observational units, observed over a period of time, are 
becoming widely available in both the developed and in developing 
countries (Baltagi 2008; Hsiao 2003; Washington, Karlaftis and Mannering 
2011). This type of data is otherwise known as panel or pooled data. Such 
data can be extremely useful, particularly when researchers wish to construct 
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realistic behavioural models that take into account both cross-sectional 
(individual) and time effects.  
Despite its various advantages, panel data does raise various potential issues 
that need to be considered. Since panel data are not simulations or controlled 
experiments but are actual observations of complicated processes that have 
taken place in the real world, there are infinite potential factors that could 
affect each individual’s behaviour. Since it is not feasible or desirable to 
attempt to include all of these factors, the researcher must ensure they 
attempt to capture at least the essential forces that could be affecting 
behaviour. If critical factors are left out of the model, this could lead to 
heterogeneity bias and, in turn, incorrect conclusions.  
Selectivity bias is another issue arising in panel data that can also drastically 
affect estimation results. Such bias can occur when the sample of individuals 
captured in the panel data are not reflective of the population, and thus do 
not exhibit the full spectrum of behaviour carried out in the real world. The 
final two panel data modelling issues to consider are those of serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity.  
Serial correlation can occur when the error terms associated with 
observations from one time period are dependent upon the error terms from 
previous time periods. Heteroscedasticity occurs when the variance of error 
terms are not constant across observations. These issues do not lead to bias in 
the estimation results, however, they do affect their efficiency – standard 
errors may be smaller than the true standard errors and thus some terms 
may appear statistically significant, when in fact they are not. When 
modelling panel data it is important to consider all of these potential issues 
in order to take full advantage of the richness that such data provides. 
The most common models used to analyse panel data are one-way (across 
individuals or time) and two-way (across both individuals and time) error 
component models, otherwise known as variable-intercept models. Such 
models assume that omitted variables individually have a negligible effect, 
but collectively are significant, and thus include a random variable that is 
independent of the included exogenous variables.  
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A regression of panel data can be written as: 
Yit =α + βXit + uit ,  i = 1,...,n;  t = 1,...,T ,  
where i   refers to the individuals or cross-sectional units, t  refers to the time 
periods, α  is a scalar, β  is a K ×1  vector, and Xit  represents the ith  
observation of the Kth  independent variable. A one-way error component 
model would most commonly have an error term specified as: 
 uit = µi +υit  
 
where µi  represents the unobserved cross-sectional specific effects, whilst υit  
represents random effects. For a two-way error component model, the error 
components would be specified as: 
uit = µi + λt +υit ,  i = 1,...,n;  t = 1,...,T ,  
where µi   represents the unobserved cross-sectional specific effects as before, 
λt  represents the unobservable time-specific effects, whilst υit  represents 
random effects. The critical difference between the two being that the latter 
takes into account specific effects in both the dimension of across time-
periods and across individual cross-sectional units. 
In both cases, µi  and λt  can be assumed to be either fixed or random effects. 
How to select between fixed and random effects is a complex issue, and one 
that still is heavily debated depending on the specific characteristics of the 
panel data under analysis. In general, when analysing a specific closed and 
reasonably small set of firms or individuals, fixed errors are generally 
chosen, however, if randomly drawing N individuals from a large 
population – randomly meaning that such a sample is representative of the 
population – then the number of fixed parameters required would be too 
great and, as such, random effects are instead generally specified. This 
distinction, however, is not always clear.  
It is important to note that random effects cannot be employed if it is 
suspected that correlation exists between the error term and the explanatory 
variables, X . In order to test for this, the Hausman test can be used, where 
the null hypothesis of the test is that the error terms are not correlated with 
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X (Hsiao 2003). As more recent publications have shown, however, the 
results of this test should be carefully examined as it may not always be 
sufficient when determining whether to use random or fixed effects – see 
Clark and Linzer (2015). 
Given Article III involves the analysis of 15 metropolitan regions over a 5 
year time period, with multiple policies introduced and phased out during 
this period, the number of dummy variables required in a fixed effect model 
would lead to a large loss of degrees of freedom. The dataset for this study 
also includes a number of different cross-sectional units that are 
representative in the incentive policies they have, of the greater population of 
cities that are encouraging an uptake in EEVs. For these reasons, random 
error components were assumed during modelling for Article III. 
In general, a two-way error component model with random effects would be 
seen as a reasonable model to specify in order to analyse the dataset for this 
study. However, such a model and the consistency of its estimates are based 
upon the assumption of a single-equation model. When trying to analyse an 
interrelated system of equations, as is the case with Article III, it can be the 
case that a dependent variable in one equation is an independent variable in 
another equation – leading to potential endogeneity. In order to analyse such 
systems, other methods are required such as two-stage (2SLS) and three-
stage least squares (3SLS) regression.  
For more information on analysing single-equation panel data models, as 
well as testing for fixed and random effects, please refer to Baltagi (2008), 
Hsiao (2003) and Washington, Karlaftis and Mannering (2011). 
3.4.3 Interrelated systems of equations with endogeneity 
Particularly within the transport sector, many behavioural situations are best 
modelled using a system of interrelated equations. Take, for example, a 
multivehicle household where the researcher wants to understand how far 
an individual travels in their car. In this situation, endogeneity is present in 
the sense that how one individual utilises their car will be dependent upon 
how other individuals in the household utilize their cars. Similarly when 
analysing vehicle speeds in adjacent lanes, the dependent variable of one 
equation (e.g. vehicle speed right-land) is an independent variable in another 
equation (i.e. vehicle speed left-lane). Such endogeneity is a serious problem 
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in econometrics, and one that is commonly ignored in the analysis of 
transportation data (Washington, Karlaftis and Mannering 2011). Ignoring 
such effects can significantly affect model estimates and lead to erroneous 
conclusions. For an example of a study in the transportation field that has 
accounted for endogeneity, see Shankar, Mannering and Barfield (1995).  
When analysing a system of equations, an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
approach cannot be taken as this would lead to biased estimates, or so-called 
simultaneous equation bias. Given not all right-hand side variables are truly 
exogenous in a system of equations i.e. some are endogenous, OLS estimates 
will not be centred on their true values, given that endogeneity is ignored. 
Therefore, in order to analyse systems of equations where endogeneity may 
be present, we must instead use instrumental variable (IV) methods, like 
two-stage (2SLS) or three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression. These two 
particular methods fall into the categories of single-equation estimation 
methods (e.g. 2SLS) and systems estimation methods (e.g. 3SLS). The main 
difference between the two broad categories is that systems methods 
consider all of the restrictions in the entire equation system and account for 
possible cross-equation correlation of error terms. 
Before discussing the specific aspects of different instrumental variable (IV) 
methods, it is important to note that careful attention must be paid to the 
instrument variables defined in the model. In cases where there are equally 
as many instruments as there are right-hand endogenous variables, the 
equation to be estimated is said to be exactly identified. In cases where there 
are more instruments than endogenous variables, the equation to be 
estimated is said to be over identified (Bollen and Davis 2009). The advantage 
of the latter situation is that one can test whether the instruments selected are 
independent of the error term i.e. assess the validity of the set of instruments. 
The Sargan test, also known as the test of over identifying restrictions, is 
used to perform this assessment by regressing the residuals from an IV 
regression on all instruments, with the null hypothesis being that all 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (Chao et al. 2014). This test 
should be carried out regularly in any over identified model that is estimated 
using IV methods. Whilst IV methods are powerful, a rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the Sargan test suggests that there is reason to doubt the 
validity of the estimates provided, using the specified set of instruments. 
  
Chapter 4: Research Design & Methods 77 
The first approach to analysing an over identified system of equations, with 
endogeneity present, as mentioned previously, is Two-Stage Least Squares 
regression (2SLS). Essentially the main aim of this method is to identify the 
‘best’ instrument for the endogenous variables in the system of equations – 
an instrument being a variable representing a ‘similar’ effect to the 
endogenous variable, but that is not correlated with any of the independent 
variables. The first stage of 2SLS involves regressing each endogenous 
variable on all of the exogenous variables. The second stage uses the values 
from the stage 1 regression as instruments, and estimates each equation 
using ordinary least squares (OLS).  
System equation methods are generally preferred over single-equation 
methods, such as 2SLS, since the latter can account for cross-equation 
correlation in error terms. In 3SLS, the first stage involves obtaining the 2SLS 
estimates of the system. In the second stage, these 2SLS estimates are then 
used to calculate residuals from which the cross-equation error term 
correlations can then be computed. Finally, the third stage involves using 
generalised least squares (GLS) to calculate the model estimates. Since the 
full information of the system is considered in 3SLS, such a method produces 
more efficient estimates than single-equation methods, such as 2SLS. In the 
case where cross-equation correlation in error terms does not exist, 3SLS 
estimates are shown to be identical to 2SLS estimates. 
These methods are only efficient, however, if the error terms are 
independently identically distributed (i.i.d.) over individual observations ! 
and time periods !, which is generally not the case when using panel data, 
such as that used in Article III. In order to allow for heteroscedasticity or 
serial correlation that generally exists amongst panel data, the 3SLS 
estimation procedure has to take into account that the variance-covariance 
matrix of the equation system possesses an error-component structure. The 
estimation procedure carried out that can account for this structure is known 
as error-component three-stage least squares (EC3SLS). 
3.4.4 Error-component three stage least squares  
The estimation of systems of equations with error components is a 
specialised topic described in Baltagi (1981). In this paper, he describes the 
error-component three stage least squares estimation method and how it can 
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be used to analyse such problems. Further information pertaining to the 
derivation of this method is described in Article III in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Essentially, the EC3SLS estimator represents a weighted combination of three 
3SLS estimators: within-groups, between-groups, and within-and-between 
groups. This particular form allows for efficient estimates of a system of 
interrelated equations, with cross-correlated error terms, whilst controlling 
for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity that may be present in the panel 
data. 
The main restriction of this method, as mentioned previously, is that a 
balanced dataset is required. As such, some observations in the full panel 
dataset could not be included in the final analysis detailed in Article III. This 
restriction is largely due to the computational complexity of weighting and 
combining the three 3SLS estimators. 
Modelling the system of equations using EC3SLS was performed using 
STATA 13. No current EC3SLS package exists for this platform, so a custom 
script and code had to be written, as part of this PhD, in order to perform the 
necessary operations. The intention is to publish this script in the STATA 
journal for ease of use by other researchers wishing to analyse systems of 
equations using panel data in the future. 
The result of using the EC3SLS estimator was a series of ! coefficients 
representing the effects of various factors on Marginal Demand (MD - %EEV 
Annual Sales), Aggregate Demand (AD - %EEVs in Vehicle Fleet) and on the 
Price Premium (Dealer listed price of Toyota Prius: Toyota Corolla). These 
coefficients were in turn used to shed further light on the mechanisms at play 
in EEV marketplaces where government incentives are (or have been) 
present, particularly in terms of the interaction between demand and pricing. 
3.5 RESEARCH TIMELINE 
The following section of this chapter provides a brief overview of the 
timelines followed in order to complete the three articles included in this 
thesis, as well as other program requirements – including this PhD thesis. A 
graphical representation of these timelines has been included in Appendix B. 
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3.5.1  General milestones for PhD candidature  
A number of general milestones had to be met in order to graduate from the 
PhD program at QUT, and to maintain progression through the Double PhD 
program. 
The first three months of the candidature at QUT (February-April 2011) 
involved undertaking the AIRS course, in conjunction with a broad literature 
review to complete the Stage 2 document. During this period I was not yet 
enrolled at KTH, and had not received an official project for the Double PhD 
Program. This period concluded with the production of the Stage 2 
document detailing literature pertaining to sustainable transport; policies to 
increase transport sustainability; and the possibility of developing a 
framework of indicators to measure the sustainability of transport systems 
around the globe. 
In April of 2011, I was enrolled at KTH and moved to Sweden in August, of 
the same year. Over the course of the next 12 months, I completed six 
mandatory courses at KTH, whilst starting work on a project that was later 
transformed in Article IV (an article that does form part of this thesis, but is 
included in the KTH PhD Thesis).  
After some delays, by April 2012, I began work on what would later become 
Article I and returned to QUT in September of the same year to carry out my 
Confirmation of Candidature. At this stage, I had continued my research into 
indicator frameworks, and had begun to collect data for developing such a 
framework to measure and track the sustainability of transport systems. This 
project was proposed at the Confirmation and approved. During this time at 
QUT, I continued to work on Article I and on a project that later was 
transformed into Article II. 
 I continued to work at QUT on this project until early 2013, and then 
returned to KTH. During this period, I also undertook a number of 
mandatory courses at QUT to transfer to the KTH PhD. 
Upon return to KTH, it became clear that the indicator project would not be 
viable, as funding could not be obtained in order to acquire the necessary 
data. As such, this project was cancelled, and a new project begun, 
investigating the impact of different government incentives on EEV demand 
and pricing across the globe – what is now Article III. 
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During this period at KTH, I continued to complete coursework whilst 
preparing a Licentiate Thesis to meet the 2-year milestone requirements at 
KTH. This resulted in the production of a thesis based on earlier versions of 
Article I and II, and defence of this thesis at a public forum in October, 2013. 
In November, 2013, I returned to QUT and continued work on finalising 
Articles I and II, whilst continuing data collection efforts for Article III.  
In January, 2014, as mentioned previously, I took on an additional position 
working on an AutoCRC project at QUT, investigating EEV market demand 
in ASEAN countries, from 2015 through to 2030. In conjunction with this 
work, I continued to complete the mandatory coursework for KTH, whilst 
finalising Article III. A significant period of 2014 was also dedicated to 
preparing the final PhD thesis for QUT. 
In June, 2014, a short three-week trip to Europe was made to present Article I 
at a conference in France, and to carry out some required duties at KTH. 
In October, 2014, I completed the full manuscript of this PhD thesis for QUT 
in preparation for my final seminar, including the completion and 
submissions of all three articles included in this thesis. 
3.5.2  Timeline for Article I 
During the first 12 months of the candidature at KTH, in addition to other 
program requirements, a large proportion of time was dedicated to working 
on Articles I and II. What was originally planned to be Article I, that of 
analysing cordon crossing data, has now been turned into Article IV (not 
included in this thesis) due to delays in acquisition of that dataset. Given 
these delays, an alternative dataset was sourced, from which similar research 
questions could be investigated. 
The sheer size of the alternative dataset was such that each modelling 
process took numerous days to be performed. As such, the process of 
modelling for Article I was slow. My limited programming skills also meant 
that I had to self-teach coding in R, STATA, BIOGEME and MATLAB in order 
estimate the required models for the task. 
The initial process of data filtering took two months, whilst the subsequent 
analysis took an additional 10 months. Although Article I was initially 
completed during early 2013, it was revised several times after various 
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conference presentations and peer review processes. The final manuscript 
was submitted to Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, in early 
2014, and was accepted for publication in September, 2014. 
3.5.3  Timeline for Article II 
As mentioned in Section 3.5.2, a significant proportion of the first 12 months 
of the candidature at KTH was spent working on Article II. This particular 
paper followed a similar timeline to that of Article I. 
Initially, it took longer than expected in order to carry out the analysis – 
again due to computational constraints. Lengthy discussions were also held 
between various supervisory groups as to which method was most suitable 
for answering the research questions of this article. The article was 
completed in June, 2014, and was under review/editing for a number of 
months. 
As of October, 2014, the article has been submitted to Transportation Research 
Part A: Policy and Practice and is currently under review. 
3.5.4 Timeline for Article III 
The capstone product of this thesis – Article III – was originally proposed by 
my principal supervisor at QUT – Professor Simon Washington.  We started 
data collection for the project in late 2013, which was completed by April, 
2014. Analysis was conducted over the following three months, with the 
complete manuscript of Article III produced in August, 2014.  
As of October, 2014, Article III has been submitted to the Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management and is currently under review.  
3.6 ETHICS CONSIDERATIONS  
To finalise this chapter, I have included notes on ethics considerations related 
to this thesis’s research design. Given the nature of the studies included in 
this thesis, potential ethics considerations are minimal.  
Given the high level of personal data available in the datasets used in 
Articles I and II, where individual citizens can be identified, it was crucial to 
follow proper security protocols to protect this information, and to not 
distribute it to others. 
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These security protocols included: establishing a secure VPN connection to a 
remote server, using a personal passkey via a mobile application. After 
establishing a secure connection, a personal password would then be 
required to logon to the remote system, which in turn was inside a close 
network – in other words, it was not ‘normally’ possible to remove and add 
data to the system (with the exception of administrative access). 
No other major ethical concerns were identified as part of this research effort. 
 
  
 
 
 Article I 
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Chapter 4: Article I 
The impact of a congestion tax exemption on the 
demand for new energy efficient vehicles in 
Stockholm 
With an ever-increasing focus of governments on measures that can be 
implemented to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including within the 
transport sector, it is often helpful to look to other regions that have already 
experimented with various policy options, in order to learn from their 
mistakes. 
The following chapter, detailing Article I of this thesis, includes the analysis 
of a unique dataset comprised of new vehicle registrations in Stockholm 
County, in 2008. This registry data has been been paired with owner-specific 
demographics, including: Owner age, gender, income, home location, work 
location, number of children, etc. 
Using this highly detailed revealed preference data – which is comprised of 
actual consumer purchase choices – a discrete choice model is developed in 
order to determine which individuals purchased EEVs (Research Question 1) 
and, through a policy simulation, assess the effect of a government incentive 
– that of an exemption for EEVs from Stockholm’s congestion pricing scheme 
– on the consumer demand for EEVs (Research Question 2). 
The results of this paper are compared with previous, simpler analyses of the 
congestion tax exemption. A comparison of these results, with the estimates 
obtained in Article III (Chapter 6) in regards to the effects of usage-based 
incentives (Type D) on the demand for EEVs, is included in Chapter 7. 
Overall, the following chapter includes a number of interesting findings 
in regards to which individuals choose to purchase EEVs, and how a 
government incentive has ultimately affected consumer demand. 
 
 
 
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted with permission from  
J. Whitehead, J. P. Franklin & S. Washington, 2014, “The impact of a 
congestion tax on the demand for new energy efficient vehicles in 
Stockholm”, Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 70: 24-40. 
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ABSTRACT                                                   
As governments seek to transition to more efficient vehicle fleets, one strategy has 
been to incentivize ‘green’ vehicle choice by exempting some of these vehicles from 
road user charges. As an example, to stimulate sales of Energy Efficient Vehicles 
(EEVs) in Sweden, some of these automobiles were exempted from Stockholm’s 
congestion tax. In this paper the effect this policy had on the demand for new, 
privately-owned, exempt EEVs is assessed by first estimating a model of vehicle 
choice and then by applying this model to simulate vehicle alternative market 
shares under different policy scenarios. The database used to calibrate the model 
includes owner-specific demographics merged with vehicle registry data for all new 
private vehicles registered in Stockholm County during 2008. Characteristics of 
individuals with a higher propensity to purchase an exempt EEV were identified. 
The most significant factors included intra-cordon residency (positive), distance 
from home to the CBD (negative), and commuting across the cordon (positive). By 
calculating vehicle shares from the vehicle choice model and then comparing these 
estimates to a simulated scenario where the congestion tax exemption was 
inactive, the exemption was estimated to have substantially increased the share of 
newly purchased, private, exempt EEVs in Stockholm by 1.8% (+/- 0.3%; 95% C.I.) 
to a total share of 18.8%. This amounts to an estimated 10.7% increase in private, 
exempt EEV purchases during 2008 i.e. 519 privately owned, exempt EEVs.  
1. Introduction 
Numerous initiatives have been employed around the world in order to address rising 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions originating from the transport sector. These measures have 
included: travel demand management (congestion-pricing), increased fuel taxes, alternative fuel 
subsidies and energy efficient vehicle (EEV) rebates. Incentivizing the purchase of EEVs has been 
one of the more prevalent approaches in attempting to tackle this global issue. EEVs, whilst having 
the advantage of lower emissions and, in some cases, more efficient fuel consumption, also bring 
the downsides of increased purchase cost, reduced convenience of vehicle fuelling, and operational 
uncertainty. To stimulate demand in the face of these challenges, various incentive-based policies, 
such as toll exemptions, have been used by national and local governments to encourage the 
purchase of these types of vehicles. 
In order to address rising GHG emissions in Stockholm, and to achieve the Swedish 
Government’s ambition to operate a fossil-fuel free fleet by 2030, a number of policies were 
implemented, targeting the transport sector. Foremost amongst these was the combination of a 
congestion tax – initiated to discourage peak-hour emissions-intensive travel – and an exemption 
from this tax for some EEVs, established to encourage a transition towards a ‘green’ vehicle fleet. 
Although both policies shared the aim of reducing GHG emissions, the exemption for EEVs carried 
the risk of diminishing the effectiveness of the congestion-pricing scheme. As the number of vehicle 
owners choosing to transition to an eligible exempt EEV increased, the congestion-reduction 
effectiveness of the pricing scheme weakened. In fact, policy makers quickly recognized this 
potential issue and consequently phased out the EEV exemption less than 18 months after its 
introduction (Hultkrantz and Liu, 2012). 
Several studies have investigated the demand for EEVs through stated-preference (SP) 
surveys across multiple countries, including: Denmark (Mabit and Fosgerau, 2011) Germany 
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(Hackbarth and Madlener, 2013; Ziegler, 2012), Norway (Dagsvik et al., 2002), United Kingdom 
(Batley et al., 2004), Canada (Ewing and Sarigöllü, 1998), USA (Brownstone et al., 1996; Bunch et 
al., 1993; Hess et al., 2012; Musti and Kockelman, 2011) and Australia (Beck et al., 2013). Although 
each of these studies differed in their approach, all involved SP surveys where characteristics were 
varied among various types of vehicles including EEVs and presented to respondents, who in turn 
made hypothetical choices about which vehicle they would be most likely to purchase.  
As described in Section 2, although these studies have revealed a number of interesting 
findings regarding the potential demand for EEVs, they relied on SP data. In contrast, this paper 
employs an approach where EEV choice data are obtained retrospectively by collecting and using 
revealed preference (RP) data, based on private vehicle registrations. By examining the revealed 
preferences of vehicle owners in Stockholm, this study overcomes one of the principal limitations of 
SP data - that stated preferences may not in fact reflect individuals’ actual choices, such as when 
cost, time, and inconvenience factors are hypothetical rather than real. While the RP data used in 
this study are sufficient, a follow up SP survey of vehicle owners in Stockholm could be interesting 
for comparing RP and SP results across a variety of dimensions. 
This paper’s RP approach involves modeling the characteristics of private individuals who 
purchased new EEVs, whilst estimating the effect of the congestion tax exemption on marginal 
demand. The study specifically builds on work undertaken by Bunch et al. (1993), Musti and 
Kockelman (2011),  Campbell et al. (2012), Graham-Rowe et al. (2012) and Ziegler (2012) in 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, in attempting to identify individuals that are 
most likely to purchase a energy-efficient vehicle. This paper also contributes to the current 
literature by examining the effectiveness of a tax exemption under revealed preference conditions, 
and by assessing the total effect of the policy based on key indicators for policy makers, including: 
vehicle owner home and work locations, commuting patterns, number of children, number of 
vehicles, age, gender and income. 
The two main research questions motivating this study were: 
• Which private individuals chose to purchase different types of new EEVs in Stockholm in 
2008?; and, 
• How did the congestion tax exemption affect the marginal demand for new EEVs in 
Stockholm in 2008? 
In order to answer these research questions the analysis was split into two stages. Firstly, a 
multinomial logit (MNL) model was used to identify which demographic characteristics were most 
significantly related to the purchase of an EEV over a conventional vehicle. The three most 
significant variables were found to be: intra-cordon residency (positive); commuting across the 
cordon (positive); and distance of residence from the CBD (negative). In order to estimate the effect 
of the exemption policy on vehicle purchase choice, the model included variables to control for 
geographic differences in preferences, based on the location of the vehicle owners’ homes and 
workplaces in relation to the congestion tax cordon boundary. These variables included one 
indicator representing commutes across the cordon and another indicator representing intra-cordon 
residency.  
The effect of the tax exemption policy on the probability of purchasing EEVs was estimated in 
the second stage of the analysis by focusing on the groups of vehicle owners that were most likely 
to have been affected by the policy i.e. those commuting across the cordon boundary (in both 
directions). Given the inclusion of the indicator variable representing commuting across the cordon, 
it is assumed that the estimated coefficient of this variable captures the effect of the exemption 
policy on the utility of choosing to purchase an exempt EEV for these two groups of vehicle owners. 
The intra-cordon residency variable also controls for differences between the two groups, based 
upon direction of travel across the cordon boundary. 
A counter-hypothesis to this assumption is that the coefficient of the variable representing 
commuting across the cordon boundary instead only captures geo-demographic differences that 
lead to variations in EEV ownership across the different groups of vehicle owners in relation to the 
cordon boundary. In order to address this counter-hypothesis, an additional analysis was performed 
on data from a city with a similar geo-demographic pattern to Stockholm, Gothenburg - Sweden’s 
second largest city.  
Based upon this framework, the vehicle alternative market shares were calculated using the 
estimated coefficients of the MNL model and compared to predicted vehicle type shares from a 
simulated scenario where the exemption policy was inactive. This simulated scenario was 
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constructed by setting the coefficient for the variable representing commutes across the cordon 
boundary to zero for all observations to remove the utility benefit of the exemption policy. Overall, 
the procedure of this second stage of the analysis led to results showing that the tax exemption had 
a substantial effect upon the probability of purchasing a new, exempt EEVs in Stockholm during 
2008 i.e. the policy lead to an increase in marginal demand.  
As part of an additional analysis, panel data from both Gothenburg and Stockholm were used 
to compare the changes in vehicle shares between 2004 (before the tax exemption and congestion 
pricing) and 2008 in both cities, with Gothenburg acting as the control group (without a congestion 
pricing scheme and/or tax exemption). This additional analysis provides evidence to support the 
method used in this paper to estimate the increase in demand for exempt EEVs in Stockholm in 
2008 due to the congestion tax exemption. 
The estimation results of two additional MNL models have also been included in the results 
section of this paper. The first of these models is a binomial model that has been included to 
compare with the principle MNL model employed for the policy analysis. The results of the third 
MNL model have been included in order to further explore what differences arise in regards to the 
demographic makeup of different vehicle owners, when the vehicle choice set is expanded based 
upon differences in vehicle purchase price, vehicle weight (as a proxy for size) and congestion tax 
exemption eligibility.   
Section 2 details the broader background of EEV choice, along with providing an overview of 
policies implemented to encourage the purchase of EEVs. In Section 3 a case study from 
Stockholm is presented, including a short overview of the history of EEV policies and summary of 
results from other studies that have investigated the effects of EEV incentive policies in Stockholm. 
Section 4 provides details of the research methodology, while section 5 documents the exploratory 
analysis of the dataset used in this study, and Section 6 discusses the results of the investigation, 
including the model estimation results and predicted shares of the vehicle alternatives. Finally, the 
study implications are discussed in Section 7, where the potential consequences of the findings are 
examined, particularly in relation to the effects of the congestion tax exemption on marginal demand 
for EEVs. 
 
2.  Background 
As energy independence and climate change have gained societal importance, many 
countries have sought to bring about a large-scale transition in the composition of national vehicle 
fleets. The policies introduced to encourage such transitions vary widely, including such measures 
as: subsidies for clean vehicle research and development; information campaigns to raise the 
importance of environmental concerns among households (Siriwardena et al., 2012); and financial 
incentives to make the choice of a clean vehicle more attractive (de Haan et al., 2009). There are 
several other incentive-based policies proposed by leading authors in this field, including Beck, 
Rose & Hensher’s (2013) paper investigating the effect of emissions charging on vehicle choice. 
The diversity of incentive-based policies makes it difficult to assess the demand for these 
vehicles, as the definitions of a ‘clean’ / ‘energy-efficient’ / ‘environmentally-friendly’ vehicle vary 
substantially between these policies. In some cases, different definitions have even been applied 
within the same country and/or region. Despite the complications of these varying definitions, it is 
clear from the literature that without incentives a substantial increase in the adoption of energy-
efficient vehicles is unlikely. Most successful cities and/or countries have provided incentives that at 
least partially offset the typical disadvantages of adopting a EEV: lower driving ranges; smaller 
vehicle size; reduced engine power; limited fuel availability, etc. Other successful case studies have 
involved the introduction of regulations to counteract these disadvantages, e.g. mandatory supply of 
alternative fuels, electric charging stations at parking locations, etc. 
Literature investigating the marginal demand for different types of EEVs in different countries 
is increasing; however, as mentioned previously, the main approach in most of these studies has 
been to conduct a SP survey, in which a number of hypothetical scenarios were presented to the 
respondent. These scenarios involved a number of different vehicles; a number of different policies 
or incentives; or a combination of both various policies and vehicles. After collecting the data from 
the surveys, the information was then analyzed through the use of discrete choice models in order 
to identify which variables or indicators were the most significant within the survey sample. 
Both Ziegler (2012) and Hackbarth and Madlener (2013) found in their SP data that in 
Germany those individuals who were younger and had higher environmental preferences were the 
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most likely group to purchase EEVs, with hydrogen vehicle owners most likely to be male. Mabit and 
Fosgerau (2011) in an analysis of the demand for alternatively fuelled vehicles (AFVs) in Denmark 
and Dagsvik et al. (2002) in a similar analysis for Norway, both found that if the cost and 
performance between AFVs and conventional vehicles were equal, due to environmental 
preferences, AFVs would be chosen. Contrary to the German studies, however, both studies found 
that females were more likely to purchase electric and/or hydrogen vehicles.  
Some studies have found that car ownership, in particular owning more than one vehicle, was 
a significant characteristic of EEV adopting individuals (Campbell et al., 2012; Graham-Rowe et al., 
2012). Campbell et al. (2012) also found that individuals living further away from the city center were 
most likely to be early adopters of EEVs, in Birmingham, UK.  Choo and Mokhtarian (2004) found in 
their study of vehicle choice in San Francisco, USA, that inner-city residents may have a tendency 
to own larger, less fuel-efficient vehicles, suggesting a reduced sensitivity to environmental 
concerns. These two studies are contrary to other evidence, particularly amongst new urbanist 
proponents, that inner-city residents tend to have higher environmental preferences and/or support 
environmental political parties (Bhat et al., 2009; Kahn, 2007), and in turn, individuals with higher 
environmental preferences tend to live more environmentally-friendly lifestyles, including purchasing 
smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles (Kahn, 2007) and fewer vehicles (Flamm, 2009). 
In terms of incentive policies, Musti and Kockelman (2011) found that under both the 
hypothetical scenarios of a doubling in fuel prices or a rebate for EEVs, there would be little effect 
on the share of these vehicles in Texas, USA. Given the scenario of a ‘feebate’, however, where 
individuals would be compensated or charged in a carrot-and-stick approach depending on the fuel 
economy of the vehicle used, the share of EEVs would be increased by approximately 10%. 
Similarly, Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) found in their analysis of state-level hybrid vehicle sales 
data across the USA that ‘feebate’ programs may be more effective in increasing the demand for 
EEVs compared to sales tax waivers and/or emissions testing fees.  
Another study, partially based on RP data from household surveys, found that monetary 
incentives had little to no effect on the adoption of EEVs, however, that an incentive such as a High-
Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane exemption, when placed in congested areas of the USA, did lead to 
an increase in EEV shares (Riggieri, 2011). 
One could argue that the congestion pricing scheme in Stockholm acted somewhat similarly to 
a hybrid combination of the HOV lane exemption and the ‘feebate’ program, at least during 2008, 
where users had to pay a fee for using high-emission vehicles in the city, but gained an exemption 
from this fee if they had purchased and used an eligible energy-efficient vehicle. 
Considering the range of issues addressed by these prior studies, a literature gap exists on 
whether incentive-based policies, such as a congestion tax exemption, have affected the demand 
for EEVs. A better understanding of the characteristics of private individuals who have purchased 
these types of vehicles is needed in order for policy makers to better target such initiatives. This 
paper attempts to address this knowledge gap using Stockholm as the case study. 
 
3.  Case study – Stockholm, Sweden  
Since 1994, the City of Stockholm has had a EEV project in place, promoting the adoption and 
usage of these vehicles and their associated fuel types. From 1994 to 2005, two of the main 
achievements of this project were to replace conventional vehicles in the government fleet with 
EEVs and to put in place a number of tax incentives in order to increase the attractiveness, and in 
turn supply of alternative fuels within the Swedish market. From 2005, the demand for alternatively 
fuelled vehicles started to increase, largely due to a number of financial incentives that were 
introduced during the same period.  
In May of 2005, free residential parking was introduced for inner-city residents in Stockholm 
who owned alternatively fuelled vehicles, a policy that remained in place until the conclusion of 
2008. The introduction of this policy was shortly followed by the commencement of a seven-month 
long congestion tax trial starting in January 2006, parallel to the introduction of a exemption from the 
congestion tax for all alternatively-fuelled EEVs e.g. vehicles running on ethanol, electricity, biogas, 
etc. After the trial, there was a 12-month period in which neither policy was active. During this 
period, a public referendum was held in order to gauge support for the policy with 52.5% of the 
population voting against the scheme (Börjesson et al., 2012). The 2006 general election also lead 
to a change in government from the center-left party to a center-right coalition.  
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Despite this period of policy instability and the referendum result (which was not legally 
binding), the new government reintroduced the congestion tax permanently, starting from August, 
2007, with the revenue raised to be hypothecated for the construction of new roads, in contrast with 
the environmentally driven motivations of the previous government. 
In 2006, during the congestion tax trial, only 2% of cordon boundary crossings were made by 
alternatively fuelled vehicles. By the end of 2008, this share had increased to 14% (Börjesson et al., 
2012). The incentive policy of exempting alternatively fuelled EEVs from the congestion tax, the 
main subject of this paper, was so successful that policy makers became concerned that the 
congestion reduction effectiveness of the greater pricing scheme was being weakened. As such, the 
tax exemption was phased out for all new EEVs purchased from the 1st of January, 2009, less than 
18 months after its introduction. The policy did, however, remain valid for all existing EEVs that were 
already exempt until the beginning of August, 2012 (Birath and Pädam, 2010). 
Concurrent with the introduction of congestion tax exemption in Stockholm, in April, 2007, a 
10,000 SEK (1,000 EUR) national purchase rebate was also introduced for all newly purchased 
alternatively fuelled and low CO2 petrol/diesel EEVs in Sweden. This last policy expanded the 
definition of EEVs to also include petrol/diesel vehicles that emitted less than 120 grams of CO2 per 
km (Börjesson et al., 2012; Pädam et al., 2009). It is this combination of policies that appears to 
have led to record growth in the sale of EEVs in Stockholm. 
The effect of the congestion tax exemption policy was the main focus of this study-- seen as 
the most significant EEV policy incentive introduced in Stockholm. This assertion has been echoed 
by several experts in the field (Börjesson et al., 2012; Hugosson and Algers, 2010) as well as 
established through a number of different studies, including: 
- Analysis of Swedish market level vehicle sales data combined with vehicle characteristics 
and fuel data using a Nested Logit model (Lindfors and Roxland, 2009); 
- Analysis of monthly reported new car registrations in Sweden using times series and cross 
sectional OLS regression (Pädam et al., 2009); and,  
- Results of an opinion survey sent to new clean vehicle owners in Stockholm in 2008 that 
was conducted by ‘Clean Vehicles in Stockholm’ (Birath and Pädam, 2010). 
Lindfors and Roxland’s (2009) paper primarily focuses on analyzing the effect the national 
purchase rebate had on the sales of alternatively fuelled vehicles throughout Sweden. They employ 
a similar method to that described in this paper where a variable representing the purchase rebate 
is included in a Nested Logit Model. Market shares are predicted based on this estimation and 
compared to shares predicted from the same model with the rebate coefficient set to zero i.e. 
removing the effect of the incentive policy. They estimate that the purchase rebase led to a 12% 
increase in alternatively fuelled vehicle sales throughout Sweden during 2008. Although brief, they 
also separate out data for Stockholm and include an additional variable representing the congestion 
tax exemption. Comparing this variable to the purchase rebate variable, they suggest that the 
exemption effect was at least twice as large as that of the purchase rebate i.e. a 24% increase. 
However, these figures refer to total sales in Stockholm, including company vehicles, which were 
subject to a number of other incentive policies active in Sweden during this period. As mentioned 
previously, only private vehicle owners are considered in this current study. 
In a separate analysis, Pädam et al. (2009) have analyzed monthly car registrations in 
Sweden, using both time series and cross-section OLS regressions, and found that the congestion 
tax exemption appears to have increased the sales of alternatively fuelled EEVs in Stockholm 
Country in 2008 by 23%. Again, this data included company and leased vehicles, and as such, we 
can expect the estimates from this paper’s analysis to be less than these figures. 
Finally, an opinion survey conducted by ‘Clean Vehicles in Stockholm’ during 2008 showed 
that EEV owners saw the congestion tax exemption and lower fuel costs as the most important 
incentives to purchasing an EEV in Stockholm (Birath and Pädam, 2010). 
The results of these studies have shown that the congestion tax exemption appears to have 
been the most significant incentive policy introduced in Stockholm in terms of increasing the 
demand for exempt EEVs. For this reason, this paper focuses primarily on annual vehicle 
registration data from 2008 - since this was the only period in which the congestion tax exemption 
was active for the entire year for all alternatively fuelled (exempt) EEVs. Importantly, the effects of 
other policies cannot be ignored thus this paper attempts to isolate the effect of the congestion tax. 
It should be noted that given the exemption was only implemented in mid-2007, there could be 
an argument that consumer behavior had not fully settled by 2008, however, given the policy was 
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phased out by 2009, this was only full 12-month period in which it could be analyzed. 2008 was also 
the latest year of data available at the time of analysis. 
4.  Methodology 
Vehicle type choice can be conceptualized using econometric models of a discrete choice 
among mutually exclusive alternatives (Train, 2009; Washington et al., 2011). Here, it is assumed 
that when individuals choose a vehicle to purchase they maximize an unobserved utility function 
(unknown to the researcher). This function can be separated into an observable portion and an 
unobservable portion, written as: Unj =Vnj + εnj , where the unobservable portion (εnj ) is i.i.d. from a 
Gumbel Type-2 distribution and captures all the factors that affect utility but that are not captured by 
observable factors ( njV ).  In logit models, it is also assumed that the unobserved factors are 
uncorrelated over alternatives, which, although restrictive, provides a convenient form for calculating 
the choice probability ( niP ) – see Equation 1: 
 
ni
nj
V
ni V
j
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e
=
∑
  (1) 
Once the choice probabilities have been calculated, the model must then be estimated by 
using the maximum-likelihood function shown in Equation 2: 
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where niy is an indicator for whether the decision maker chooses alternative i  and ! 
represents the parameter that maximizes this function. As shown by McFadden (1974), !!(!) is 
globally concave for linear-in-parameters utility. It can therefore be said that the ! value that 
maximises this function is that where the derivative of the function is equal to zero – thus the global 
maximum. In this paper, this procedure was carried out using both Biogeme (BIerlaire, 2003) and 
STATA, testing a number of different model specifications and forms in order to find the best fit for 
new vehicle choice in Stockholm during 2008. 
In order to estimate the effect of the congestion tax exemption, it was necessary to 
operationalize which vehicle owners would be considered "treated" versus "untreated". This is not 
obvious: in some sense, a large portion of the total population might be considered "treated", since 
all who might sometimes travel by car, even as a passenger, across the cordon during peak periods 
might be affected by the presence of a congestion toll or a tax exemption. However, in this study the 
treatment group was designed to focus on private vehicle owners whose homes and workplaces 
were located on opposite sides of the cordon boundary. Hence, the vehicle owner population was 
split into four groups based on their home-work locations relative to the cordon, to separate out 
those owners that were more likely to have been affected by the policy. These four groups were: 
A. Living and working within the cordon; 
B. Living within but working outside the cordon (commute across the cordon); 
C. Living outside but working within the cordon (commute across the cordon); and, 
D. Living and working outside the cordon. 
Based on these groups, three variables were defined to control for geographic differences in 
preferences towards EEVs: 
• Living within the cordon (or not); 
• Commuting across the cordon (home-work trips); 
• Working within the cordon (or not). 
All three variables were not included within the model due to extreme multi-collinearity. The 
first two variables were included in the model specifications since the location of the workplace was 
seen to have had the least bearing upon vehicle choice. The second variable, representing 
commutes across the cordon, was seen as critical to this analysis as it was assumed to have a 
strong relationship with the effect of the congestion tax exemption policy. It is also possible that the 
estimated coefficient of this variable would instead capture other effects of geography on vehicle 
choice, such as vehicle owners who lived in the suburbs and worked in the city center having a set 
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of attitudes and preferences that made them more likely to choose EEVs. To test this counter-
hypothesis and provide evidence to support the validity of the method employed in this study, an 
additional analysis of panel data comparing new, exempt EEV shares in both Stockholm and in 
Sweden’s second largest city - Gothenburg (acting as a control group i.e. no congestion pricing 
scheme/tax exemption), has been included in Section 7.1. 
To assess the total effect of the exemption policy upon the demand for new, exempt EEVs in 
Stockholm, the predicted vehicle type shares were calculated based upon the estimated coefficients 
of the best model. By making the assumption that the estimated coefficient of the variable 
representing commuting across the cordon captured the effect of the exemption policy upon the 
utility of choosing to purchase an exempt EEV, this coefficient was then set to equal zero for all 
observations to simulate removing the benefit of the EEV exemption for crossing the cordon 
boundary. Predicted vehicle shares were then recalculated based upon this new scenario where the 
exemption was effectively inactive. By comparing the predicted shares from these two scenarios, an 
estimate of the effect that the congestion tax exemption had upon the demand for exempt EEVs 
could then be calculated. The estimation procedure was first carried out using Biogeme (BIerlaire, 
2003), and then repeated in STATA using bootstrapping (1000 repetitions) in order to provide 95% 
confidence intervals for the reported results.  
Although factors other than the congestion tax exemption could have affected the decision of 
vehicle owners to commute across the cordon, by including a number of other variables to control 
for many of the demographic and geographic differences between vehicle owners, the calculated 
difference in vehicle shares could largely be attributed to the effect that the exemption policy had 
upon the demand for exempt EEVs. The findings of the additional panel data analysis (see Section 
7.1) also assist providing evidence to support these conclusions. 
As stated earlier, the focus in this study is on the treatment effects on commute trips over the 
cordon. The resulting estimation is regarded as conservative since the demand for exempt EEVs by 
other vehicle owners, such as those who did not commute across the boundary, could have also 
been affected by the congestion tax exemption. This is likely to especially be true for those who 
lived and worked within the toll cordon. The data used in this analysis did not include detailed trip 
data, precluding estimation of the effect that the exemption policy would have had based on other 
trips. Regardless, the estimation provides some insight into the extent of the effect of the exemption 
policy, with the additional panel data analysis yielding estimated effects of the tax exemption on 
vehicle owners not commuting across the cordon boundary. It should also be noted that the free 
residential parking policy could have conflated the results obtained for inner-city residents. 
5.  Data and exploratory analysis 
Swedish vehicle ownership and distance travelled data, analyzed by Pydokke (2009), 
revealed that rural vehicle owners’ usage is higher compared to urban vehicle owners, and that car 
ownership is slow to change throughout Sweden. A subset of the same data analyzed in that paper, 
obtained from Sweden’s Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB), is used in this study and consists of 
vehicle registrations for the year 2008 combined with demographic characteristics for private vehicle 
owners in Sweden.  
The dataset used in this paper was created by first merging all vehicles with their respective 
owners and disregarding any entries that either had no vehicle or no owner. At this level the dataset 
included all owners in Sweden, so the study was further reduced to only those individuals who lived 
and worked in Stockholm County. Additionally, approximately 50% of the observations related to 
company-owned or -leased vehicles. Since it was impossible to determine whether the home 
locations were true to the vehicle owner, these entries were also discarded. Note that here, ‘new 
vehicles’ are defined as encompassing all vehicles with a manufactured date of 2007, 2008 or 2009, 
due to some 2007 and 2009 models being sold and registered during 2008. 
In the analysis it was assumed that the registered owner of the vehicle was also the 
predominant driver of that vehicle; the vehicle was used for home-work trips; and for the small group 
of owners with multiple vehicles, the most driven vehicle was the predominant vehicle for home-
work trips. 
In calculating the predicted vehicle shares, the refined dataset was subdivided into groups 
based upon home and work locations. In particular focus were the groups commuting across the 
cordon in order to assess the impact of the congestion tax exemption upon the demand for new 
EEVs. A frequency table of the four groups, based on home-work locations, along with the 
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annotation of incentive policies applicable to each of these groups, can be found in Table 1. Home 
and Work locations were based on postal code groupings, with Stockholm divided into 
approximately 50 areas. 
It should be highlighted that although the number of electric vehicles was relatively small, from 
an analysis of the summary statistics (see Table 2) it was clear that this group of owners was 
distinctly different from Ethanol EEVs, and thus the two groups were kept separate. It should also be 
noted that there were also a very small number of other alternatively-fuelled EEVs running on 
biogas, however, these observations were excluded from the data used in this analysis. 
TABLE 1 – Number of New Vehicles by Vehicle Alternative and Home-Work Group, including applicable 
incentives 
 
Living inside Cordon Living outside Cordon 
All Owners Working inside 
Cordon 
Working outside 
Cordon* 
Working inside 
Cordon* 
Working outside 
Cordon 
Conventional 1 144 (64.5%) 700 (49.0%) 4 974 (71.0%) 13 827 (75.6%) 20 645 (72.43%) 
Low CO2 
Petrol 101 (5.7%) 99 (6.9%) 343 (4.9%) 985 (5.4%) 1 528 (5.36%) 
Low CO2 
Diesel 67 (3.8%) 
63 (4.4%) 206 (2.9%) 638 (3.5%) 974 (3.42%) 
Electric 47 (2.7%) 41 (2.9%) 94 (1.3%) 149 (0.8%) 331 (1.16%) 
Ethanol 415 (23.4%) 526 (36.8%) 1 386 (19.8%) 2 697 (14.7%) 5 024 (17.63%) 
Total 1 774 1 429 7 003 18 296 28 502 
Key: Dotted = National Government Purchase Rebate; Dashed = Inner-City Residential Parking Exemption; 
Solid = Congestion Tax exemption; *Represents those owners crossing the cordon. 
Through inspection of Table 1, it is apparent that the group with the highest share of exempt 
EEVs (electric, ethanol) was those owners commuting across the boundary but living inside the 
cordon. This is expected as these owners benefited from all three policies shown. The share of 
exempt EEVs was highest amongst those living within the cordon, but was also substantial for those 
living outside the cordon but still commuting across the boundary. 
Table 2 includes summary statistics for each vehicle alternative, providing average values for 
the various socio-demographic characteristics included in this analysis. Mean and Median values for 
the Purchase Pricei and Total Weight (as a proxy for size) of each Vehicle Alternative have also 
been included in order to provide some insight into the alternative specific differences. It can be 
seen that on average Conventional, Ethanol and Electric vehicles in this sample were approximately 
the same size and price, although there was a large range of variation within Electric Vehicle 
category. Low CO2 Petrol models were the smallest and the cheapest, followed by Low CO2 Diesel 
models. 
The number of alternatives included in the vehicle choice model could have been significantly 
greater given the range of vehicles in the dataset. The chosen level of aggregation of alternatives is 
motivated by the main research question of this study to better understand the impact of the tax 
exemption on the marginal demand for EEVs in Stockholm, and to gain some insight into individual 
preferences towards different aggregate EEV types, and not to analyze individual preferences 
towards every new vehicle available on the market. The five alternatives outlined in Table 2 are 
each distinctly different in regards to either: tax exemption eligibility; the demographic makeup of 
owners in that vehicle category; and/or the specific characteristics of that alternative. Two additional 
models have also been included in this paper to examine how the demographics of owners varied 
depending on exemption eligibility, vehicle purchase price and/or vehicle weight; however, all three 
models yield the same results in regards to policy implications. 
Finally, considering literature reviewing findings, the primary research questions, and the 
summary statistics shown in Tables 1 and 2, three research hypotheses were developed: 
1.) Intra-Cordon residency had a significant, positive influence on an individual’s likelihood to 
purchase a tax exempt EEV i.e. electric or ethanol; 
2.) The congestion tax cordon crossing exemption had a significant, positive influence on an 
individual’s likelihood to purchase an exempt EEV; and, 
3.) Residential distance to the CBD had a significant and negative influence on the likelihood of 
purchasing an ethanol or electric vehicle 
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TABLE 2 – Summary Statistics for each Vehicle Alternative 
 
6.  Results 
Several model forms were tested and estimated, with these models varying in how vehicle 
alternatives were grouped and whether some of the explanatory variables were common across 
alternatives. The modeling aim was to develop the most plausible and defensible discrete choice 
model for capturing the relationships between vehicle choice and the demographics of private 
individuals purchasing new vehicles in Stockholm during 2008. It was also important for the model 
to provide the greatest insight into the effect of the congestion tax exemption on the demand for 
EEVs. 
The three different choice structures tested include: 
• Model 1: Binomial logit with two alternatives: a) EEVs exempt from congestion tax 
(electric/ethanol), b) Non-exempt vehicles (conventional, low CO2 petrol, CO2 diesel); 
• Model 2: Multinomial logit model with five alternatives: a) conventional vehicles, b) low CO2 
petrol vehicles c) low CO2 diesel vehicles, d) electric/hybrid vehicles, d) ethanol; and, 
• Model 3: Multinomial logit model with 8 alternatives based on the tax exemption (eligible or 
not), vehicle purchase price (cheap or expensive) and vehicle weight (light or heavy). 
Several alternative model specifications were also tested for each choice set, but ultimately 
deemed to be redundant when compared to the three models outlined previously. The model 
specifications tested include:  
• Binomial logit with 2 alternatives (EEVs vs. non-EEVs); 
• Multinomial logit with 3 alternatives (conventional vs. tax exempt EEVs vs. non-exempt 
EEVs); 
• Multinomial logit with 4 alternatives (conventional vs. low CO2 petrol/diesel vs. ethanol vs. 
electric); 
• Nested logit version of Model 2 with 2 nests (tax exempt EEVs nested and non-exempt 
vehicles nested);  
• Nested logit version of Model 2 with 3 nests (tax exempt EEVs nested, non-exempt EEVs 
nested, non-exempt vehicles nested); 
• Nested logit version of Model 3, with varying nesting structures; and, 
• Nested logit with 20 alternatives based on fuel type, vehicle purchase price and vehicle 
weight, with varying nesting structures. 
Attribute Averages Conventional Vehicles 
Low 
CO2 
Petrol 
Low 
CO2 
Diesel 
Electric/ 
Hybrid 
Electric 
Ethanol 
No. of Observations 20 645 1 528 974 331 5 024 
Mean Vehicle Purchase Price (EUR) 22 956 12 255 19 165 19 349 21 669 
Median Vehicle Purchase Price (EUR) 19 130 11 120 18 400 23 040 19 290 
Mean Vehicle Total Weight (kg) 1 958 1 229 1 728 1 935 1 918 
Median Vehicle Total Weight (kg) 1 950 1 190 1 700 1 730 1 900 
Owner Age (Years) 47.50 45.56 46.57 49.70 47.05 
Owner < 30 Years 4.98% 9.23% 5.54% 3.32% 4.32% 
Females 34.17% 57.72% 37.78% 35.95% 33.88% 
No. of Children 0.93 0.86 0.89 0.80 0.91 
No. of Cars 1.28 1.30 1.30 1.29 1.22 
Yearly Income (EUR) 47 504 34 314 42 860 90 628 41 087 
Home inside Cordon 8.93% 13.09% 13.35% 26.59% 18.73% 
Commuting across Cordon Boundary 27.48% 28.93% 27.62% 40.79% 38.06% 
Home Distance from CBD (km) 14.03 12.41 14.90 8.83 11.27 
Home-Work Trip (km) 15.25 15.17 17.86 14.15 14.85 
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The results of the binomial logit model (Model 1) aligned with expectations, however, it was 
apparent from the analysis of the summary statistics that there were substantial variations in the 
demographic makeup and alternative specific characteristics of categories within both the exempt 
EEV and non-exempt alternatives, and that the model could more accurately represent vehicle type 
choice by dividing the exempt group into two categories: electric versus ethanol; and by also 
dividing the non-exempt group into three categories: conventional versus low CO2 petrol and low 
CO2 diesel. Aggregating vehicle type choice to five alternatives provided an opportunity to compare 
between different types of EEVs, both exempt and non-exempt, whilst still principally allowing for the 
calculation of the effect of the tax exemption upon the demand for exempt EEVs, including how the 
policy affected different types of exempt EEVs. 
Among the nested logit structures, all tested specifications were found to have nesting 
parameters not statistically different from one, thus collapsing back to multinomial logit (MNL). 
Through iteratively experimenting with the available parameters and verifying the progressive 
improvement of the model with log-likelihood ratio tests, the final iteration resulted in a five-
alternative MNL model with 33 estimated parameters. Correlation amongst coefficients for this 
model was reviewed, with no significant issues identified. The estimation results of Models 1 and 2 
are provided in Table 3.  
When interpreting the results for Model 2, it is interesting to compare these findings with the 
estimates for Model 1 to understand the effects of aggregating the number of alternatives, and 
justifying the use of five alternatives compared to the simpler binomial model. 
One of the clearest results from Model 2 was that the ‘Living inside Cordon’ coefficient was 
significant for all five types of EEV, with positive values for all EEV alternatives (Electric = 0.815; 
Ethanol = 0.527; LowCO2 Diesel = 0.596; LowCO2 Petrol = 0.342). Electric vehicles had a 
coefficient approximately two times greater than the coefficient for low CO2 petrol vehicles, whilst for 
ethanol it was approximately one and half times larger. This relative difference is due to low CO2 
petrol vehicles that were not exempt from congestion tax. Interestingly, however, low CO2 diesel 
vehicles had a coefficient higher than ethanol vehicles. This suggests that those owners that 
preferred low CO2 diesel were less sensitive to the congestion tax and also to the incentive of free 
residential parking for inner-city residents. Overall, this positive coefficient supports hypothesis 1 - 
that higher preference towards energy-efficient vehicles exists for those residing within the cordon. 
The coefficients representing crossing the cordon boundary for home-work trips were, as to be 
expected, positive for exempt EEVs (Electric = 0.365; Ethanol = 0.311). This coefficient for both low 
CO2 petrol and low CO2 diesel vehicles was not statistically significant. This is reasonable given that 
these vehicles were not exempt from the congestion tax. This coefficient, unsurprisingly, was 
estimated at a similar magnitude in Model 1. These findings support hypothesis 2, that crossing the 
cordon was a significant factor in determining an individual’s likelihood of purchasing an exempt 
EEV. 
An additional interaction variable was included to represent owners living inside the cordon 
and commuting across the boundary for work. This variable was only statistically significant for 
ethanol EEVs (Ethanol = 0.303), and corresponds with the findings from the initial analysis shown in 
Table 1; owners living within the cordon and crossing the boundary for work, being the only group 
that benefitted from all three major incentive policies (congestion tax exemption, free residential 
parking for inner-city residents and national purchase rebate), had the highest likelihood of 
purchasing exempt EEVs. 
Another noteworthy variable was an owners’ residential distance from the CBD (inner-city). 
This variable's coefficient was statistically significant for electric, ethanol and low CO2 diesel 
vehicles, with all having negative values (Electric = -0.353; Ethanol = -0.129; Low CO2 Petrol = -
0.156). This result supports the finding that those individuals within or close to the cordon had the 
highest preference towards purchasing an EEV and confirms hypothesis 3. Campbell et al. (2012) 
found the opposite, that the further an individual lived from the city center in Birmingham, UK, the 
more likely there were to purchase an EEV; however, their analysis was based upon the assumption 
that EEV owners were early adopters. Moreover, the effect of income distribution of Birmingham 
may have confounded the distance effect. 
Owner income was statistically significant for electric, ethanol and low CO2 petrol vehicles, 
with a positive relationship for electric vehicles (Electric = 0.005) as opposed to the negative 
relationship for both ethanol (Ethanol = -0.014) and low CO2 petrol vehicles (Low CO2 Petrol = -
0.046). This overall trend suggests that wealthier owners were less sensitive to incentive-based 
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policies. The positive coefficient for electric vehicles is presumed to arise because these vehicles 
were generally more expensive than other types of EEVs, and thus, it was predominantly wealthier 
individuals who could afford to purchase this vehicle type. This notion will be explored further upon 
examination of Model 3. This is one variable that highlights the differences between Models 1 and 2. 
Upon analysis of Model 1, it appears that owner income, although statistically significant and slightly 
negative, did not have a substantial influence on the utility of purchasing an exempt EEV. As stated 
above, however, this is not the case; rather that Model 1’s owner income coefficient for exempt 
EEVs was merely reflecting the opposite signs held by the two different exempt EEV alternatives 
(electric and ethanol) in Model 2. 
TABLE 3 – Estimated Parameters of Multinomial Models 1 and 2 
Model 1 Non-Exempt Vehicles = Base Alternative 
Log-Likelihood = -13 310.66 Exempt EEV 
Attributes: β S.E. 
Living inside cordon .510 .064** 
Commuting across boundary 
(CAB) .314 .037** 
Living inside cordon * CAB .261 .086** 
Distance from inner-city (CBD) -.128 .018** 
Home-work trip distance .031 .016* 
Income in 10k SEK -.004 .002** 
Number of children .020 .015 
Number of vehicles -.125 .030** 
Owner under 30 years old -.174 .059** 
Female -.101 .033** 
ASC -1.23 .071** 
Model 2 Conventional Vehicles = Base Alternative 
Log-Likelihood = -23 991.78 Low CO2 Petrol Low CO2 Diesel Electric Ethanol 
Attributes: β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
Living inside cordon .342 .090** .596 .100** .815 .157** .527 .067** 
Commuting across boundary 
(CAB) .016 .061 -.052 -.074 .365 .118** .311 .038** 
Living inside cordon * CAB       .303 .088** 
Distance from inner-city (CBD) -.156 .031**   -.353 .082** -.129 .019** 
Home-work trip distance .084 .026** .166 .022** .117 .062* .043 .017** 
Income in 10k SEK -.046 .011**   .005 .001** -.014 .003** 
Number of children     -.093 .056* -.026 .015* 
Number of vehicles .189 .033** .082 .042*   -.112 .030** 
Owner under 30 years old .578 .080** .337 .107** -.605 .260**   
Female .972 .055** .194 .068**     
ASC -4.11 .124** -3.77 .130** -4.08 .140** -1.33 .052** 
Key: ** = significant at ! ≤ !.!"; * = significant at ! ≤ !.! 
The variables gender and number of children were statistically significant for some of the 
alternatives in Model 2. The number of children held a negative coefficient for ethanol (Ethanol = -
0.026) and electric (-0.093). Gender was statistically significant for low CO2 petrol and diesel 
vehicles, with females more likely to purchase these alternatives (Low CO2 Petrol = 0.972; Low CO2 
Diesel = 0.194). This could reflect a tendency for women to be more environmentally-conscious 
than men, as found by some other studies (Dagsvik et al., 2002; Golob and Hensher, 1998; Mabit 
and Fosgerau, 2011), however, this does not appear to apply to exempt EEVs. 
Individuals under the age of 30 had a positive coefficient for low CO2 petrol and diesel 
vehicles (Low CO2 Petrol = 0.578; Low CO2 Diesel = 0.337); however, this coefficient was negative 
for electric vehicles (Electric = -0.605). That young owners were attracted to some EEVs is at least 
partially consistent with the findings of the previously discussed SP studies (Hackbarth and 
Madlener, 2013; Ziegler, 2012). The equivalent coefficient in Model 1 was also negative and 
statistically significant, but with a lower magnitude (Exempt EEV = -0.174). It is unclear exactly why 
vehicle owners under 30 years were less likely to purchase exempt EEVs; however, this may be a 
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price and/or income consideration. An interaction variable for income * age was tested, but was not 
found to be significant.  
Finally, contrary to the findings of both Campbell et al. (2012) and Graham-Rowe et al. (2012), 
in Stockholm it appears that owners of exempt EEVs tend to have less vehicles, where as owners of 
non-exempt EEVs (Low CO2 Petrol/Diesel) have higher number of vehicles. This is likely a size 
consideration, which again will be explored further in the analysis of the results from Model 3. 
The estimation results of Model 3 have been included in Table 4. This model is an extension 
of the binomial model – Model 1 – where non-exempt and exempt alternatives were split into eight 
alternatives based on both purchase price (cheap or expensive) and vehicle weight as a proxy for 
vehicle size (light or heavy). The estimated coefficients of Model 3 largely reflect the same trends 
outlined for Model 2. 
It is interesting to note that the ‘Commuting across the cordon boundary’ (CAB) variable is 
statistically significant and positive for all exempt EEV alternatives, and relatively similar in 
magnitude regardless of purchase price or vehicle weight. The CAB variable is also positive for the 
non-exempt alternatives, however, as can be seen in Figure 1, the magnitude of these coefficients 
is, on average, approximately half that of the exempt EEV alternatives.  
FIGURE 2 – Percentage of New Exempt EEVs in Stockholm and Gothenburg for four Home-Work Groups 
 
Recall that the alternatives estimated in Model 3 are relative to the base alternative – Light, 
Cheap, Non-Exempt, therefore it is reasonable to expect that the CAB coefficient would be positive 
and statistically significant for other non-exempt alternatives.  
It is likely that the CAB coefficients for non-exempt vehicles in this model are positive since 
vehicle owners commuting across the cordon would have had higher incomes and preferred larger 
or more expensive vehicles (whether exempt or not) relative to the Light, Cheap, Non-Exempt 
vehicles. This assertion is supported by all owner income coefficients being statistically significant 
and positive for non-exempt vehicle alternatives, except for Heavy, Cheap, Non-exempt, which does 
have a slightly positive and significant CAB variable, but with a much lower magnitude (0.079**).   
Referring to Figure 1, we can also note that both of the Heavy, Exempt alternatives have the 
highest CAB estimate values. It is hard to say exactly what this result is reflecting, but it may be that 
heavy vehicle owners are more sensitive to the congestion tax as they already have higher 
operating costs, and as such, prefer exempt EEVs. 
Other points to highlight from the Model 3 estimation results include: 
- Individuals under 30 years of age were more likely to purchase non-exempt, lighter 
vehicles regardless of purchase price; 
- Females were more likely to purchase non-exempt, light, cheap vehicles, relative to all 
other alternatives; 
- Wealthier individuals were more likely purchase more expensive vehicles, regardless of 
exemption eligibility or vehicle weight/size; 
- Individuals living closest to the city were more likely to have smaller vehicles and also to 
have exempt EEVs – possibly reflecting higher environmental preferences amongst these 
residents (Bhat et al., 2009; Kahn, 2007), increased parking demands, and higher 
likelihood of crossing the cordon; 
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- Owners of exempt EEVs had fewer vehicles (see Flamm (2009)) and owners of non-
exempt vehicles had more vehicles –revealing perhaps that the economic benefits of the 
tax exemption outweighed the practical limitations of a smaller vehicle; and finally, 
- Owners with more children tended to have larger vehicles, however, there was little 
difference in preference among larger cars due to tax exemption or purchase price. 
 
TABLE 4 – Estimated Parameters of MNL Model with Eight Alternatives based on Price, Weight and Eligibility 
for Congestion Tax Exemption 
Model 3 Light, Cheap, Non-Exempt Vehicles = Base Alternative 
Log-Likelihood = -43 233.53  
Light,  
Cheap, Exempt 
Light, 
Expensive, 
Non-Exempt 
Light, 
Expensive, 
Exempt 
Attributes:   β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
Living inside cordon   .884 .088** .927 .129** .650 .260** 
Commuting across boundary (CAB)   .409 .050** .202 .085** .328 .160** 
Living inside cordon * CAB   -.066 .118 -.386 .188** .030 .337 
Distance from inner-city (CBD)   -.161 .025** -.129 .040** -.342 .091** 
Home-work trip distance   .028 .022 .048 .035 .155 .069** 
Income in 10k SEK   .016 .009* .097 .006** .089 .010** 
Number of children   .130 .021** -.023 .037 -.043 .071 
Number of vehicles   -.118 .044** .220 .042** -.110 .140 
Owner under 30 years old   -.119 .072* .179 .111* -.779 .301** 
Female   -.381 .043** -.730 .075** -.273 .136** 
ASC   -.784 .103** -2.145 .144** -3.577 .310** 
     
 
Heavy,  
Cheap, 
 Non-Exempt 
Heavy,  
Cheap,  
Exempt 
Heavy, 
Expensive, 
Non-Exempt 
Heavy, 
Expensive, 
Exempt 
Attributes: β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
Living inside cordon .079 .103 .503 .208** .655 .074** .803 .123** 
Commuting across boundary (CAB) .079 .047* .413 .107** .281 .039** .476 .068** 
Living inside cordon * CAB -.401 .158** .057 .270 -.616 .112** -.051 .163 
Distance from inner-city (CBD) .026 .189 -.076 .051 -.035 .017** -.072 .034** 
Home-work trip distance .025 .017 -.003 .046 -.025 .016 .021 .030 
Income in 10k SEK .008 .009 .009 .020 .096 .006** .095 .006** 
Number of children .273 .018** .161 .045** .276 .016** .255 .028** 
Number of vehicles -.027 .035 -.052 .087 -.130 .027** .015 .051 
Owner under 30 years old -.178 .070** -.537 .189** -.379 .064** -.608 .132** 
Female -1.032 .042** -1.144 .106** -1.120 .036** -1.085 .067** 
ASC .077 .091 -1.621 .218** .255 .075** -1.345 .132** 
Key: ** = significant at ! ≤ !.!"; * = significant at ! ≤ !.! 
6.1 Policy Simulation 
The following section of this paper details the effect of the congestion tax exemption on the 
demand for new, exempt EEVs. Prior to detailing the results of the policy simulation outlined in the 
methodology, an additional analysis of panel data from 2004 to 2008, comparing new, exempt EEV 
shares in both Gothenburg and Stockholm, is included. 
Table 5 presents summary statistics of the panel data, comparing averages between the two 
metropolitan regions. The home-work grouping was constructed to be largely based around a 
cordon in Gothenburg where tolls have more recently been implemented, although those tolls were 
not active in that city during 2008, when this data was collected.  
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TABLE 5 – Summary Statistics of dataset used for Stockholm compared to Gothenburg 
Summary Statistics Stockholm Gothenburg Difference 
No. of Observations 28 502 15 547 +13 186 
Age (Years) 47.41 45.99 +1.334 
Females 35.52% 38.65% -3.20%pts 
No. of Children 0.92 0.86 +0.07 
Owner Income (EUR/Year) 46 008 33 099 +13 160 
Living inside Cordon/Inner-city 11.24% 12.14% -0.90%pts 
Commuting across Cordon Boundary 29.58% 30.42% -0.93%pts 
EEVs 27.52% 38.25% -10.51%pts 
Congestion Tax Exempt EEVs 18.79% 15.66% +3.17%pts 
Congestion Tax Exempt EEVs and 
Commuting across Cordon Boundary 7.18% 5.13% +2.07%pts 
Home-Work Trip Distance (km) 15.25 12.57 +2.64 
Distance of Residence from CBD (km) 13.42 9.38 +4.01 
Analysis Region:    
Population (persons) 1 925 735 745 317 +1 180 418 
Land Area (sq.km) 4 509 1 892 +2 616 
Population Density (p/sq.km) 427 394 +33 
As shown in Table 5, comparing averages of each city reveals a great deal of similarity, with 
the most notable difference being income levels. Although the total population of the Stockholm 
region was much greater in 2008, the two study areas were very similar in terms of population 
density. Furthermore, both regions had similar shares of vehicle owners commuting across the 
cordon/inner-city boundary, similar shares of EEVs and similar shares of EEVs eligible for the 
congestion tax exemption in Stockholm. The vehicle registration data for Gothenburg came from the 
same source as the data used for Stockholm in the previous analysis. Additional demographic data 
was also sourced from Sweden’s Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB). 
Using the panel data described, the percentage of new, exempt EEVs in both Stockholm and 
Gothenburg have been presented in the four graphs displaying in Figure 2. Each graph refers to 
one of the four Home-Work Groups; as described previously: 
A. Living and working within the cordon; 
B. Living within but working outside the cordon (commute across the cordon); 
C. Living outside but working within the cordon (commute across the cordon); and, 
D. Living and working outside the cordon. 
As shown in Figure 2, particularly for the two groups commuting across the cordon (Groups B 
and C), the percentage of new, exempt EEVs increased over time in both cities between 2007 and 
2008 (when the congestion tax exemption was introduced), while the demand in Stockholm 
increased at a much greater rate. Comparing these results to Group D – the group of vehicle 
owners that were least likely to be affected by the congestion tax exemption – there was relatively 
no difference in the rate of increase in demand for new, exempt EEVs between the two metropolitan 
areas.  
Interestingly, in Group A there was a greater increase in demand in Stockholm compared to 
Gothenburg, although these vehicle owners were not commuting across the cordon boundary and 
not directly affected by the congestion tax. This could be due to the free residential parking policy 
that was also active during this period, or perhaps a social marketing effect of increased visibility of 
EEVs in Stockholm. It is expected that this group would also be affected by the exemption tax given 
the high probability that these vehicle owners would need to drive across the cordon boundary 
regularly for other, non-commute based trips. 
By taking a difference-in-differences approach, an estimate of the effect of the congestion tax 
exemption was calculated. Table 6 details the differences in the increases in demand for new, 
exempt EEVs between Stockholm and Gothenburg, over the time periods: 2007 to 2006, 2008 to 
2007 and 2008 to 2006. The difference-in-differences have been calculated as a whole, as well as 
for each of the four home-work groups outline above (Groups A, B, C, D).  
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FIGURE 2 – Percentage of New Exempt EEVs in Stockholm and Gothenburg for four Home-Work Groups  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These particular time periods were selected for comparison since: the congestion tax trial was 
only valid during the first 6 months of 2006; the permanent exemption was in place for the last 5 
months during 2007; but the exemption was in place for the entire 12 months during 2008. Although 
it may seem more suitable to compare 2005 with 2008, during 2005 the free residential for inner-city 
EEV owners was introduced in Stockholm, further conflating the results. 
It should also be noted that the purchase rebate policy for EEVs was introduced in mid-2007, 
however, since this was a national policy, it was assumed to affect vehicle owners in both cities 
equally and, therefore, not affect this analysis. 
As shown in Table 6, over the course of congestion tax exemption (2006 to 2008), there was a 
1.56% greater increase in the market share of new, exempt EEV registrations in Stockholm 
compared to Gothenburg. Focusing specifically on 2008 compared to 2007, the increase in market 
share of exempt EEV registrations in Stockholm was 1.76% greater than in Gothenburg.  
The differences between the increases in two metropolitan areas have also been included in 
Table 6 by the four home-work groups. The difference in market share increases for Group D was 
negligible, with the largest difference occurring amongst Group B, followed by Groups A and C.  
Interestingly, the differences between Stockholm and Gothenburg from 2006 to 2007 appear 
to have been negligible. There was a definitive increase in the market shares of exempt EEVs for 
the two groups most likely to be affected by the congestion tax exemption (Groups B and C), but 
these were offset by the reductions for Groups A and D. The policy instability during these two years 
could have affected demand during this period, with the effect not settling down until 2008. 
In this analysis we can try to separate the effect of the free residential parking policy and the 
tax exemption by comparing Groups A and B. Assuming the upper bound of the free residential 
parking effect on CBD residents was 3.46% between 2007 and 2008 (assuming the congestion tax 
did not affect this group), means that the congestion tax likely resulted in a minimum of a 5.53% 
exempt EEV increase amongst CBD residents. It is more difficult to separate out the general CBD 
environmental preferences, which could have also influenced purchasing decisions for this group of 
vehicle owners. Such information could be obtained through follow-up SP surveys. 
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TABLE 6 – Increase in market share of new, exempt EEV registrations: Stockholm compared to Gothenburg 
Stockholm vs. Gothenburg: % increase in market share of new exempt EEV registrations 
Time Period 
Comparison 
Group A: 
Live in/Work in 
Group B: 
Live in/Work out 
Group C: 
Live out/Work in 
Group D: 
Live out/Work out All 
2007 vs. 2006 -0.87% 4.55% 1.27% -1.06% -0.20% 
2008 vs. 2007 3.46% 8.99% 2.00% 0.95% 1.76% 
2008 vs. 2006 2.59% 13.55% 3.27% -0.11% 1.56% 
Using the estimated coefficients of Model 2, a policy simulation was carried out in order to 
assess the effect that the congestion tax exemption had upon the demand for EEVs in Stockholm 
during 2008 using an alternative method. This simulation applied the methodology outlined in 
Section 4. By assuming the variable representing commuting across the cordon largely captured the 
effect of the exemption policy, this variable was set to zero for all observations, removing the utility 
benefit of this variable for exempt EEVs and simulating a scenario where the exemption was not 
active. The predicted shares were then recalculated and compared to the predicted shares of the 
original model. 
Referring to the predicted shares in Table 7, by first focusing on ‘All Owners’ it can be seen 
that, overall, the congestion tax exemption increased the share of exempt EEVs by 1.82% (+/- 
0.32%; 95% C.I.). For owners living inside but working outside the cordon (Group B) the effect was 
substantially higher at 13.08% (+/- 3.18%; 95% C.I.), whilst for owners living outside but working 
inside cordon (Group C) the effect was a 4.76% increase (+/- 1.13%; 95% C.I.). 
Interestingly, these figures closely mirror the results of the panel data analysis comparing 
Stockholm and Gothenburg between 2008 and 2007. The overall estimate of the effect of the policy 
is almost identical at a 1.78% market share increase. The magnitude of the increase for each of the 
four groups does vary between the two methods, largely as a result of the policy simulation 
approach, which focused on the two groups that were affected by the policy-- vehicle owners that 
commuted across the boundary (Groups B and C). Moreover, the trend was similar for vehicle 
owners living inside the cordon and commuting out of it for work (Group B). 
The differences in shares of each vehicle type calculated through the policy simulation 
analysis reflected an increase in the total number of exempt EEVs in Stockholm by 10.7%, 
corresponding to an increase of 49.2% for those living inside and working outside the cordon, and 
an increase of 29.0% for those living outside and working inside the cordon. In other words, the 
congestion tax exemption appears to have had a substantial effect, leading to an increase of 519 
(+/- 91; 95% C.I.) exempt EEVs in Stockholm during 2008, out of the 5 355 purchased that year 
(10.7% increase).  
Recall that this estimate is based upon the assumption that only those vehicle owners that 
commuted across the cordon were affected by the congestion tax exemption, when in fact non-
commuting across the cordon vehicle owners would have also been influenced by this policy. This 
may be one reason as to why there are some differences in the estimates between the two methods 
outlined in this section. Most likely, the effect for Group B has been overestimated, capturing the 
effect of the policy upon those vehicle owners also living within the cordon but not commuting 
across the boundary (Group A). Since it is not possible to differentiate the effect of the inner-city free 
residential parking incentive, this policy partially conflates the estimates for Groups A and B.  
Previous studies, however, combined with the results of the panel data analysis, suggest that the 
congestion tax exemption policy had a relatively greater effect.  
Overall, both methods yield very similar estimates for the total effect of the congestion tax 
exemption policy on the demand for new, exempt EEVs in Stockholm during 2008, providing 
additional evidence to support the accuracy of these results. How these results compare with the 
results obtained in previous analyses of this policy will be explored further in the discussion. 
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TABLE 7 – Predicted Vehicle Alternative Market Shares from MNL Model 2  
Key: ** = significant at ! ≤ !.!" 
7.  Discussion 
This study provides an overview of not only the differences between individual preferences 
towards exempt EEVs (ethanol and electric) compared to other vehicles, but also estimates the 
differences between the various categories of EEVs. This study presents a number of important 
findings in addition to assessing the effect that the congestion tax exemption had upon the demand 
for new EEVs in Stockholm in 2008. 
Focusing on the estimation results, a few key variables differentiate among individuals’ 
preferences for EEVs. One of the most significant variables is the distance of residency from the 
CBD, with a statistically significant, negative relationship for both exempt EEV alternatives and low 
CO2 petrol vehicles. This finding suggests that the further an individual lived from the CBD, the less 
likely they were to purchase an EEV. Complementing this finding is the positive relationship of intra-
cordon residency, which is statistically significant for all four categories of EEVs. Individuals living 
closer to the inner-city may be motivated by financial incentives, may have higher levels of 
environmental awareness, may be more motivated to adopt cutting edge technologies, and as a 
result exhibit a preference towards ‘green’ alternatives (Hackbarth and Madlener, 2013; Jones and 
Dunlap, 1992; Mabit and Fosgerau, 2011; Ziegler, 2012). 
Focusing on cordon boundary crossings, the coefficient representing this commuting pattern 
in MNL model 2 was not statistically significant for low CO2 EEVs, suggesting that low CO2 owners 
Estimated Vehicle Alternative Market Shares in % (with 95% C.I.) 
 Conventional 
Low CO2 
Petrol 
Low CO2 
Diesel 
Electric/ 
Hybrid Ethanol 
Exempt EEV 
Total 
All Owners 
With 
Exemption 
72.38 
(+/- 0.51**) 
5.39 
(+/- 0.26**) 
3.44 
(+/- 0.21**) 
1.16 
(+/- 0.13**) 
17.64 
(+/- 0.46**) 18.80 
Without 
Exemption 
73.95 
(+/- 0.61**) 
5.50 
(+/- 0.31**) 
3.58 
(+/- 0.25**) 
1.05 
(+/- 0.16**) 
15.92 
(+/- 0.52**) 16.97 
Exemption Effect 
Market Share (%) 
-1.57 
(+/- 0.36**) 
-0.11 
(+/- 0.17) 
-0.14 
(+/- 0.13**) 
0.11 
(+/- 0.10**) 
1.72 
(+/- 0.31**) 
1.82 
(+/- 0.32**) 
Exemption Effect 
Annual Sales (%) 
-2.12 
(+/- 0.49**) 
-2.01 
(+/- 3.08) 
-3.94 
(+/- 3.65**) 
10.46 
(+/- 9.68**) 
10.08 
(+/- 1.81**) 
10.73 
(+/- 1.88**) 
Exemption Effect 
Annual Sales 
(Vehicles) 
-447 
(+/- 103**) 
-31 
(+/- 48) 
-40 
(+/- 37**) 
31 
(+/- 29**) 
490 
(+/- 88**) 
519 
(+/- 91**) 
Owners Living inside + Working outside Cordon 
With 
Exemption (%) 
49.91 
(+/- 2.37**) 
6.20 
(+/- 0.97**) 
3.85 
(+/- 0.74**) 
3.07 
(+/- 0.70**) 
36.98 
(+/- 2.46**) 40.05 
Without 
Exemption (%) 
60.71 
(+/- 2.16**) 
7.40 
(+/- 1.00**) 
4.92 
(+/- 0.89**) 
2.59 
(+/- 0.65**) 
24.37 
(+/- 2.15**) 26.96 
Exemption Effect 
Market Share (%) 
-10.81 
(+/- 2.80**) 
-1.20 
(+/- 0.79**) 
-1.08 
(+/- 0.62**) 
0.48 
(+/- 0.65) 
12.60 
(+/- 3.26**) 
13.08 
(+/- 3.18**) 
Exemption Effect 
Annual Sales (%) 
-18.08 
(+/- 4.68**) 
-14.76 
(+/- 9.47**) 
-19.68 
(+/- 11.47**) 
20.09 
(+/- 26.36) 
52.05 
(+/- 13.59**) 
49.18 
(+/- 11.84**) 
Exemption Effect 
Annual Sales 
(Vehicles) 
-154 
(+/- 40**) 
-17 
(+/- 11**) 
-15 
(+/- 9**) 
7 
(+/- 9) 
180 
(+/- 47**) 
187 
(+/- 45**) 
Owners Living outside + Working inside Cordon 
With 
Exemption (%) 
70.77 
(+/- 1.04**) 
5.10 
(+/- 0.49**) 
3.08 
(+/- 0.38**) 
1.29 
(+/- 0.24**) 
19.76 
(+/- 0.93**) 21.05 
Without 
Exemption (%) 
74.96 
(+/- 0.70**) 
5.32 
(+/- 0.36**) 
3.43 
(+/- 0.26**) 
0.95 
(+/- 0.15**) 
15.34 
(+/- 0.60**) 16.29 
Exemption Effect 
Market Share (%) 
-4.19 
(+/- 1.25**) 
-0.22 
(+/- 0.56) 
-0.35 
(+/- 0.43) 
0.34 
(+/- 0.27**) 
4.42 
(+/- 1.11) 
4.76 
(+/- 1.13**) 
Exemption Effect 
Annual Sales (%) 
-5.57 
(+/-1.67**) 
-4.30 
(+/-10.88) 
-10.63 
(+/-13.01) 
33.92 
(+/-27.07**) 
28.75 
(+/-7.25**) 
29.07 
(+/-6.89**) 
Exemption Effect 
Annual Sales 
(Vehicles) 
-293 
(+/- 88**) 
-15 
(+/- 39) 
-25 
(+/- 30) 
24 
(+/- 19**) 
310 
(+/- 78**) 
333 
(+/- 79**) 
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were not detectibly sensitive to congestion pricing. The coefficient for intra-cordon residency for low 
CO2 vehicle owners was, however, significant and positive. This could mean that the benefits of 
improved fuel economy and, potentially, more widely distributed fuel types, outweighed the toll 
deterrence, and that the congestion charge was not set high enough.  Intuitively, owners living 
within the cordon should have incurred higher costs due to the congestion pricing scheme, and 
therefore should have been more sensitive to the potential exemption, decreasing their likelihood of 
purchasing a non-exempt EEV i.e. low CO2 vehicles. An interaction variable representing owners 
living inside the cordon and commuting across the boundary was also tested for low CO2 vehicles, 
but was not found to be statistically significant. A potentially important and omitted factor that could 
influence vehicle demand is the price response to the exemption from local dealers across all 
vehicle types, but unfortunately these data were unavailable.  
Intra-cordon residents had the highest preferences towards electric vehicles, demonstrated by 
a coefficient of distance from the cordon for electric vehicles being greater than the magnitude of 
this coefficient for other EEVs. This finding could again point towards higher environmental attitudes 
of inner-city residents, with electric vehicles being seen as the most ‘green’ EEV alternative, higher 
disposable incomes of these residents, and other constraints such as parking. An interaction 
variable between income and residency within the cordon was not statistically significant. 
Driver age was significant for electric and low CO2 petrol/diesel vehicles, and shows a trend of 
younger individuals (under the age of 30) preferring low CO2 petrol/diesel vehicles compared to 
individuals over the age of 30 preferring electric vehicles, somewhat contrary to other studies 
suggesting that younger people prefer more ‘environmentally-friendly’ alternatives (Hackbarth and 
Madlener, 2013; Ziegler, 2012) 
Contrary to the findings of Campbell et al. (2012), no relationship was found between large car 
owners and number of vehicles owned, however, for smaller, exempt EEVs, vehicle owners tended 
to own fewer vehicles, supporting Flamm’s (2009) finding that EEV owners have fewer vehicles. 
Conversely, smaller, non-exempt vehicle owners in Stockholm own more vehicles.   
7.1  Policy Effect 
The congestion tax exemption policy increased the demand for exempt EEVs in Stockholm 
during 2008. The variable representing vehicle owners commuting across the cordon boundary was, 
as expected, most significant for exempt EEVs. An indicator variable representing individuals who 
crossed the boundary for work and lived within the cordon was also found to be significant for 
ethanol EEVs, providing further evidence that the exemption was significant in inducing demand for 
exempt EEVs and that the policy had the strongest effect on owners living within the city and 
commuting across the boundary for work (Group B).  
The operationalization of the "treatment" was based on those working and living on opposite 
sides of the cordon. As stated previously, this effect could capture other socio-demographic effects. 
To control for possible socio-demographic effects, an additional analysis based upon panel data 
from 2004-2008 for both Stockholm and Sweden’s second largest city, Gothenburg, was conducted. 
Gothenburg has a similar geographic distribution of socio-economic and demographic groups to 
Stockholm, although at a reduced scale. Contrary to Stockholm, however, in 2008 there was no 
congestion pricing scheme in Gothenburg, nor were there exemption policies for EEVs. Using EEV 
demand in Gothenburg as a case control, a parallel estimate of the effect of the exemption policy on 
the demand for new, exempt EEVs in Stockholm was estimated and shown in Section 6.1. Overall, 
this case control methodology revealed that the tax exemption increased demand for new, exempt 
EEVs in Stockholm from 2007 to 2008 by an estimated 1.78%. The policy simulation suggests that 
the exemption policy increased the share of EEVs in Stockholm by 1.82% to a total share of 18.8%, 
corresponding to a 10.7% increase in the number of exempt EEVs sold during 2008 (519 exempt 
EEVs). These similar results suggest that the case control methodology is appropriate and 
strengthens belief in the estimates obtained using Stockholm data.  
Although the policy simulation did not capture the effect that the exemption policy had on 
owners not commuting across the cordon, the findings of the case control analysis using 
Gothenburg data suggests that the exemption increased the share of new, exempt EEVs for these 
vehicle owners (Group A) by up to 3.5%. Again, the effect of the inner-city free residential parking 
incentive on inner-city residents could not be separated from either these estimates, no doubt 
conflating the estimates for these two groups of vehicle owners. Regardless, previous studies and a 
comparison of the differences in market share increases between Groups A and B suggest that the 
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congestion tax had a much larger effect on the demand for new, exempt EEVs, compared to the 
free residential parking policy for inner-city residents. 
Previous analyses of the tax exemption in Stockholm found that the increase in market share 
of exempt EEVs during 2008 due to the policy was 23% (Pädam et al., 2009) and 24% (Lindfors 
and Roxland, 2009). These estimates are significantly higher than the 10.7% sales increase 
estimated in this study. A primary reason for this discrepancy is that these two prior studies were 
based on aggregate level data that included both private and company-owned vehicles. Since 
aggregate level data were used, socio-demographic factors could not be taken into account, and 
admittedly, the two analyses were relatively less rigorous, with one focused mainly on the effect of 
the national purchase rebate, and the other based on a simpler OLS regression. Regardless of 
these discrepancies, given that approximately 50% of new vehicles in Stockholm during 2008 were 
company-owned, this paper’s estimate of the exemption policy effect is reasonable and within 
expectations. The compared results suggest that the congestion tax had a much greater impact 
upon company vehicle purchases compared to private vehicle purchases.  
 
8.  Conclusions 
By making use of unique evidence from revealed preferences of EEV owners in Stockholm, 
this study has identified the common characteristics of new EEV owners and estimated the effect of 
Stockholm's congestion tax exemption upon the demand for new, exempt EEVs during 2008. 
Individual’s with the greatest propensity towards purchasing an exempt EEV included: intra-cordon 
owners; owners living closest to the CBD, and owners commuting across the cordon boundary. It 
was also determined that owners under the age of 30 years and females preferred non-exempt 
EEVs (low CO2 petrol/diesel), whilst those over the age of 30 years preferred electric vehicles. The 
results of this study also tend to suggest that EEV owners in fact own fewer vehicles.  
By calculating the predicted shares from the estimated MNL model for two different scenarios, 
the effect of the congestion tax exemption upon the demand for new EEVs in Stockholm during 
2008 was estimated. Overall, the congestion tax exemption was found to have increased the share 
of exempt EEVs in Stockholm by 1.82%, with, as expected, a much stronger effect on those 
commuting across the boundary, with those living inside the cordon having a 13.08% increase, and 
those owners living outside the cordon having a 4.76% increase.  
This increase in demand corresponded to an additional 519 (+/- 91; 95% C.I.) new exempt 
EEVs purchased in Stockholm during 2008 or a 10.7% increase in private sales. This estimate is 
consistent with the existing literature.  
One limitation of these estimates was that the effect of the CBD free residential parking 
incentive, particularly in regards to inner-city residents, could not be separated from the effect of the 
congestion tax exemption. Despite this shortcoming, other studies have asserted that the free 
parking policy effect was minimal. 
In conclusion, policy makers can take note that an incentive-based policy can increase the 
demand for EEVs and it appears to be an appropriate approach to adopt when attempting to reduce 
transport emissions through encouraging a transition towards a ‘green’ vehicle fleet. In future 
studies it would be interesting to examine the potential rebound effects of the congestion tax 
exemption in regards to EEV usage. There is also a need to better understand vehicle-pricing 
responses by vehicle manufacturers in response to incentive policies that could in turn influence 
vehicle purchase decisions. A follow-up state-preference survey of Stockholm vehicle owners could 
also be useful for comparing with the revealed-preference based results and conclusions of this 
study. 
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Endnotes: 
 
i Purchase price values were not included in the vehicle registry data used in this study, but were 
instead manually extracted from independent sources, including www.bilpriser.se. These values were 
at a aggregate level, and although were collected for make and model, were not obtained for the 
various series or types of each model i.e. Base vs. Luxury vs. Sports – with Base model being the 
assumed purchase price for all. 
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Chapter 5: Article II 
Transitioning to energy efficient vehicles: an 
analysis of the potential rebound effects and 
subsequent impact upon emissions 
Despite the increasing number of studies investigating consumer preferences 
and demand for EEVs, usage rates and behavioural changes due to EEV 
adoption are yet to be comprehensively addressed in the literature. 
Building on the model structure presented in Article I, but focussing on a 
different subset of data for Stockholm County in 2008 that included real 
annual usage rates; Article II compares usage rates between 
demographically-similar vehicle owners to assess the rebound effects of EEV 
ownership (Treatment 1) and commuting across the boundary (Treatment 2). 
Using propensity score matching, owners are compared based on their 
demographics – age, gender, income, home location, number of children, etc. 
– and a car characteristic – vehicle weight (as a proxy for size) – in order to 
minimise the number of potentially confounding factors. As a result of this 
process, any differences in usage rate could be attributed to the specific 
treatment – either owning an EEV (1) or crossing the cordon boundary (2). 
Article II, whilst complementary to the research effort detailed in Article I, 
focuses specifically on the rebound effects of owning an energy efficient 
vehicle (Research Question 3); how a specific government incentive affected 
EEV usage rates (Research Question 4); and finally, the change in emissions 
due to the transition towards EEVs, including any offsets due to rebound 
effects. 
The article details a number of particularly important lessons for policy-
makers considering to incentivise the uptake of EEVs using usage-based 
benefit policies (Type D), such as an exemption from congestion pricing. 
© 2015 Elsevier. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted with permission from J. 
Whitehead, J. P. Franklin & S. Washington, 2015, “Transitioning to energy 
efficient vehicles: an analysis of the potential rebound effects and 
subsequent impact on emissions”, Transportation Research Part A: Policy and 
Practice, 74: 250-267.  
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ABSTRACT 
Given the shift towards energy efficient vehicles (EEVs) in recent years, it is 
important that the effects of this transition are properly examined. This paper 
investigates some of these effects by analyzing Annual Kilometers Traveled 
(AKT) of private vehicle owners in Stockholm in 2008. The difference in 
emissions associated with EEV adoption is estimated, along with the effect of 
a congestion-pricing exemption for EEVs on vehicle usage. Propensity score 
matching is used to compare AKT rates of different vehicle owner groups 
based on the treatments of: EEV ownership and commuting across the 
cordon, controlling for confounding factors such as demographics. Through 
this procedure, rebound effects are identified, with some EEV owners found 
to have driven up to 12.2% further than non-EEV owners. Although some of 
these differences could be attributed to the congestion-pricing exemption, the 
results were not statistically significant. Overall, taking into account lifecycle 
emissions of each fuel type, average EEV emissions were 50.5% less than 
average non-EEV emissions, with this reduction in emissions offset by 2.0% 
due to rebound effects. Although it is important for policy-makers to consider 
the potential for unexpected negative effects in similar transitions, the overall 
benefit of greatly reduced emissions appears to outweigh any rebound effects 
present in this case study.
1. Introduction
Stockholm, Sweden was chosen in 2010 as the first “European Green Capital”, not least due
to the range of policies implemented in an attempt to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 
its transport sector. Amongst these policies is Stockholm’s well-renowned congestion-pricing 
scheme – a time-varying inner-city cordon toll that creates a disincentive to emissions-intensive 
automobile trips, particularly during the weekday peak hours. Parallel to this initiative, an additional 
policy was introduced to encourage vehicle owners to transition to energy efficient vehicles (EEVs); 
certain EEVs were exempted from the congestion tax. Although both policies shared similar aims to 
reduce transport emissions, the exemption carried the additional risk of diminishing the 
effectiveness of the congestion-pricing scheme itself, as more owners took the decision to purchase 
EEVs, thus exempting themselves from the very charge that was implemented to discourage travel.  
In this paper, we seek to understand the effects of this transition towards EEVs upon annual 
kilometers traveled (AKT); whether any rebound effects occurred due to the combination of a 
decrease in fuel cost per kilometer (increased fuel efficiency of EEVs) and a decrease in operating 
costs (EEV exemption from congestion pricing); and ultimately, what was the final difference in 
emissions due to the transition towards EEVs, taking into account any potential rebound effects.  
For the purpose of this paper, we define a rebound effect as an increase in AKT due to an 
increase in fuel efficiency and/or a decrease in operating costs. Furthermore, the group of EEVs 
        doi:10.1016/j.tra.2015.02.016
examined in this paper predominantly consists of flexi-fuel vehicles (FFVs), along with a smaller 
number of hybrid-electric vehicles (HEVs). 
With the adoption of EEVs as a relatively new phenomenon, there are a limited number of 
studies investigating the AKT for these types of vehicles. This paper aims to assist in filling this gap 
by examining the extent, if any, to which rebound effects occurred in Stockholm due to some vehicle 
owner’s transition from conventional vehicles (non-EEVs) to EEVs. We also aim to assess how the 
introduction of a congestion tax exemption for EEVs has affected AKT. We do so by examining the 
differences in actual AKTs between different groups of EEV and non-EEV owners in Stockholm 
during 2008.  
This study is unique in that it uses a revealed preference dataset to analyze real AKTs; and 
employs propensity score matching to control for potential self-selection bias between owner 
groups, minimizing the number of factors to which any differences in AKTs could be attributed. The 
research approach is specifically designed such that the effects of the congestion tax exemption 
policy upon the AKT rates of EEVs can be assessed, as well as the average difference in emissions 
between demographically-similar non-EEV and EEV owners. 
Given these ambitions, the three main research questions for this study are: 
RQ1. Did private owners of EEVs in Stockholm County in 2008 drive further than 
demographically-similar conventional vehicle (non-EEV) owners? 
RQ2. How did the congestion tax exemption affect the AKTs of EEVs in Stockholm during 
2008?; and, 
RQ3. Overall, how did the transition to EEVs affect vehicle emissions in Stockholm in 2008, 
and to what extent did rebound effects (EEV ownership and the congestion tax 
exemption) offset these emissions reductions? 
In order to answer the research questions outlined above, in this study we need to not only 
separate out the effect of owning an EEV but also the effect of the congestion tax exemption. In 
order to do so we adopt three different approaches using propensity score matching. These are: 
1.) Compare the annual usage rates of demographically-similar vehicle owners with the 
main difference being whether individuals own an EEV or not (Treatment 1);  
2.) Compare the annual usage rates of demographically-similar vehicle owners with the 
main difference being whether individuals commute across the cordon or not 
(Treatment 2); and, 
3.) Compare usage differences, using a combination of the results from Treatments 1 and 
2, in addition to a comparison between those owners affected by the congestion tax 
exemption, crossing the cordon and EEV ownership (EEV owners commuting across 
the cordon) and those that are not (non-EEV owners not commuting across the 
cordon) i.e. Treatment 3. 
With these AKT differences obtained, with combinations of factors applying to each, we are 
able to isolate the rebound effects attributed to both EEV ownership and the congestion tax 
exemption, in addition to the effect of commuting across the cordon, in terms of affected vehicle 
owners AKT i.e. EEVs commuting across the cordon. The results obtained from this comparative 
analysis are subsequently used to estimate the change in vehicle emissions due to the transition 
within the fleet towards EEVs. These results also provide the possibility to assess the extent to 
which emissions reductions have been offset by rebound effects i.e. EEV owners driving further due 
to either increased fuel efficiency (EEV ownership) and/or the congestion tax exemption. 
Section 2 of this paper continues with an outline of the background literature pertaining to 
rebound effects and AKT. A history of EEV policies in Stockholm is briefly detailed in Section 3, 
followed by a more detailed explanation in Section 4 of the methodology described above. The 
revealed preference dataset is then outlined and explored in Section 5. Whilst finally, the results of 
the analysis are detailed in Section 6, including the calculated rebound effects, differences in 
emissions and the effect of the exemption policy upon AKT for EEVs, with the implications of these 
findings discussed in Section 7.  
2.  Background 
Several studies have investigated the purchase demand for EEVs across multiple countries, 
including in: Denmark (Mabit and Fosgerau, 2011), Germany (Hackbarth and Madlener, 2013; 
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Ziegler, 2012), Norway (Dagsvik et al., 2002), United Kingdom (Batley et al., 2004), Canada (Ewing 
and Sarigöllü, 1998), USA (Brownstone et al., 1996; Bunch et al., 1993; Hess et al., 2012; Musti and 
Kockelman, 2011) and Australia (Beck et al., 2013), yet there is limited literature pertaining to the 
extent to which EEV are used, that is, the annual kilometers traveled (AKT) compared to 
conventional vehicles. The EEV purchase literature largely involves stated-preference data analysis, 
where EEV demand has been modeled using respondents’ answers to hypothetical scenarios 
involving different vehicles; different incentive policies; or a combination of both. Although these 
studies have shed light on the potential preferences of individuals towards EEVs, since the results 
have been based upon answers to hypothetical scenarios, it is difficult to conclusively state that 
these findings reflect what actual choices vehicles owners have made in regards to purchasing and 
using EEVs.  
This paper builds on a previous study published in Transportation Research Part A: Policy and 
Practice, that examined consumer preferences for EEVs in Stockholm in 2008 and the effect of the 
congestion tax exemption on EEV demand (Whitehead et al., 2014). Taking advantage of the same 
set of revealed preference data, here we analyze annual vehicle usage rates. In doing so, this study 
overcomes one of the limitations of using SP data - that stated preferences might not reflect the 
respondents’ choices in real-life. A follow-up SP study could be useful, however, in understanding 
how incentive policies may affect future vehicle purchase and usage decisions, particularly 
regarding new and future vehicle types i.e. solar-powered vehicles or fuel-cell vehicles. 
One of the main research questions we aim to address in this paper is whether rebound 
effects occurred in Stockholm, due to the transition to EEVs, in order to understand to what extent 
these rebound effects could have offset the intended environmental benefits. We define a rebound 
effect as an increase in annual kilometers traveled (AKT) due to an increase in fuel efficiency and/or 
a decrease in operating costs. In the context of EEVs, rebound effects may specifically refer to an 
increase in travel that partially offsets the reductions in fuel consumption and pollutant emissions 
that would be gained from a change to clean fuels - all else equal.  
Rebound effects have been found to occur in the transition phase of a number of different 
‘environmentally-friendly’ products, such as space heating, white goods, residential lighting and 
even automotive transport (Gillingham et al., 2013; Greening et al., 2000; Schipper and Grubb, 
2000). It is not so much the existence, but rather the extent of these rebound effects, that is 
important for policy analysis in order to understand what the actual reduction in energy usage or 
emissions is of a policy or incentive. The concept of rebound effects was first noted by William 
Jevons in 1865 (often referred to as Jevons’ Paradox) where he speculated that improvements in 
engine technology not only led to an increase in the efficiency at which coal was used, but made 
coal an economical fuel for many other uses and in turn led to an overall increase in coal usage 
(Jevons, 1865). A similar concept was proposed by Brookes (1979) and Khazzoom (1980), which 
suggested that policies promoting increases in energy efficiency would lead to overall increases in 
energy usage, offsetting the intended policy-induced reductions. This concept is often referred to as 
the ‘Khazzoom-Brookes Postulate’ (Gillingham, 2011). 
In the transition to EEVs, it is unclear to what extent such potential rebound effects have offset 
the intended emissions reductions. In a recent opinion piece in Nature, Gillingham et al. (2013) 
suggest that the rebound effects of such transitions are ‘overplayed’ and, that although they are 
real, studies have shown that such rebound effects only offset energy (or emission) savings by 5-
30% maximum, meaning that overall energy use, or in this case overall emissions, is still 
substantially reduced through the transition towards more energy efficient products. 
A number of studies have investigated the effects of increases in fuel economy or fuel 
efficiency upon AKT. As one of the forerunners in this field, Greene (1992) found that the rebound 
effects of these shifts have been consistently slight, at around 5-15%. Small & Van Dender (2005) 
similarly found that increases in fuel efficiency in the United States between 1966 and 2001 led to 
rebound effects corresponding to approximately 5-20% increases in AKT, with a noticeable decline 
in the magnitude of these rebound effects over time. Interestingly, Small (2012) found that an 
incentive policy, specifically “feebates” (fees for purchasing non-EEVs and rebates for purchasing 
EEVs) have led to equally modest increases or ‘rebound effects’ in regards to AKT in the United 
States in recent years. Whether rebound effects occur due to the implementation of usage-based 
EEV incentives, such as a congestion tax exemption, is not clear. This paper aims to fill this gap. 
One study, similar to this paper, addresses the so-called ‘Prius Fallacy’ – the notion that 
transitioning to environmentally-friendly products results in increased overall energy usage that 
completely offsets any reduction in energy usage due to the improvement in energy efficiency 
(Afsah and Salcito, 2012). Using a dataset supplied by Gillingham (2011), the study compares the 
distribution of annual distances traveled by Prius owners in California with that of all other vehicles 
in the state between 2002 and 2009. Through this analysis, no major differences in the usage rates 
between the two groups of owners were identified. We aim to compare the results from our study 
with Afsah and Salcito (2012) findings, and in turn, shed further light on whether rebound effects do 
occur in the EEV market, and these rebound effects impact upon intended emissions reductions. 
In addition to literature specifically focusing on AKT for EEVs, Golob et al. (1990; 1996; 1989) 
uses structural equation modeling (SEM) to jointly examine car ownership and car usage, analyzing 
the causal relationships between driver characteristics and annual distance driven. Although these 
papers do not specifically investigate EEVs, they provide insight into which variables could be 
relevant to analyzing car usage. In particular, the demographics of: disposable income, owner age, 
number of children and home location, appear significant in relation to how much an individual uses 
their vehicle. 
3.  Case study – Stockholm, Sweden  
The City of Stockholm has had an EEV project active since 1994, promoting the adoption of 
EEVs and their associated fuel types (Pädam et al., 2009). Two of the main actions in this project 
between 1994 and 2005 were to implement several tax incentives in order to increase both the 
demand and supply of alternative fuels, and to replace conventional vehicles (non-EEVs) within the 
government fleet with EEVs. During 2005, the demand for alternatively fueled vehicles sharply 
increased, with a common explanation being the variety of financial incentives that were introduced 
during the same year. Free residential parking was introduced in May 2005 for inner-city residents 
with alternatively-fueled vehicles, followed shortly by the introduction of a seven-month long 
congestion pricing trial starting in January 2006, from which alternatively fueled vehicles e.g. 
ethanol, hybrid/electric, biogas-fueled vehicles, were exempt. A 12-month hiatus followed in which 
neither policy was active. During the hiatus, a referendum was conducted on the question of 
whether to retain the congestion pricing scheme or not, with 52.5% of the population voting against 
the policy (Börjesson et al., 2012). During 2006, a national general election was also held, which led 
to a change in government from the previous center-left party to a center-right alliance of parties. 
Despite the setback of the referendum result (which was in fact not legally binding) and the change 
in government, the congestion tax, including the EEV exemption, was reintroduced permanently 
from August 2007, with the tax revenue to be hypothecated for the construction of new roads. This 
was in contrast to the environmental motivations of the policy under the previous government. In 
April of 2007, the new national government also introduced a purchase rebate for all alternatively 
fueled and low CO2 vehicles. This policy included not only alternatively fueled EEVs, but also 
gasoline/diesel vehicles emitting less than 120 grams of CO2 per km (Lindfors and Roxland, 2009; 
Pädam et al., 2009). 
This combination of policies, but particularly the congestion tax exemption, appears to have 
led to a significant increase in the usage and ownership of EEVs in Stockholm. During the 
congestion tax trial in 2006, only 2% of cordon crossings were made by exempt EEVs. Fast-forward 
a few years, and by December 2008, this number had increased to 14% (Börjesson et al., 2012).  It 
quickly became apparent to policy-makers in Stockholm that the exemption policy had been so 
successful, that the congestion-reduction effectiveness of the congestion pricing scheme was 
eroding. This realization led to the tax exemption being phased out on the 1st of January 2009, less 
than 18 months after its permanent introduction. The exemption did, however, remain active for all 
eligible EEVs that had been purchased prior to this date until the 1st of August 2012 (Birath and 
Pädam, 2010) 
The effect of the congestion tax exemption policy is analyzed as part of this study as it is seen 
as the most significant EEV incentive policy introduced in Stockholm. In a previous study it was 
found to have increased the share of new EEVs in Stockholm in 2008 by 1.8% (Whitehead et al., 
2014). Despite this, the effects of other policies applicable to EEVs during 2008 cannot be ignored 
and may be partially captured in the results of this analysis - despite efforts being made to isolate 
the effect of the exemption policy. Also, since the congestion tax exemption policy was phased out 
from the beginning of the year 2009, 2008 was the only full year in which the exemption was active 
for all new EEVs; it was the only year of data available for which exempt EEV owners had reported 
their AKTs; and was the latest year of data available at the time of analysis. 
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4.  Methodology 
The quantitative analysis in this study consists of a series of “difference-in-differences” 
comparisons of annual kilometers traveled (AKT) between different vehicle owner groups to isolate 
different rebound effects. This is followed by estimates of the emissions effects that might be 
attributable to choice of vehicle-type and to these different rebound effects. The “difference-in-
differences” comparisons build on a conceptual model of several factors that could influence AKT 
and how these factors interact with each other.  
4.1  Conceptual Approach 
As shown in Figure 1, while AKT (1) are surely somewhat dependent on owner characteristics 
(2) via various direct or unknown mechanisms, there may be some mechanisms that can be 
detected using vehicle registry data. In this framework, these indirect mechanisms largely follow five 
paths. First, environmental impacts (3), and second, operating costs (4), are both a direct result of a 
vehicle’s fuel type (6), though to some extent the role of environmental impacts depends also on 
how highly the owner takes this into account when making travel decisions (2). 
 
 
Figure 1 – Conceptual Model of Factors Influencing Annual Kilometers Traveled 
The third mechanism is whether commute trips were subject to the congestion tax (5). In the 
context of Stockholm’s congestion pricing scheme, whether such charges were applicable was 
dependent upon both fuel type (6) and whether trips crossed the toll cordon (7), where the second 
of these was determined by the owner’s home and work locations (8 & 9). The direction of travel 
across the cordon, and whether a trip crosses the cordon (7), acts as a fourth mechanism affecting 
AKT. This is expected as a owner’s home-work trip would have a significant affect on the magnitude 
of annual vehicle usage. Finally, the fifth mechanism is that kilometers traveled on non-work trips 
could be significantly affected by home location (8), due to differences in urban structure and in 
access to other travel modes.  
To detect and quantify rebound effects in the context of EEV usage in the Stockholm region, it 
is necessary to first identify which private vehicle owners belong to groups affected by the 
mechanisms shown in Figure 1. The three main mechanisms, identified in this case study, that may 
specifically affect EEV owner usage rates are: the reduced operating costs of commute trips (due to 
the congestion tax exemption for EEVs); possibly lower per-kilometer operating costs and 
environmental impacts of EEVs compared to non-EEVs (EEV ownership); and systematic 
differences in usage needs of vehicle owners crossing the cordon for work (commuting across the 
cordon). Note that for the available data used here, it is impossible to distinguish between 
environmental effects and per-kilometer operation cost effects, since these manifest in the same 
owner groups.  
The first mechanism is identified based on delineation between: those who are affected by the 
congestion tax exemption versus those who are not. Indeed, all EEV owners in the Stockholm area 
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might cross the toll cordon on some of their trips, but there is a clear group who are affected on a 
regular basis: those who commute across the toll cordon. These owners can be identified based on 
home and work location information included in the data analyzed. All conventional vehicle owners 
can be considered to have unaffected commutes; EEV owners who live and work on the same side 
of the cordon can also be said to have unaffected commutes; whilst those EEV owners who live and 
work on different sides can be said to have affected commutes. 
Assessing the second mechanism requires delineation between EEV and non-EEV owners, 
which is relatively straightforward to implement since the vehicle registry includes complete data on 
vehicle fuel type. The comparison is complicated, however, by the fact that EEV owners commuting 
across the cordon are also affected by the first mechanism - lower operating costs of commute trips 
due to the congestion tax exemption. A comparison of usage rates between these EEV and non-
EEV owners is also complicated by the tendency for vehicle owners with certain characteristics to 
choose EEVs instead of non-EEVs e.g. Hybrid-Electric vehicles being purchased by wealthier 
individuals due to their higher purchase price. The propensity score matching (PSM) procedure, 
detailed below, helps to minimize these confounding effects.  
Delineation between vehicle owners commuting and not commuting across the cordon allows 
for an assessment of the third mechanism. Again, this is relatively easy to implement given that 
owner home and work locations are included in the data analyzed. The comparison is complicated 
though, again by the fact that EEV owners commuting across the boundary are also affected by the 
congestion tax exemption. 
As mentioned previously, the effects of these three mechanisms are confounded by the direct 
effects of owner characteristics on AKT. To minimize these confounding effects, propensity score 
matching (PSM) can help by computing differences in AKT between owners that have been paired 
using a set of weights that are based on the propensity for an owner to be among a specific group, 
where that propensity is, in turn, based on owner characteristics. The detailed methodology for PSM 
is presented in Section 4.2, but an important consideration is that the methodology applies to only 
one level of vehicle owner grouping at a time. In practice, the choice of how to organize the PSM 
procedure depends on how the “treatment” is defined.  
The first treatment is that an owner’s vehicle is an EEV, and the estimated average treatment 
effects on the treated (ATETs) reflect a comparison between the AKTs for EEV versus non-EEV 
owners, after correcting for different propensities to be in the treated group. Indeed, owners have 
two other characteristics important to the framework in Figure 1: whether they live within the cordon 
and whether they work within the cordon. In this first approach, these characteristics are used to 
identify a series of four commuting groups that are analyzed in parallel. As shown in Figure 1, home 
location and commuting across the toll cordon are thought to be more closely related to AKT than 
work location. Since including all three of these would over-define the groups, the commute groups 
for analysis were chosen to be:  
A. Inner-city worker-residents (living and working within the cordon); 
B. Reverse commuters (living within but working outside the cordon);  
C. Standard commuters (living outside but working within the cordon); and, 
D. Outer-city worker-residents (living and working outside the cordon). 
The four parallel analyses allow comparisons to be drawn between the ATETs for different 
commuting groups in order isolate different effects on AKT. The method behind these comparisons 
is described further in Section 4.3. Most relevant amongst these comparisons is between groups B 
and A, and between C and D; in both cases, the difference being whether vehicle owners are 
directly affected by the congestion tax exemption – by crossing the cordon – or not. 
Still, the differences in ATETs in these comparisons could also be explained by other 
unobserved owner characteristics. The PSM procedure minimizes the unobserved effects of owner 
characteristics on the computed “difference-in-differences” in AKT between EEV and non-EEV 
owners, but it does not do the same for the additional delineations between these owner groups. 
For example, when comparing between groups B and A, the differences in estimated ATETs may 
be due to the tax exemption policy; commuting across the toll cordon; or they may be due to 
systematic differences. 
In an attempt to account for this, a second approach is undertaken using an alternative 
organization of the groups such that the “treatment” is taken to be commuting across the cordon.  
The analysis is then conducted in parallel on the following four owner-resident groups: 
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E. EEV owners living inside the cordon; 
F. Non-EEV owners living inside the cordon; 
G. EEV owners living outside the cordon; and, 
H. Non-EEV owners living outside the cordon. 
By comparing Groups E and F, the additional AKT due to owning an EEV and commuting 
across the cordon for those EEV owners living inside the cordon can be obtained (similarly to 
comparing Groups A and B above). By comparing Groups G and H, the additional AKT due to 
owning an EEV and commuting across the cordon, for EEV owners living outside the cordon, can be 
obtained (similar to comparing Groups C and D above). Although these differences in ATETs could 
be due to the congestion tax exemption, again, they could also be due to additional delineations, in 
this case - EEV ownership, or due to other systematic differences. The full identification and 
isolation of these different factors is described in Section 4.3. 
4.2    Propensity score matching procedure 
The propensity score matching procedure, first proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983),  
aims to pair comparable observations between treated and control groups by matching those 
observations that exhibit similar characteristics according to a propensity score. The propensity 
score is calculated as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given pre-treatment 
characteristics. The exact form of the propensity score is defined by the modeler; in this case, the 
score is based upon a logistic regression. The propensity score for this paper is calculated in 
STATA 10 using the “pscore.ado” function (Becker and Ichino, 2002).  
For this paper, the probability of an owner belonging to the treated group (!TEEV =1 ) i.e. likely 
to own an EEV or in the case of Treatment 2 - commute across the cordon, conditional on !Xi – the 
owner-specific demographics and car characteristics, is defined by the following binomial logit 
model:  !Pr(TEEV =1|Xi )= F Xi{ }    (1) 
   
where, the probability is calculated by carrying out a logistic regression (!F  denotes the logistic 
c.d.f.) on a function of the owner demographics and a vehicle characteristic !f (Xi ) , !including all 
covariates as linear terms , for example:  ! f (Xi )= β0 +βageAge+βgenderGender +βincomeIncome+βcarsizeCarsize+…+βmXm  
The covariates included in the regression (Equation 1) were: age, gender, number of children, 
income, home distance from cordon, home-work trip distance and vehicle weight (as a proxy for 
vehicle size). By fitting the logit model to the starting specification!f (Xi ) , the estimated covariates 
β 's  can then be used to produce a score for every observation, representing each owners’ 
propensity towards purchasing an EEV (or commuting across the cordon for the secondary 
analysis) based upon!f (Xi ) !i.e. their demographics and the car characteristic.   
The suitability of the specified propensity score, and in turn the included owner 
demographics/car characteristic, can be tested by a procedure of successive splits in the sample 
group.  First, the sample group is split into 5 equal intervals of the propensity score. Within each of 
the intervals, the average propensity score of the treated and control groups are tested to ensure 
that they do not differ. If the test fails, the interval is then split in half and the process continues until, 
in all intervals, the averages do not differ. Once a suitable number of intervals is determined, within 
each interval, the means of each variable are tested to ensure that they do not differ between the 
control and treated groups (e.g. same average age, same average income, etc.). If the means of 
one or more characteristics differ, the specification of the propensity score is determined as 
unsuitable and has to be respecified. This process ensures that the propensity score specified is 
able to simulate a randomized sample i.e. by ensuring that the final number of intervals are 
balanced, all treated observations can be matched with appropriate control observations.  
Once an appropriate specification of the propensity score is determined, the matching process 
can then be performed. Each treated observation is matched with the closest control observations 
based upon the propensity score. There are several different methods for matching propensity 
scores, including: nearest-neighbor, caliper and kernel matching. The method employed in this 
study is that of kernel matching, given the small number of owners in the treatment group (energy 
efficient vehicles): approximately 1,000 EEV owners vs. 90,000 non-EEV owners. Kernel matching 
allows for all treated observations to be matched with a weighted average of every control 
observation, with weights inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity score of the 
treated observation and that of the control observation. The kernel matching procedure was carried 
out in STATA 10 using the “attk.ado” function (Becker and Ichino, 2002). Nearest-neighbor matching 
was also performed for comparative purposes. 
Equation 2 displays how the average difference in AKT between EEV and non-EEV owners 
(or owners commuting/not commuting across the cordon),!τ
K , otherwise known as the average 
treatment effect upon the treated (ATET), is calculated using the kernel matching (“attk.ado” 
function).  
The average treatment effect upon the treated (!τ
K ) is calculated by: 
 
!
τ K = 1
NT
Yi
T − Yj
C W(i , j)( )j∈T∑{ }
i∈T
∑ where:
W(i , j)=weighting!function = G pj − pihn⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
G
pk − pi
hn
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟k∈C
∑
  (2) 
The procedure can be explained as follows. The difference is first calculated between a single 
treated (EEV) observation,!Yi
T , and the weighted average AKT of all control observations -
 ! YjC W(i , j)( )j∈T∑ . This weighted average is based upon the weights provided by the kernel function, 
represented by !
G ⋅( ) , and is multiplied by the differences between the propensity score of the 
treated observation, !pi , and each control observation’s propensity score -!pj . Essentially this means 
that higher weights are given to the control observations with propensity scores closest to that of the 
treated observation i.e. higher weights are given to control group individuals who are most similar in 
age, number of children, car weight, etc., compared with each treated individual. This procedure is 
repeated for all treated observations, then summed together and divided by the total number of 
treated observations,!NT , in order to obtain the ATET -!τ
K . Bootstrapping was used to obtain 
standard errors for the ATET results, with the procedure described above, repeated 500 times per 
matching comparison. 
The result of developing the propensity score matching process is two matched groups that 
can then be used to calculate the average treatment effect upon the treated group (ATET), as 
described above. The final result, the ATET, provides a value for comparison of the difference in 
AKTs between the two groups whilst minimizing confounding effects due to demographic 
differences and a car characteristic. The outputs of these functions were verified with the use of 
“psmatch2.ado”, a similar function to those supplied by Becker & Ichino (2002), which was supplied 
by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
4.3    Identification and separation of factors and rebound effects on EEV usage rates 
In addition to identifying differences in AKT between owner groups based on a treatment 
(ATETs), using the PSM procedure outlined above, it is important to understand what proportion of 
these differences in ATETs, and in turn AKTs, are attributable to different factors and rebound 
effects. In the case study of Stockholm, these different factors are principally that of: 
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1.) Rebound effect of EEV ownership on EEV (crossing) AKT – due to reduced lower 
per-km operating costs and environmental effects; 
2.) Effect of crossing the cordon on EEV (crossing) AKT – due to differences in usage 
needs between crossing/non-crossing vehicle owners; and, 
3.) Rebound effect of congestion tax exemption policy on EEV (crossing) AKT – due to 
reduced operating costs for commute trips (toll exempt). 
In order to do so, it is necessary to isolate the effects of these different factors by comparing 
between the ATETs obtained for each of the eight vehicle owner groups previously described 
(Groups A-H), with the addition of two further comparisons – as outlined in approach 3 below. The 
following explanation, including figures, mainly focuses on those owner groups with home locations 
within the cordon (Groups A, B, E and F), however, the same method applies for the other four 
groups with home locations outside of the cordon (Groups C, D, G and H). 
As shown in Figure 2, the first approach to identifying and isolating the effects of different 
factors on vehicle usage involves comparing between the ATETs estimated using Treatment 1 (EEV 
ownership) for crossing/non-crossing EEV groups - ATET(A) and ATET(B), respectively. In doing 
so, an estimate for the tax exemption effect on the AKT of crossing EEVs can be obtained: ATET(B) 
minus ATET(A). This rebound effect estimate, however, is based on the assumption that the tax 
exemption only affected those owners commuting across the cordon; and, that the rebound effect of 
EEV ownership was equal for non-crossing/crossing EEV owners. Given that the rebound effect of 
EEV ownership could differ between these two groups, a second approach is also adopted. 
!
Figure 2 – Estimating rebound effects and factors affecting AKT based on Treatments 1, 2 and 3, using 
the example of vehicle owners living inside the cordon.  
The second approach to identifying and isolating different effects involves comparing the 
ATETs obtained using the treatment of “commuting across the cordon” (Treatment 2). An estimate 
of the effect of the congestion tax exemption on EEV (crossing) AKT can be obtained by comparing 
between the ATETs obtained for EEV owners - ATET(E), with non-EEV owners - ATET(F), as 
shown in Figure 2: ATET(E) minus ATET(F). Again, however, this estimate is based on the 
assumption that the treatment of crossing the boundary affected both non-EEV and EEV vehicle 
owner’s equally. Given this may not have been the case in reality, a third approach is adopted. 
The third, and final approach to identifying and isolating different factors affecting vehicle 
usage rates, involves combining the results of Treatments 1 and 2 to compare the ATETs between 
EEV owners crossing the cordon, and in turn affected by the tax exemption policy (Figure 2 shows 
the example of the EEV-Live In-Work Out group for owners living inside the cordon), with all other 
vehicle owners with the same home location relative to the cordon. This means that an additional 
comparison also has to be made, using the propensity score matching procedure, between vehicle 
owners affected by the factors of EEV ownership, crossing the boundary and the tax exemption 
policy (EEV, Live In, Work Out) and the vehicle owners not affected by any of these factors (non-
EEV, Live In, Work In) – Treatment 3 (EEV Ownership + Crossing Cordon). 
In doing so, we have: 
1.) ATET(B) - including the rebound effects of EEV ownership and the tax exemption on 
crossing EEVs; 
2.) ATET(E) - including the effect of commuting across the cordon and the rebound effect 
of the tax exemption on crossing EEVs; and, 
3.) ATET(J) - from PSM comparison using Treatment 3, including the effect of commuting 
across the cordon, and the rebound effects of EEV ownership and the tax exemption 
on crossing EEVs. 
Each of these ATETs control for other confounding factors that could lead to differences in 
AKT between the crossing EEVs, and other vehicle owners. As such, the estimated ATETs can 
largely be attributed to the associated treatments specified in each procedure. By comparing 
between the three ATETs, separately for owners living inside/outside the cordon, we can quantify 
the effect of crossing the boundary and the rebound effect of EEV ownership on EEV (crossing) 
AKTs. In doing so, we gain an understanding of whether the factors of EEV ownership, and 
commuting across the cordon, affect vehicle owner groups differently – contrary to the assumptions 
of approaches 1 and 2. These results are then compared with those obtained in approaches 1 and 
2, in order to estimate the effect of the congestion tax exemption. 
The estimates of these different factors and rebound effects, for approaches 1, 2, 3, are 
obtained by repeating the calculation of ATETs, and comparing between ATETs, 500 times through 
a bootstrapping procedure in STATA. The final estimates obtained for approach 3 are subsequently 
used to calculate the changes in vehicle emissions, in order to quantify the contribution of the 
different factors, as described below. 
4.4   Estimating the effects on CO2 emissions 
The emissions related to different rebound effects, as well as due to the overall transition to 
EEVs, are quantified based on the ATETs, and differences in ATETs, obtained through the methods 
previously detailed. In understanding the effect of these changes on emissions, the first 
consideration is to understand the types of fuels consumed by EEVs. Since the majority of EEVs 
examined in this study were flexi-fuel vehicles that ran on both ethanol (E85) and gasoline, it was 
difficult to ascertain which fuel was predominantly selected during the period of analysis.  
Previous studies have found that consumers in Sweden appear to exhibit utility maximizing 
behavior when considering the purchase of E85 compared to gasoline. Pacini et al. (2014) plot the 
net monetary benefit of choosing to use E85 over regular gasoline, based on the assumption that 
consumers will choose E85 fuel when the price of E85,!PE85 , is less than 74.4% the price of regular 
gasoline, 
!
Pgasoline   – see Equation 3.  !Net!Monetary!Benefit!of!choosing!E85! = Pgasoline ×0.744( )−PE85⎡⎣ ⎤⎦   (3) 
This assumption is based on prior analyses of the differences in energy content between E85 
and regular gasoline (Goettemoeller, 2007; Roberts, 2008; West et al., 2007; Yacobucci, 2007) and 
has been published previously – see Pacini and Silveira (2011). 
We plot the same net monetary benefit of choosing E85 over gasoline, along with the volume 
of E85 sold in Sweden between July 2007 and June 2009, in Figure 3, using data obtained from the 
Swedish Petroleum Institute (2012). As can be seen, the volume of E85 sold during this period 
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largely follows the trend of the net monetary benefit curve, suggesting that Swedish flexi-fuel vehicle 
owners behaved rationally.  
It should be noted that the net monetary benefit of E85 is relative to choosing regular gasoline 
(no ethanol component) and is therefore conservative given that the specification of gasoline sold in 
Sweden during the period of analysis contained a minimum of 5% ethanol, and thus had a lower 
energy content than regular gasoline (Gröna Bilister, 2007). 
Figure 3 – The net monetary benefit (+) or loss (-) of choosing to use E85 versus gasoline in 
Sweden between 2007 and 2009, compared with the volume of E85 fuel sold during this period. 
From Figure 3, it can be seen that E85 was the more economical fuel choice before October 
2008; however, the opposite was the case from late 2008 onwards. For minor cost differences, 
many owners may have chosen ethanol over gasoline, assuming their choice of vehicle type 
reflected an underlying preference for ethanol. However, many users of these vehicles may have 
perceived that gasoline was the more economical fuel choice given that their vehicle would drive 
further on a single tank of fuel when filled with gasoline. This may have instead led to a bias towards 
gasoline, particularly during the periods when the difference between ethanol (E85) and gasoline 
was minimal.  
For the sake of this study, a scenario has been assumed where, on average, EEV owners 
choose to purchase E85 75% of the year and gasoline for the other 25% of the year. This scenario 
aligns with the split in cost efficiency of the two fuel types in 2008, as shown in Figure 3. In order to 
show the sensitivity of these calculations, summary emission results have also been calculated for a 
50% E85/ 50% Gasoline scenario, and also a 100% E85 scenario.  
The dataset examined in this study contained information pertaining to each vehicle’s fuel 
economy, emissions and the annual kilometers traveled. The main concern with using the included 
emissions factors were that they did not include the lifecycle emissions of different fuel types – a 
point of contention that has been greatly discussed, particularly in regards to ethanol fuel (Delucchi, 
2005; Searchinger et al., 2008). In order to be consistent, and include lifecycle emissions, emissions 
factors were sourced from Gröna Bilister (2007) - the Swedish Green Motorists Society – who in 
turn sourced these factors from a life-cycle analysis of each fuel type that was conducted by 
Network for Transport Measures (NTM). This analysis accounted for all emissions from Field-to-
Wheel or Well-to-Wheel for both gasoline and E85 sold in Sweden (Blinge, 2006). 
Specifically, for E85, as of 2006, the life-cycle emissions factor was 0.6kg CO2/L CO2. This 
was based on 70% of Swedish ethanol being sourced from Brazilian sugarcane and 30% from the 
Swedish Pulp Industry. It is also based on an average yearly composition of 84% Ethanol/ 16% 
Gasoline, given the gasoline content is increased up to 21.4% during the winter months (Gröna 
Bilister, 2007). For gasoline, the life-cycle emissions factor used was 2.68 kg CO2/L (Gröna Bilister, 
2007). The gasoline emissions factor was used in calculating emissions changes amongst both 
flexi-fuel vehicles and hybrid-electric vehicles. 
It’s also important to note that these emission factors are for the specific time period examined 
in this paper. Developments post-2008 led to a change in the sourcing of ethanol in Sweden, with 
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the Brazilian sugarcane component reduced down to only 10.8% by 2011 (Östborn et al., 2013). 
More recent life-cycle assessments of E85 in Sweden, that have taken into account these changes 
in Ethanol sources, have found that the lifecycle emissions factor for E85 is 1.07 kg CO2/L, whilst for 
gasoline (with 5% ethanol) it is 2.74 kg CO2/L. Interestingly, it has also been found that the average 
E85 mix has changed to 82% Ethanol and 18% Gasoline (Östborn et al., 2013). These newer 
figures were considered less relevant than the 2006 figures, and as such, are not used in the 
subsequent emissions calculations. 
For each EEV vehicle, three levels of emissions are calculated. Specifically for flexi-fuel 
vehicles: 
E1. Emissions of EEVs, including rebound effect!!= 25%×GasolineCR×GasolineLEF × AKT( )+ 75%×E85CR×E85LEF × AKT( ) !!
E2. Emissions of EEVs, not including rebound effects!
!= 25%×GasolineCR×GasolineLEF × AKT − ATET( )
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
+ 75%×E85CR×E85LEF × AKT − ATET( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  
 
E3. Simulated Emissions of similar 100% gasoline non-EEV, not including rebound effects 
!
= NonEEVGasolineCR×NonEEVGasolineLEF × AKT − ATET( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦   
where, CR = Consumption Rate; LEF = Lifecycle Emissions Factor; AKT = Annual Kilometers 
Traveled;  ATET = Average Treatment Effect on the Treated/Rebound Effect. 
Actual Emissions (E1) represents the actual emissions of each EEV, including any rebound 
effects. The Simulated Emissions (E2) represents what emissions would have been for each EEV 
had the rebound effects not occurred. Whilst the Simulated Emissions of an equivalent non-EEV, 
running on 100% gasoline (E3), represents what the emissions would have been for each vehicle, 
had it been an equivalent non-EEV and the rebound effect had not occurred. In regards to the 
Simulated Emissions (E3), for flexi-fuel vehicles, the fuel consumption of similar models running on 
100% gasoline were used, whilst for hybrid-electric vehicles (predominantly Toyota Prius), the 
consumption rates of a Toyota Corolla, extracted from the dataset, were used (162 grams CO2/km; 
6.9L/km). 
By taking the average difference between (E1) and (E3), the average difference in emissions 
due to the transition to EEVs is estimated. Additionally, by taking the average difference between 
(E1) and (E2), the average difference in emissions due to rebound effects, and thus the average 
offset in emissions reductions, is also estimated. These offsets are additionally split into the 
proportions attributable to each rebound effect.  
The emissions calculations are carried out separately for each of the four commuter groups 
(A, B, C and D), with average emissions rates per EEV obtained for each of the three levels of 
emissions described above, as well as overall averages for the EEV fleet in Stockholm in 2008. 
5.  Data and exploratory analysis 
Vehicle ownership and distance traveled have been previously analyzed for all of Sweden by 
Pyddoke (2009). In his study, he found that in Sweden it appears that rural vehicle owners use their 
vehicles significantly more than urban vehicle owners, and that car ownership is relatively slow to 
change across the country’s population. The same data, procured from Sweden’s Central Bureau of 
Statistics (SCB), are used here and consist of vehicle registration data for the year 2008, combined 
with socio-economic variables for individuals in Sweden. This particular dataset is part of a larger 
set of panel data, which holds the same information but for the years 1998 through to 2008. 
However, the only year in which congestion pricing was in place and for which distance-traveled 
data was available for EEVs was 2008, hence the analysis here is restricted to that year.  
The dataset for this analysis is based upon vehicle registry data that has been merged with 
owner-specific demographics. The dataset is restricted to include only private vehicle owners who 
lived/worked within Stockholm; owned a vehicle built in 2000 or later; and who had reported their 
annual kilometers traveled (AKT) during 2008. 
It is important to note that in Sweden new vehicles are not required to report the AKT, through 
a safety inspection, until 2-3 years after the date of purchase. For this reason, all newly purchased 
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vehicles did not have real AKT values in the analyzed dataset. This meant that most new vehicles 
from 2007 and 2008, including new EEVs, are not included as part of this analysis. 
In terms of EEVs included in the dataset analyzed, the group predominantly consisted of 
gasoline/E85 (ethanol) flexi-fuel EEVs – 82% of EEVs. The lower number of other EEVs, such as 
the hybrid-electric (7% of EEVs in the dataset), could be attributed to the fact that these vehicles 
were mostly newer models i.e. after 2005/2006, and thus had non-real AKT values. Only ethanol 
flexi-fuel and hybrid-electric vehicles are included in this study. 
To assess the circumstances of different vehicle owners with respect to the congestion tax 
exemption, for the principal analysis (approach 1) the dataset is split into the four previously 
mentioned groups (A-D). Table 1 outlines the summary statistics for these groups.  
 Table 1 – Summary of groups used for propensity score matching based on home and work locations 
Attribute Averages: 
Living/working 
inside Cordon  
(A) 
Living 
inside/working 
outside cordon 
(B) 
Living 
outside/working 
inside cordon  
(C) 
Living/working 
outside cordon 
(D) 
No. of Observations. 4,717 2,760 19,108 63,190 
AKT [km/year] 11,719 13,506 13,339 14,596 
Age [years] 47.3 46.8 46.3 46.8 
Females [%] 33.9 32.6 36.7 34.6 
No. of Children 0.69 0.6 1.17 1.09 
Disposable Income [SEK]; 538,614 399,870 420,474 320,081 
EUR in Brackets (53,861) (39,987) (42,047) (32,008) 
Congestion Tax Exempt [%] 2.37 3.59 1.30 0.90 
EEVs [%] 2.37 3.59 1.30 0.90 
Home-Work Distance [km] 5.00 14.72 16.91 15.15 
Distance from Cordon [km] - - 11.91 16.28 
For comparative purposes, in Table 2, the difference in AKTs between EEVs and conventional 
vehicles, before propensity score matching, is also included. For Treatment 1, it can be seen that 
the average EEV AKTs were largely similar at approx. 15,000 km for three of the four groups (B, C, 
D). Similarly for conventional vehicles, these same three groups had an average AKT of approx. 
13,800 km. The fourth group – those drivers living and working inside the cordon  (A) – drove the 
least and had the smallest difference in AKT. This is expected as this group had the greatest access 
to public transport and the shortest distances to drive for home-work trips. For Treatment 2, in terms 
of those individuals living inside the cordon (E, F), both EEV and non-EEV owners commuting 
across the cordon traveled more than their non-crossing counterparts. The opposite is true for those 
individuals living outside the cordon (G, H). 
For Treatment 1, the two groups with the highest difference between the EEV AKTs and non-
EEV AKTs were those who commuted across the cordon, with those living in the city having a 
difference of 9.3% and those living outside the city having a difference of 4.7%. These results are in 
line with what was expected, given that EEV owners in each of these two groups had the additional 
incentive of free trips across the congestion-pricing cordon.  
A similar trend is observed amongst the descriptive statistics for the groups in Treatment 2, 
where the EEV owners living inside and commuting across the cordon (E) traveled 24.1% further 
than their non-commuting EEV counterparts, which was greater than the 14.9% difference between 
non-commuting/commuting non-EEV owners living inside the cordon (F). EEV owners living outside 
the cordon and commuting across the boundary traveled 7.6% less than their non-commuting 
counterparts, which is less than the 8.7% difference between commuting/non-commuting non-EEV 
owners living outside the cordon. Interestingly, EEV owners inside the cordon, crossing the 
boundary, travelled 25.5% further than their non-EEV, non-crossing counterparts (J). For EEV 
owners living outside the cordon and crossing the boundary, however, they in fact travelled 4.4% 
less annually compared with their conventional, non-crossing counterparts (K). 
These results, although interesting, cannot be fully attributed to EEV ownership or the 
congestion tax exemption, as other confounding factors, such as demographic differences, could 
have affected AKT. It is for this reason that we employ propensity score matching (PSM) in order to 
minimize the number of potential confounding factors. 
Table 2 - Comparison before propensity score matching (PSM) 
  # Observations Mean Annual Kilometers Traveled (AKT) 
Group Treatment Treated Control Treated Control Diff. % Diff. 
[km/year] [km/year] [km/year] 
A Live & work inside cordon 
1: 
EEV 
ownership 
102 4,605 11,844 11,707 +137 +1.17% 
B Outbound commuter 87 2,661 14,692 13,447 +1,245 +9.26% 
C Inbound commuter 216 18,859 13,950 13,324 +626 +4.70% 
D Live & work outside cordon 514 62,621 15,094 14,590 +504 +3.46% 
All Groups 919 88,746 14,426 14,137 +289 +2.05% 
E EEV owner living inside cordon 
2: 
Commute 
across 
cordon 
87 102 14,692 11,844 +2,848 +24.05% 
F Non-EEV owner living inside cordon 2,661 4,605 13,447 11,707 +1,740 +14.86% 
G EEV owner living outside cordon 216 514 13,950 15,094 -1,144 -7.58% 
H Non-EEV owner living outside cordon 18,859 62,621 13,324 14,590 -1,266 -8.68% 
All Groups 21,823 67,842 13,350 14,394 -1,043 -7.25% 
J Live inside cordon 3.  
EEV & 
Crossing 
Cordon 
87 4,605 14,692 11,707 +2,985 +25.50% 
K Live outside cordon 216 62,621 13,950 14,590 -640 -4.39% 
6.  Results 
6.1 Propensity Score Matching results 
Table 3 provides a summary of the results obtained in both the principal analysis (approach 1) 
for each of the four commute groups (A, B, C, D) and in the secondary analysis (approach 2) for 
each of the vehicle owner groups (E, F, G, H), as well as the additional two comparisons made for 
approach 3 (Groups 1 and 2) after propensity score matching. By comparing the results of Table 2 
(before PSM) and Table 3 (after PSM) it can be seen that there are only marginally significant 
differences between the ATET and the mean annual kilometers traveled for some of the groups 
analyzed. For Treatment 1, the groups of owners living inside the cordon had the greatest 
differences: 
- Group A: Mean AKT Diff. = 137 km vs. ATET = 175 km;Δ of Differences = +27.7% 
- Group B: Mean AKT Diff. = 1,245 km vs. ATET = 1,592 km;Δ of Differences = +27.9% 
Whilst for Treatment 2, the groups of vehicle owners living outside the cordon had the greatest 
differences: 
- Group G: Mean AKT Diff.= -1,144 vs. ATET = -780 km;Δ of Differences = -31.9% 
- Group H: Mean AKT Diff. = -1,266 vs. ATET = -1,004 km;Δ of Differences = -20.7% 
These results suggest that some level of self-selection bias was present amongst these 
groups, and as such we have managed to successfully control for some of the confounding factors 
that could have potentially affected the analysis had PSM not been performed. 
Focusing on the results for Treatment 1, we can recall the assumption of this study, that those 
EEV owners with home-work trips crossing the congestion pricing cordon would be the main 
individuals affected by the tax exemption policy. The results in Table 3 show that both of the groups 
commuting across the cordon for work had the greatest ATETs (B, C). Focusing on those living 
outside and working inside the cordon (C), the ATET is 628 km, however, this ATET is not 
statistically significant. This means that the average increase in usage rates of 4.7% cannot solely 
be attributed to EEV ownership and the congestion tax exemption. For the reverse group, those 
living inside and working outside the cordon (B), the ATET is much greater at 1,576 km, and is 
statistically significant, therefore representing an average of a 12.2% increase in AKT due to EEV 
ownership and the congestion tax exemption. Despite the result for Group C, given these two 
groups were affected by the congestion tax exemption; it appears that this policy may have led to 
some increases in vehicle usage rates. The proportion of the increase in usage rates observed that 
can be attributed to the tax exemption will be discussed further in Section 6.2. 
  # Matched Observations PSM Results 
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 Table 3 – Comparison of AKTs after propensity score matching (PSM) 
Key: *** = significant at ! ≤ !.!"; ** = significant at ! ≤ !.!"; * = significant at ! ≤ !.! 
In regards to the two groups not commuting across the cordon (A and D), for those living and 
working inside the cordon (A), the rebound effect of EEV ownership is relatively small at 175 km, but 
not statistically significant. For owners living and working outside the cordon, the rebound effect is 
greater at 502 km, and statistically significant, corresponding to a 3.4% increase. Both of these 
groups were assumed to be least affected by the exemption policy given they did not commute 
across the cordon. Presumably those living inside the cordon, due to its limited size of approx. 
30km2, would have been affected to some degree given they may cross the boundary for non-
commuting trips, but the fact that the group living and working outside the cordon still was found to 
have an average AKT for EEV owners higher than that of non-EEV owners, even after controlling for 
demographic and vehicle characteristic differences, implies that another effect, although minimal, 
was also at play. The results suggest that these EEV owners were using their vehicles more than 
they would have if they had owned a non-EEV, without any incentive to do so, which implies that 
this rebound effect was most likely due to the improved fuel economy of their EEV. As alluded to in 
Section 2, clear evidence for rebound effects associated with the purchase of ‘green’ products exists 
in other contexts, particularly for home heating, white goods and lighting (Gillingham et al., 2013; 
Greening et al., 2000; Schipper and Grubb, 2000). In all of these cases, the improvement in energy 
efficiency and, in turn, the associated energy cost reductions, ultimately resulted in an increased 
level of total consumption by the consumers on average. We will investigate in Section 6.3, whether 
this applies in the case study of EEVs in Stockholm. 
Returning to Table 3, in terms of the results for Treatment 2, the trends largely reflect those 
discussed in Section 5. For EEV and non-EEV owners living inside the cordon, crossing commuters 
traveled further than their non-crossing counterparts; whilst the opposite was true for EEV and non-
EEV owners living outside the cordon. The differences in usage rates between crossing and non-
crossing owners are quite significant, particularly amongst those individuals living inside the cordon. 
EEV owners living inside the cordon and commuting across the boundary (E) traveled 22.30% 
further than their non-crossing EEV counterparts. Although less so, non-EEV owners living inside 
the cordon and commuting across the boundary for work (F) traveled 14.9% further than their non-
crossing non-EEV counterparts. Both ATETs were statistically significant. 
Again it was interesting to see that non-crossing vehicle owners, living outside the cordon, 
traveled further than their crossing counterparts. For EEV owners (G), we can see those crossing 
the boundary traveled 5.3% less than their non-crossing EEV counterparts. This points to another 
potential geographic factor at play, leading to individuals living/working outside the cordon to drive 
further than other individuals – presumably most likely due to less alternative modes of transport. 
For non-EEV owners (H) living outside the cordon and commuting across the boundary the 
Group Treatment Treated Control ATET [km/year] 
Std. 
Error 
ATET/ 
(AKTTreated 
– ATET) 
AKT 
Diff. 
Before 
PSM 
A Live & work inside cordon 
1.  
EEV 
ownership 
102 4,473 +174.9 559.7 +1.50% +1.17% 
B Outbound commuter 87 2,369 +1,592.3 644.9** +12.16% +9.26% 
C Inbound commuter 216 16,523 +628.0 509.9 +4.71% +4.70% 
D Live & work outside cordon 514 62,546 +502.0 328.3 +3.44% +3.46% 
E EEV owner living inside cordon 
2.  
Commute 
across 
cordon 
87 96 +2679.1 835.5*** +22.30% +24.05% 
F Non-EEV owner living inside cordon 2,661 4,595 +1739.7 164.6*** +14.86% +14.86% 
G EEV owner living outside cordon 216 431 -779.5 580.9 -5.29% -7.58% 
H 
Non-EEV owner 
living outside 
cordon 
18,859 58,008 -1004.4 225.4*** -7.01% -8.68% 
J Live inside cordon 3.  
EEV & 
Crossing 
Cordon 
87 4,232 +3018.0 646.1*** +25.85% +25.50% 
K Live outside cordon 216 50,792 -327.8 451.3 -2.30% -4.39% 
difference was even greater - they traveled 7.0% less than their non-crossing counterparts. This 
result is to be expected given the non-crossing counterparts did not have to pay a congestion tax for 
their commute trips, and again, their alternative modes of transport would have been limited. 
Finally, whilst we can see that the results for the owner groups living inside the cordon (J) 
were fairly similar before and after PSM; for owners living outside the cordon (K), the effect of the 
treatment on the treated (ATET = -328 km), although not statistically significant, was almost half of 
the pre-PSM results (-640 km). This difference in results suggests that these two owner groups 
were likely quite different in terms of the propensity to own an EEV and commute across the cordon. 
6.2 Estimates of different rebound effects including the congestion tax exemption 
In order to assess different rebound effects on EEV owners’ AKTs we compute differences in 
ATET using three approaches. Starting with the PSM results for Treatment 1 (owning an EEV), we 
can isolate differences in total travel for those commuting across the cordon versus those with other 
commutes. As before, we assume that home location has a greater bearing than work location on 
AKT. We can compare then the calculated ATETs between Groups B and A (living inside the 
cordon) and between Groups C and D (living outside the cordon) – with the only difference between 
each of these groups being whether they commuted across the cordon or not. Assuming our PSM 
results have minimized the potential confounding factors that could lead to differences in AKT 
between EEV and non-EEV owners, and that the rebound effect of EEV ownership is equal for both 
crossing/non-crossing groups, we can then say that any difference in ATETs between each of these 
groups, with the home location being the same, after bootstrapping, can be attributed to the 
congestion tax exemption. The results for this analysis can be seen in the first part of Table 4. 
Comparing Groups B and A, we can see that the congestion tax exemption appears to have 
increased the average AKT of EEV owners living inside the cordon by 10.7%. Similarly, by 
comparing Groups C and D we can see that the congestion tax exemption appears to have 
increased the average AKT of EEV owners living outside the cordon by 0.9%. The result for owners 
living inside the cordon was statistically significant after bootstrapping; however, the result was not 
significant for those owners living outside the cordon.  
Intrinsic to approach 1, the comparisons B-A and C-D control for some self-selection into EEV 
ownership but do not control for self-selection into commuting across the cordon. To investigate 
these effects further, we adopt two further approaches using Treatments 2 and 3, respectively. 
In the second approach we use the calculated ATETs from Treatment 2 to carry out a similar 
comparison to approach 1, now comparing Group E to Group F and Group G to Group H. In this 
case we have used PSM to calculate the average difference in AKT between owners commuting/not 
commuting across the cordon for each home location/vehicle type group.  Assuming that through 
this procedure we manage to minimize the number of confounding factors that may influence the 
difference in AKT between commuting/not commuting across the boundary groups, and that 
commuting across the cordon effects EEV and non-EEV owners equally, by comparing these 
calculated ATETs between the EEV and non-EEV owner groups - that both live either inside or 
outside the cordon - we can attribute these differences in ATETs to the rebound effect of the 
congestion tax exemption policy on the AKT of EEV owners crossing the cordon. These results are 
also shown in Table 4. 
Comparing Groups E and F, we can see that the congestion tax exemption appears to have 
increased the average AKT of EEV owners living inside the cordon and crossing the boundary by 
6.8%; this is less than the result from Approach 1 of a 10.4% increase and is not statistically 
significant after bootstrapping. Similarly, by comparing Groups G and H we can see that the 
congestion tax exemption appears to have increased the average AKT of EEV owners living outside 
the cordon and crossing the boundary by 1.6%, slightly greater than the finding of a 0.9% increase 
in AKT for this group from Approach 1, but again is not statistically significant. 
It is not unexpected that the results for the effect of the congestion tax exemption from each 
Treatment approach differ. One factor contributing to these differences is due to the process of 
propensity score matching. Treatment 1 involved matching demographically-similar vehicle owners 
in each four of the home/work commuter groups, with the only difference being whether the 
individual owned an EEV or not. Whilst for Treatment 2, the process involved matching 
demographically-similar commuters crossing the cordon, with those that did not cross the cordon, 
for each home locate/vehicle type group. In both cases, whilst confounding factors have been 
controlled for in obtaining ATETs, when comparing between ATETs based on an additional 
delineation, the estimates rely on the assumption that the factors affecting each owner group are 
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equal. Given this may not be the case in reality, a third and final approach to identifying and 
isolating the factors affecting EEV AKT is undertaken, with results also shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 – Estimation results for Approaches 1, 2 and 3 to difference-in-differences between ATETs 
Group(s))
PSM)Treatment)
Or#difference#in#
treatments)
Interaction)of)Factors))))))))))))))
Or#difference#in#factors)
On)Group))
or#(Comparison))
) ATET))
or#difference#in#ATETs)
EEV) CAB) ICR)
)
EEV)
*CAB)
EEV)
*ICR)
CAB)
*ICR)
EEV)
*CAB)
*ICR)
)
EEV) CAB) ICR)
)
Est.) S.E) %)Chg.)
A! X! ! ! ! ! X! ! ! ! X! ! X! ! +175! 546! +1.5%!
B! X! ! ! ! X! X! ! X! ! X! X! X! ! +1592! 645**! +12.2%!
B"A$ $ $ $ $ X$ $ $ X$ $ X$ (X)$ X$ $ +1417$ 830*$ +10.7%$
F! ! X! ! ! ! ! X! ! ! ! X! X! ! +1740! 159***! +14.9%!
E! ! X! ! ! X! ! X! X! ! X! X! X! ! +2679! 818***! +22.3%!
E"F$ $ $ $ $ X$ $ $ X$ $ (X)$ X$ X$ $ +939$ 827$ +6.8%$
J! X! X! ! ! X! X! X! X! ! X! X! X! ! +3018! 668***! +25.9%!
J"E$ X$ $ $ $ $ X$ $ $ $ (X)$ X$ X$ $ +339$ 598$ +2.4%$
J"B$ $ X$ $ $ $ $ X$ $ $ X$ (X)$ X$ $ +1426$ 184***$ +10.7%$
B"(J"E)$ $ $ $ $ X$ $ $ X$ $ (X)$ (X)$ X$ $ +1253$ 823$ +9.3%$
E"(J"B)$ $ $ $ $ X$ $ $ X$ $ (X)$ (X)$ X$ $ +1253$ 823$ +9.3%$
D! X! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! X! ! ! ! +502! 328! +3.4%!
C! X! ! ! ! X! ! ! ! ! X! X! ! ! +628! 510! +4.7%!
C"D$ $ $ $ $ X$ $ $ $ $ X$ (X)$ $ $ +126$ 616$ +0.9%$
H! ! X! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! X! ! ! 91004! 228***! 97.0%!
G! ! X! ! ! X! ! ! ! ! X! X! ! ! 9779! 581! 95.3%!
G"H$ $ $ $ $ X$ $ $ $ $ (X)$ X$ $ $ +225$ 584$ +1.6%$
K! X! X! ! ! X! ! ! ! ! X! X! ! ! 9328! 447! 92.3%!
K"G$ X$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ (X)$ X$ $ $ +452$ 395$ +3.3%$
K"C$ $ X$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ X$ (X)$ $ $ "956$ 267***$ "6.4%$
C"(K"G)$ $ $ $ $ X$ $ $ $ $ (X)$ (X)$ $ $ +176$ 655$ +1.3%$
G"(K"C)$ $ $ $ $ X$ $ $ $ $ (X)$ (X)$ $ $ +176$ 655$ +1.3%$
Key:!
ICR!=!Inner!city!resident!
EEV!=!Energy!efficient!vehicle!ownership!
CAB!=!Commuting!across!cordon!boundary!
EEV*CAB!=!Effect!of!congestion!tax!exemption!
***!=!significant!at!p!<=!0.01!
**!=!significant!at!p!<=!0.05!
*!=!significant!at!p!<=!0.10!
The final approach involved comparing the EEV-crossing the cordon owner groups – that had 
usage rates affected by crossing the cordon, and the rebound effects of EEV ownership and the tax 
exemption - with each of the other vehicle owner groups that were not affected by all three of these 
factors simultaneously. In doing so, the total differences in usage rates (ATETs) could proportionally 
be attributed to each of these effects. 
We can see for those owners living inside the cordon, it in fact appears that the rebound effect 
of EEV ownership differed between commuting/non-commuting groups – in contrast to the 
assumption of approach 1. This meant that EEV ownership led to a 2.4% increase in AKT for EEV 
owners crossing the boundary, in contrast to the 1.5% increase in AKT for EEVs not crossing the 
boundary. Similarly, crossing the boundary appears to have affected EEV and non-EEV owners 
differently, with the AKT of EEV owners crossing the boundary 10.7% higher than non-crossing EEV 
owners, as opposed to the 14.9% higher usage rates of non-EEV owners crossing the cordon, 
compared with non-crossing non-EEV owners. Overall, this meant that the congestion tax 
exemption led to a 9.2% increase in the usage rates of EEV owners living inside the cordon and 
crossing the boundary for work i.e. +1,237 km per EEV owner per year. This estimate was in 
between those obtained in approaches 1 and 2, but was not statistically significant. 
Turning to those owners living outside the cordon, it appears that both the rebound effect of 
EEV ownership and the effect of crossing the boundary differed across vehicle owner groups, 
although less so than for owners living inside the cordon. EEV ownership led to a 3.4% increase in 
AKT amongst EEVs not crossing the cordon, but instead increased the AKT of EEVs crossing the 
boundary by 3.3% on average. Similar to what was found in approach 2 for owners living outside 
the cordon, both EEV and non-EEV owners crossing the cordon had lower AKT rates than their non-
crossing counterparts. The magnitude of this effect did differ, however, with a 6.4% decrease for 
EEV owners and a 7.0% decrease for non-EEV owners. These findings meant the congestion tax 
exemption led to a 1.3% increase in the usage rates of EEV owners living outside the cordon and 
crossing the boundary for work i.e. +176 km per EEV owner per year. This estimate was again in 
between those obtained in approaches 1 and 2, but was not statistically significant. 
Although it is not possible to scientifically assess whether the estimates of approach 3 are 
more robust than those obtained in approaches 1 and 2, the final approach allowed for variation in 
the effects of factors across different owner groups (unlike the assumptions required for approaches 
1 and 2), and the results of approach 3 were largely in line with expectations. Without carrying out 
approaches 1 and 2, however, it would not have been possible to undertake approach 3, nor would 
have its theoretical basis been as clear. Given these findings, the results from approach 3 have 
been used in the vehicle emissions calculations – detailed in Section 6.3. Also, although some 
results were also not statistically significant, we have taken a conservative approach when 
calculating emissions changes, assuming rebound effects from approach 3 occurred. 
6.3 Emissions results 
The results of the emissions calculations have been summarized in Table 5, based on the 
results from approach 3, with vehicle owners split into the four groups based upon home and work 
locations – as with Treatment 1. Using the 75% E85/25% Gasoline scenario, including both flexi-fuel 
and hybrid-electric vehicles, the reduction in emissions due to the fleet transition towards EEVs was 
50.5% or approximately 1.27 metric tons of CO2 less per vehicle per year. In saying this, however, 
had EEV owners not driven the extra distances (ATETs), additional reductions of 0.11 and 0.02 
metric tons of CO2 per vehicle per year in direct emissions would have been applicable for EEVs 
that commuted across the congestion pricing cordon, offsetting the potential reduction in emissions 
by a further 4.4%-pts and 0.6%-pts respectively.  
Overall, the potential reduction in emissions due to owners’ choices to purchase EEVs was 
offset by 2.0%-pts or 0.05 metric tons of CO2 per vehicle per year due to rebound effects. The offset 
in reduction emissions was made up of a 1.47%-pt offset due to EEV ownership and a 0.56%-pt 
offset due to the congestion tax exemption. The congestion tax exemption had a particularly large 
impact on offsetting the emissions reductions of the group of EEV owners living inside the cordon 
and commuting across the boundary, at 4.4%-pts. These figures show that, across the entire 
population of EEV Owners, actually owning the vehicle – with its reduced per-km operating costs 
and environmental effects – had a bigger effect on increasing usage rates, and offsetting emissions 
reductions, compared with that of the congestion tax exemption.  
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Table 5 - Difference in CO2 emissions for flexi-fuel (E85/gasoline) + hybrid-electric EEVs 
 
Home Work Obs. ATET [km] 
Scenario: 75% E85/25% gasoline flexi-fuel EEVs 
+ Hybrid-Electric EEVs 
Average CO2 
Emissions 
per EEV 
[metric tons] 
Rebound Effects Applicable: EEV Ownership 
In In 102 +175 
Emissions with rebound effect 0.971 
Emissions without rebound effects 0.957 
Emissions without rebound effects if equivalent gasoline vehicle 2.074 
Change in Emissions attributable to EEV transition 
-1.102 
(-53.17%) 
Change in Emissions attributable to rebound effect +0.014 (+0.69%) 
Rebound Effects Applicable: EEV Ownership + Congestion Tax Exemption Policy 
In Out 87 
+1592 
 
(EEV: 
339  
+ 
Tax 
Policy: 
1253) 
Emissions with rebound effect 1.253 
Emissions without rebound effects 1.117 
Emissions without rebound effects if equivalent gasoline vehicle 2.419 
Change in Emissions attributable to EEV transition 
-1.166  
(-48.20%) 
Change in Emissions attributable to all rebound effects +0.137 (+5.65%) 
Change in Emissions attributable to Tax Exemption Policy 
+0.108  
(+4.44%) 
Rebound Effects Applicable: EEV Ownership + Congestion Tax Exemption Policy 
Out In 216 
+628.0 
 
(EEV: 
452   
+ 
Tax 
Policy: 
176) 
Emissions with rebound effect 1.203 
Emissions without rebound effects 1.150 
Emissions without rebound effects if equivalent gasoline vehicle 2.492 
Change in Emissions attributable to EEV transition 
-1.287  
(-51.72%) 
Change in Emissions attributable to all rebound effects +0.053 (+2.13%) 
Change in Emissions attributable to Tax Exemption Policy 
+0.015  
(+0.60%) 
Rebound Effects Applicable: EEV Ownership 
Out Out 514 +502.0 
Emissions with rebound effect 1.311 
Emissions without rebound effects 1.268 
Emissions without rebound effects if equivalent gasoline vehicle 2.618 
Change in Emissions attributable to EEV choice 
-1.307  
(-49.92%) 
Change in Emissions attributable to rebound effect +0.043 (+1.64%) 
All 919 - 
Average change in Emissions attributable to EEV choice -1.266 
(-50.54%) 
Average Emissions reduction offset attributable to  
EEV Ownership rebound effect 
+0.038 
(+1.47%) 
Average Emissions reduction offset attributable to 
Congestion Tax Exemption Policy rebound effect 
+0.014 
(+0.56%) 
Average Emissions reduction offset attributable to  
all rebound effects 
+0.051 
(+2.03%) 
Whilst focusing on the rebound effects, it is also important to note that these losses in 
emissions reductions do not take into account the impact of secondary effects, such as the effect of 
increased AKT of EEVs upon congestion levels, and in turn upon the efficiency of other vehicles on 
the road, which would only further offset reductions in emissions. Nor has this investigation 
considered the lifecycle emissions of transitioning to an EEV from a non-EEV, relative to these 
annual emissions reductions, though these estimates do include fuel-type lifecycle emissions. 
In order to see how sensitive the emissions results were in comparison to the 75% E85/ 25% 
gasoline scenario, emissions from two additional scenarios were also calculated, with the summary 
results included in Table 6. As shown, if owners of flexi-fuel EEVs in Stockholm, during 2008, chose 
solely to use E85, whilst still including the emissions savings from hybrid-electric vehicles, the 
overall emissions reductions could have been as high as 67.8% or -1.7 metric tons of CO2 per EEV 
on average. Even under a 50%/50% fuel split scenario, the overall emissions reductions are still 
substantial at 33.3% or -0.8 metric tons of CO2 per EEV on average. 
Table 6 – Sensitivity Analysis of Emissions Results under different Scenarios 
Summary Emissions Results 
Average CO2 Emissions per EEV [metric tons] 
Emissions Scenarios  
50% E85/  
50% Gasoline EEV 
+ Hybrid-Electric 
EEV 
75% E85/ 
25% Gasoline EEV 
+ Hybrid-Electric 
EEV 
100% E85/ 
0% Gasoline EEV 
+ Hybrid-Electric 
EEV 
Average change in Emissions attributable to  
EEV choice 
-0.835 
(-33.30%) 
-1.266 
(-50.54%) 
-1.698 
(-67.78%) 
Average Emissions reduction offset attributable to 
EEV Ownership rebound effect 
+0.051 
(+1.97%) 
+0.038 
(+1.47%) 
+0.024 
(+0.98%) 
Average Emissions reduction offset attributable to  
Congestion Tax Exemption Policy rebound effect 
+0.019 
(+0.77%) 
+0.014 
(+0.56%) 
+0.008 
(+0.35%) 
Average Emissions reduction offset attributable to 
all rebound effects 
+0.070 
(+2.74%) 
+0.051 
(+2.03%) 
+0.033 
(+1.32%) 
Overall, it is apparent that the transition towards a cleaner, energy efficient vehicle fleet in 
Stockholm has resulted in a substantial reduction in the volume of direct emissions generated by 
these owners. In saying this, the loss in efficiency due to the rebound effects of increased AKT for 
EEVs cannot be ignored, particularly for those EEV owners commuting across the cordon. For these 
groups, the rates of increased usage appear to largely be due to the congestion tax exemption 
policy, rather than EEV ownership – although this was still a factor.  
Whilst the congestion tax exemption policy appears to have achieved its’ goal in improving the 
sustainability of Stockholm’s vehicle fleet through incentivizing the purchase of EEVs, it does also 
appear to have partially offset this improvement in vehicle emissions through also encouraging 
additional AKT of these vehicles. The extent of these rebound effects appear to be in line with the 
ranges suggested in other studies of 5-30% (Gillingham et al., 2013; Gillingham, 2011; Greening et 
al., 2000; Schipper and Grubb, 2000), which have also advocated that rebound effects of this 
magnitude are ‘overplayed’ and not substantial.  
Whether it is in fact the case such rebound effects are ‘overplayed’ or not, it is nonetheless 
important for policy-makers to be aware of such effects; the potential extent to which such effects 
may offset the intended reductions in vehicle emissions; and in turn, be able to take these effects 
into account in any cost-benefit analyses that are carried out for similar policies in the future. This 
study provides additional evidence to support incentivizing EEVs, whilst providing valuable insight 
into one of the unintended consequences of such a program, and its magnitude i.e. the magnitude 
of rebound effects generated by encouraging an uptake in EEVs. 
7.  Discussion and conclusions 
Overall, the results of this study suggest that EEV owners traveled further annually than non-
EEV owners, with this effect ranging from 1.5-12.2% depending upon home/work location. These 
findings are in line with the results of other studies into the rebound effects of transitions to 
“environmentally-friendly” products of lying within the range 5-30% (Gillingham et al., 2013; 
Gillingham, 2011; Greening et al., 2000; Schipper and Grubb, 2000) and are a real contribution to 
helping narrow this range, particularly in terms of rebound effects concerning the uptake of EEVs. 
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The results also largely concur with the findings of a similar investigation into the comparison of 
AKTs of Prius owners in California, with the rest of the population (Afsah and Salcito, 2012), in 
showing that rebound effects overall are fairly minimal. However, in contrast to these earlier studies, 
the differences in ATETs calculated in this study suggest that at least part of this increase in AKT for 
EEV owners can be attributed to a congestion tax exemption policy, rather than just EEV ownership, 
particularly for owners commuting across the congestion-pricing cordon in Stockholm.  
Of course a number of other factors could have also affected the AKTs of the vehicles 
analyzed in this study. The group of vehicle owners living within the cordon, but crossing it for work, 
also benefitted from other incentives at the time of analysis and, inner-city residents might have had 
stronger preferences towards environmental products. This could explain the discrepancy between 
the magnitudes of ATET values for the two groups of EEVs commuting across the cordon.  
It also appears that other factors, such as crossing the cordon, have influenced the vehicle 
owners’ AKT. This was particularly evident given the results of the PSM analysis of Group F: which 
showed that controlling with various demographic factors and a vehicle characteristic, non-EEV 
owners living inside the cordon and commuting across the cordon, traveled further annually on 
average than their non-EEV non-crossing counterparts. This is likely due to the high density of 
public transport options available to owners living and working inside the cordon, as well as the 
shorter home-work distances – increasing the likelihood of owners also engaging in active transport 
modes, such as cycling and walking. 
It is difficult to be precise about the effect of the congestion pricing exemption upon AKT for 
EEVs, due to the number of other factors potentially involved, such as environmental preferences, 
other vehicle cost considerations and other unobserved demographic differences. Yet, by controlling 
for some of the differences in demographics, and adopting three different approaches to comparing 
between the ATETs obtained for each owner group in order to estimate the effect of different factors 
on AKT, this study minimizes the number of potentially unconsidered effects.  
Although the possibility of unconsidered effects remains, through the three approaches 
adopted in this study, it appears that both EEV ownership and the congestion tax exemption had 
significant effects on EEV owners’ AKT. Overall, the rebound effects of EEV ownership, 3.1%, were 
greater than those estimated for the congestion tax exemption, 1.1%, on the entire EEV fleet. EEV 
owners living inside the cordon and crossing the boundary for work increased AKT by 9.3% on 
average due to the tax exemption, as opposed to the 2.4% increase due to EEV ownership. Whilst 
for EEV owners living outside the cordon and crossing the boundary for work, the opposite trend 
was observed, with the tax exemption policy appearing to have increased AKT by 1.3% on average, 
as opposed to the 3.3% increase due to EEV ownership. 
In order to quantify and understand the potential repercussions of these findings for the 
sustainability of Stockholm, we also have estimated the differences in CO2 emissions. It is clear 
from this analysis that the reduction in emissions due to the transition to EEVs in Stockholm was 
substantial, with the emissions of vehicle owners now driving EEVs reduced by 50.5% on average. 
In saying this, however, had the rebound effects of increased AKT for EEVs not been present, the 
overall average emissions could have been reduced by a further 2.0%; 1.5% due to rebound effects 
of EEV ownership; 0.6% due to the congestion tax exemption. Even after accounting for these 
rebound effects, the transition to EEVs, undoubtedly spurred by incentives such as the congestion 
tax exemption as shown by Whitehead et al. (2014), appears to have had a substantial net impact 
on reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
The findings of this paper are particularly relevant when considering the design of future 
incentive policies and the cost-benefit analysis carried out to assess such programs. Cost-benefit 
analyses of incentive policies encouraging the uptake of energy-efficient products, such as EEVs, 
must consider the significance of rebound effects, which although minimal, may ultimately affect 
both the financial cost of reaching a particular environmental target, as well as the final 
environmental impacts of such policies.  
By accounting for rebound effects, policy-makers can better design incentive policies that 
have a realistic chance of meeting climate change goals. This analysis has not, however, been able 
to capture the potential secondary effects of these rebound effects, such as increased road 
congestion due to increases in AKTs. Further research is required into how substantial such 
secondary rebound effects could be in offsetting emission reductions. 
Being very likely that the personal vehicle will continue as a high share mode for home-work 
trips over the coming decades, incentive policies encouraging a transition to more energy efficient 
alternatives are necessary. It is important, however, that these initiatives are balanced and that 
attempts are made to control for potential rebound effects in the cost-benefit analyses of such policy 
initiatives.  
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Chapter 6: Article III 
The impacts of incentive policies on 
energy efficient vehicle demand and price: an 
international comparison 
As the number of regions incentivising the uptake of EEVs increases around 
the globe, it is important for policy-makers to sufficiently understand how 
different types of policies affect marginal demand (annual sales), aggregate 
demand (fleet penetration) and pricing of energy efficient vehicles. 
Article III, included in this chapter, departs from the case study analysis of 
Stockholm featured in Articles I and II, and focuses on a broader set of 
aggregate level, panel data, consisting of EEV market information for 15 
metropolitan regions around the globe, over a 5 year period between 2008 
and 2012. Although there is some overlap with Article I in regards to analysis 
of consumer demand, Article III investigates the effects of four different 
types of incentives policies on not only consumer demand (marginal and 
aggregate) but also upon pricing (Research Question 6). Utilising an 
innovative proxy for the price gap (or premium) between EEVs and 
comparable conventional vehicles, this analysis also examines whether 
different incentives have increased this difference in price, or reduced it. 
By taking a broader perspective on the market, a number of additional 
factors could be introduced into the model (Research Question 8), and 
specifically the relationship between EEV demand and price could be 
examined for endogenous effects (Research Question 7). 
Complementary to the findings of Article I, policy-makers would be 
particularly interested in the evaluation of different incentive effects on EEV 
price and demand, as well as the magnitude of these impacts, relative to 
other economic or demographic changes, as detailed in Article III. 
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“The impacts of incentive policies on energy efficient vehicle demand and 
pricing: an international comparison”, Transportation Research Part D: 
Transport and Environment, submitted. 
 144 Chapter 6: Article III 

 146 Chapter 6: Article III 
 
The Impacts of Incentive Policies on Energy Efficient Vehicle Demand 
and Price: An International Comparison 
 
Jake Whitehead1,*, Simon Washington2, Joel P. Franklin3 & Jonathan Bunker4 
 
1Post-doctoral Research Associate, Queensland University of Technology, 2 George Street, Brisbane, Australia 4000 and 
Double PhD Candidate, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Teknikringen 72, Stockholm, Sweden SE-100 44; Tel. (Australia) 
+61 4 3040 4974; Tel. (Sweden) +46 7 6252 1284; Email: je.whitehead@qut.edu.au  
 
2Professor and ASTRA Chair, Queensland University of Technology, 2 George Street, Brisbane, Australia 4000; Tel. 
(Australia) +61 7 3138 9990; Email: simon.washington@qut.edu.au  
 
3Associate Professor, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Teknikringen 72, Stockholm, Sweden SE-100 44; Tel. (Sweden) 
+46 8 790 8374; Email: joel.franklin@abe.kth.se 
 
4Associate Professor, Queensland University of Technology, 2 George Street, Brisbane, Australia 4000; Tel. (Australia) +61 
7 3138 5086; Email: j.bunker@qut.edu.au  
ARTICLE INFO 
Article history: 
Received                      
1st June, 2015 
Keywords:   
Energy Efficient Vehicles;  
Hybrid Vehicles;  
Electric Vehicles;  
Incentive Policies; 
Endogeneity;  
Error Component Three 
Stage Least Squares. 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT                                                   
Significant efforts to incentivize energy efficient vehicles (EEVs) are evident 
across the globe. Given EEV marketplaces are dynamic and that demand 
may fluctuate in response to incentives, this may also affect market forces 
to influence prices. An analysis of EEV incentives, therefore, must account 
for possible endogeneity between demand and prices. Here we estimate 
the effects of several different incentives on EEV demand and price 
premiums across 15 regions between 2008 and 2012. Using error 
components three-stage least squares (EC3SLS) regression, we dis-
entangle the endogeneity between EEV demand and price, finding that 
increased price premiums lead to reduced marginal demand (MD) and 
aggregate demand (AD). In turn, increased MD leads to lower price 
premiums. Upfront subsidies (Type A incentives) are found to increase MD 
and AD, however, unlike other incentive types, also appear to lead to 
higher price premiums. We also find fuel price increases lead to higher MD, 
AD and price premiums. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Increasing the share of Energy-Efficient Vehicles (EEVs) is a goal shared by many governments 
around the globe. Many of these policy initiatives have been initiated, with the principal aim to reduce 
the transport sector’s contribution to total greenhouse gas emissions, and in turn, anthropogenic 
climate change. Some governments also seek to leverage EEV sales to reduce exposure to local air 
pollution, assist in the transition towards renewable energy sources, reduce dependence on foreign 
oil, and support innovation and jobs within the automobile-manufacturing sector. Whilst having the 
advantage of low or no tail-pipe emissions, and in most cases lower operating costs, EEVs are often 
disadvantaged by higher purchase costs, operational/technological uncertainty, as well as possible 
refueling inconvenience (relative to petrol refueling) arising from lack of EEV infrastructure.  
In order to stimulate demand for these vehicles, despite these known challenges, governments 
have implemented various types of incentive policies. These various incentives may affect EEV 
demand in different ways, with no clear trend in the literature suggesting which types of incentives 
most significantly increase the uptake of EEVs. Moreover, there is a general dearth of research into 
the effects of these incentives on the interaction between demand and prices of EEVs using revealed 
preference data. Prevailing literature in this field is summarized in Section 2.0, including analysis of 
studies investigating the effects of incentive policies on product prices across different markets 
documented in Section 2.4.  
Considering the number of EEV related policies that have been implemented around the world; 
the current interest in EEVs internationally; and the general lack of research on their actual impacts, 
this study aims to: 
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1. Identify which factors affect the demand and price of EEVs at the regional level; 
2. Establish that EEV demand and price are endogenous; 
3. Estimate the effects of various factors (including government policies) on EEV demand; 
and, 
4. Estimate the effects of various factors (including government policies) on EEV price 
premiums. 
In order to achieve these four aims, we have collected panel data from 15 international 
metropolitan regions, with a history of EEV purchases and policies, for 2008 to 2012. Using these data 
we construct an econometric model system with three equations and dependent variables including:  
1. Annual EEV Marginal Demand (MD) i.e. marginal annual EEV sales as a proportion of 
total;  
2. Annual EEV Aggregate Demand (AD) i.e. proportion of EEVs active in the current vehicle 
fleet; and, 
3. EEV Price Premium i.e. the normalized difference between the dealer-listed price of a 
new Toyota Prius (EEV) and its internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) equivalent, a 
new Toyota Corolla. 
Equation 1 captures short-term or marginal demand, while Equation 2 captures long-term 
demand and the cumulative effects of EEV market momentum; and Equation 3 captures the price 
premium attributed to EEVs relative to comparable ICEVs. The price premium variable is a surrogate 
variable intended to capture the overall EEV market price trends; where a larger ratio in one region 
would suggest that EEVs are more expensive relative to conventional vehicles.  
To address aims 1 and 2, a number of exogenous factors are included in the equations, 
including: socio-demographic characteristics of the consumer population, economic factors, and 
incentive policy indicator variables. In addition, to test for potential endogeneity between EEV price 
premium and demand, endogenous variables are included in each equation i.e. price premium in the 
demand equations, and demand in the price premium equation. The variables included in the model 
are described further in Section 3.0. In order to address aims 3 and 4, we aggregate incentive policies 
into four categories based upon how and when they affect consumers. Details of the different incentive 
policies active in each region, as well as the categorization of these policies, are discussed in Section 
3.1. 
To account for the model system of equations and endogeneity, the analysis required the 
adoption of an instrumental variable (IV) approach known as Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS). 
Generally this method is sufficient for such an analysis, however, given the nature of the panel data 
(multiple observations within a city or region), standard 3SLS could not account for correlation across 
time periods. To account for this sampling approach, Error Component Three-Stage Least Squares 
(EC3SLS), derived by Baltagi (1981), was adopted. An overview of the EC3SLS model is described in 
Section 4.0, with the estimation results discussed in Section 5.0. 
Our EC3SLS model results provide evidence that certain incentive policies affect both the 
demand and price premium of EEVs. The specific results of this study are detailed in Section 5.0, 
whilst the implications and conclusions of these findings are outlined in Sections 6.0 and 7.0. We 
continue by describing EEVs; discussing studies that have analyzed demand and the effect of 
incentive polices on EEV sales; whilst providing an overview of literature that has analyzed the effect 
of incentive policies on product prices across different markets.  
 
2.  Background and Literature Review 
The term Energy-Efficient Vehicle (EEV) has been used to describe many different types of 
vehicles. In this paper, EEVs are defined as all vehicles recognized as hybrid-electric and plug-in 
hybrid-electric vehicles by local and national governments in each metropolitan region analyzed. More 
broadly speaking, however, one can find EEV or low-emission vehicles (LEVs) across the literature 
referring to a wide range of different types of vehicles – some based on their CO2 emissions, others 
based on their main fuel for propulsion, and others combining the two. With such broad definitions of 
EEVs around the globe, complications arise in deciding which incentives apply across different 
situations and vehicle types. 
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For this analysis, we focus solely on privately owned (non-fleet), new hybrid-electric vehicles 
that were sold on the market between 2008 and 2012. These vehicles include plug-in hybrid-electric 
vehicles but exclude full battery electric vehicles – mainly due to the lack of data available.  
2.1 EEV Technology  
Hybrid-electric vehicles, referred to as EEVs in this study, are vehicles that use both petroleum 
and an electric battery to operate. The way these two fuel sources drive the vehicle can vary. Both 
sources may operate in parallel to propel the vehicle. Alternatively the vehicle may be primarily driven 
by one source, with the other supporting the operation. One of the most popular hybrid-electric 
vehicles on the market globally is the Toyota Prius, known as a series-parallel hybrid. The Prius has 
both an electric motor and a petroleum-fuelled engine, and both can operate simultaneously or 
independently, with the operation choice tailored to suit what is most energy efficient in each 
encountered scenario (Riggieri, 2011). The current majority of Prius models in the fleet do not require 
plugging in for charging, as the battery is charged internally. This dual motor configuration, however, is 
considerably more fuel-efficient than a comparable vehicle with only an internal-combustion engine 
(ICEV). More recently, however, plug-in hybrid-electric vehicles (PHEV) have been progressively 
introduced, particularly amongst existing hybrid-electric models, such as the Toyota Prius. These 
newer vehicles have the added advantage of being able to run purely on electricity without petroleum, 
and retain the advantage of being able to travel longer distances when using petroleum fuel in parallel 
to electricity, as opposed to battery-electric vehicles (BEV). Although the market for BEVs is 
expanding, as mentioned previously, such vehicles are not included in this analysis, largely due to a 
lack of data on their purchase. 
2.2  Demand for EEVs 
In conjunction with the major increase in demand for EEVs globally during the past decade, the 
corresponding literature has also grown – particularly pertaining to hybrid-electric vehicles. A large 
proportion of these studies have involved the analysis of consumer preferences through stated 
preference (SP) surveys, in which a series of hypothetical scenarios are presented to respondents 
who then make choices about what vehicles they would expect to purchase in the future. These 
studies are numerous and have analyzed vehicle purchase preferences in a number of countries 
including Norway (Dagsvik et al., 2002), Denmark (Mabit and Fosgerau, 2011), United Kingdom 
(Batley et al., 2004), Germany (Hackbarth and Madlener, 2013; Ziegler, 2012), USA (Brownstone et 
al., 1996; Bunch et al., 1993; Hess et al., 2012; Musti and Kockelman, 2011), Canada (Ewing and 
Sarigöllü, 1998) and Australia (Beck et al., 2013). 
These studies have largely been motivated by a lack of available real-world data due to the short 
amount of time that such vehicles have been widespread on the market in conjunction with the power 
of SP surveys to test preferences about vehicle types and/or attributes that may not be offered in the 
current marketplace or with which the respondent has had no prior experience. This last point, 
however, is also a weakness of SP as respondents select among hypothetical choices with attributes 
or technologies with which they are unfamiliar. Such uncertainty in decisions may lead researchers to 
analyze preferences that do not in fact reflect real world market conditions. In numerous applications, 
however, SP surveys are the most efficient and powerful way to forecast future choices. As EEVs 
continue to grow in popularity, there will undoubtedly be an increase in the availability of revealed 
preference (RP) data, and in turn, growth in literature analyzing real world vehicle purchase behavior. 
A couple of revealed preference (RP) studies examining factors that have influenced EEV 
demand have been documented. One such study conducted in the State of California, U.S.A. found 
that a community’s share of Green Party registered voters, acting as a proxy for community 
“environmentalism”, was positively correlated with hybrid-electric vehicle sales, providing strong 
evidence for a link between environmental awareness and demand for EEVs (Kahn, 2007). Another 
RP study, by Sexton and Sexton (2014), suggests that through their theory of “conspicuous 
conservation”, individuals seek status by demonstrating austerity in the context of increasing concerns 
about the environment. They estimated that individuals were willing to pay US$ 430 to US$ 4,200 
more for a Toyota Prius (depending on the consumer’s location) in order to obtain green status from 
this product. 
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2.3  Effect of fuel prices on EEV pricing 
One factor, other than incentive policies, that has been found to affect vehicle pricing is that of 
fuel prices. This body of literature is particularly relevant to this study given fuel price taxation is often 
cited as an alternative to government incentives in order to induce a shift towards more fuel-efficient 
vehicles. Analyzing vehicle sales from four major automobile manufacturers in the U.S.A. between 
2003 and 2006, Langer and Miller (2009) found that a US$ 1 increase in petrol price (per liter) would 
lead to a 10.7%1 increase in the price gap between least fuel efficient and most fuel efficient vehicles, 
with increased fuel prices generally decreasing vehicle prices, except for in the case of highly-efficient 
vehicles, such as the Toyota Prius.  
Similarly, Busse et al. (2009) analyzed vehicle sales between 1999 and 2008 at 20% of 
automobile dealerships in the U.S.A., and found that a $USD 1 increase in petrol price (per liter) would 
lead to 9.7%2 decrease in the price of an average car, but would increase the price of a Toyota Prius 
by 17.2%3.  
Beresteanu and Li (2011) analyzed vehicles sales from 22 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
in the U.S.A. between 1999 and 2006, and found that if the petrol price was still at 1999-levels, in 
2006, the Toyota Prius would have been 7.0% cheaper. Taking into account this price difference, and 
converting to fuel price per liters, this translates to a 24.8% increase in the price of a Toyota Prius due 
to a US$ 1 increase in petrol price. 
All three of these studies provide strong evidence to suggest that fuel price increases lead to an 
increase in EEV prices and that these price increases are largely due to a shift in demand towards 
more fuel-efficient vehicles to reduce exposure to the increased petrol prices. In this analysis we will 
compare the magnitude of the estimated effect of fuel price changes and government incentives on 
EEV pricing based on our dataset, with that of the findings published in each of these studies. 
2.4  Analysis of government incentive polices  
As mentioned previously, a significant challenge when analyzing the effects of various 
government incentive policies on the demand for EEVs lies in the spectrum of definitions for them. 
With a wide range of vehicles classified in different jurisdictions as EEVs, it is difficult to isolate groups 
of vehicles common across a majority of markets that are equally eligible (or ineligible) for certain 
policy incentives. It is this difficulty that ultimately led to hybrid-electric vehicles being chosen for this 
analysis. 
Literature on the effects of various incentive policies on EEV demand is limited to a number of 
specific case studies. Musti and Kockelman (2011) found that the estimated effects of EEV cash 
rebates and doubling of fuel prices on EEV demand in Texas, U.S.A, was negligible. In contrast, the 
estimated effect of a ‘fee-bate’, where vehicle owners are charged or compensated using a carrot-and-
stick approach depending on the fuel-efficiency of their vehicle, was a 10% increase. 
One U.S.A. study based on revealed preferences found that direct monetary incentives had little 
to no effect on the demand for EEVs, however, incentives with indirect monetary value, such as 
exemption from High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane rules, would lead to a significant increase in the 
demand for EEVs (Riggieri, 2011). 
Another RP study showed that an exemption from a congestion tax in Stockholm for EEVs led to 
a 10.7% increase in sales of LEVs in 2008 alone (Whitehead et al., 2014). In this study EEVs included 
flexi-fuel ethanol vehicles in addition to electric-hybrids. 
Martin (2009) found that U.S.A. income tax credits for hybrid vehicles were more effective in 
encouraging demand for fuel-efficient vehicles than a doubling of the fuel tax. Diamond (2009) 
analyzed cross-sectional data and found that EEV sales in the U.S.A. between 2004-2009 increased 
as a result of upfront monetary incentives, however, a strong relationship also existed between EEV 
demand and fuel prices. Similarly, Beresteanu and Li (2011) found that EEV sales in the U.S.A. would 
have been 37% lower in 2006 if petroleum prices had stayed at 1999 levels, and that the federal 
income tax credit incentive accounted for 20% of EEV sales in 2006. 
                                                
 
 
 
1 Reported as a 2.8% increase in price gap for a US$1 per gallon increase in petrol price. 
2 Reported as a 2.6% decrease in vehicle price for a US$1 per gallon increase in petrol price. 
3 Reported as a 4.5% increase in vehicle price for a US$1 per gallon increase in petrol price. 
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Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) conducted one of the few studies that attempted to estimate 
the effects of different incentive police using RP data. When analyzing quarterly EEV sales data in the 
U.S.A. between 2000 and 2006, the type of incentive offered was just as important as the incentive 
monetary value in affecting consumer demand. Sales tax waivers were found to have a larger effect 
on EEV demand compared to income tax credits, conditional on incentive values. They also found that 
higher fuel prices led to higher rates of EEV adoption. A similar study of sales tax rebates in Canada, 
by Chandra et al. (2010), found that sales tax rebate incentives led to a substantial increase in the 
share of EEVs, accounting for 26% of their sales. 
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis of EEV national sales data combined with 
economic and demographic factors for 30 countries in 2012, Sierzchula et al. (2014) found that 
financial incentives combined with local production facilities were significantly and positively correlated 
with EEV adoption rates. Unfortunately, incentives were aggregated to a single parameter in the 
regression, and as such did not provide insight into the potential variation amongst different policy 
incentives. Sierzchula et al. (2014) also identify a limitation of their analysis being that data were 
collected at a national level, not accounting for variation of preferences across the population.  
Finally, they did not account for possible endogeneity of demand and price.  
This summary of incentive policy studies provides insight into the current literature in this field. 
There is empirical evidence that different incentive policies have affected the demand for EEVs, but 
uncertainty exists around whether or not monetary incentives, particularly those paid up front, are 
effective in increasing demand. Despite this uncertainty, monetary incentives continue to be the most 
prevalent category of incentive policies available in markets globally. Disentanglement of the different 
policy effects on EEV demand remains a significant interest.  
An additional research gap is whether government incentives have affected the prices 
consumers have paid for EEVs, and whether such initiatives have made these vehicles more 
affordable, or instead have exacerbated the price gap between EEVs and their ICEV equivalents. 
2.5 Effect of government incentives on product prices 
That government incentive policies (to promote purchase of particular vehicles, land 
development options, solar panels, continued education, etc.) may lead to a mixture of demand and 
price responses is of interest across a variety of markets. The economic principal is that providing 
incentives to increase the utility of a product can result in either or both increased demand (consumer 
response) for the product and/or increased product price offerings (supplier response). At the 
extremes of market response are 100% of the incentive policy ‘value’ subsumed into commodity price 
(with no demand response) to 100% of incentive policy ‘value’ being allowed to drive consumer 
demand through increased consumer surplus. What other researchers have found lays the foundation 
for this study.  
Kirwan (2009) analyzed the effect of agricultural subsidies in the U.S.A., initiated in 1973 in 
order to increase farmers’ incomes. Questions have been raised as to whether this policy increased 
farmer incomes (the policy goal) or instead was transferred to higher leases for agricultural land. The 
possibility to increase leases arises because farmers lease over half of all the farmland located in the 
U.S.A. Standard economic theory supports the notion that the government subsidies would be 
transferred directly to land owners. Upon analysis, Kirwan (2009) found that 75% of the benefit has 
been captured by farmers, whilst about 25% has been captured by landowners. 
With parallels to the EEV market, de la Tour and Glachant (2013), analyzed the effect of feed-in-
tariffs for solar generated electricity on the demand for and prices of solar photovoltaic (PV) panels. 
Using weekly price data in Germany, France, Italy and Spain from 2005 to 2012, their analysis 
suggests that although prices for PVs increased, this was largely due to a silicon shortage in 2009, 
rather than the tariff incentive. The findings of this study align with Kirwan (2009), suggesting that 
incentives affected demand more than price. 
Similar to de la Tour and Glachant (2013), Podolefsky (2013) analyzed the effect of the solar 
investment tax credit (ITC) scheme in the U.S.A. between 2007 and 2012. The ITC was initially setup 
as a demand side incentive in the form of a tax break worth 30% of a systems’ installed price. This ITC 
was originally capped at US$ 2,000, but this was removed to be unlimited in 2009. In contrast with the 
two prior studies, Podolefsky (2013) found that when prices of equivalent systems between residences 
that were and were not eligible for the ITC scheme were compared, only 17% of the benefit of the 
incentive was being passed to eligible consumers, whilst the remaining 83% was being absorbed 
through price increases by solar PV installers. 
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Another case study examined the vehicle retirement scheme in Spain known as Plan2000E, 
analyzed by Jimenez et al. (2011). Plan2000E was introduced to create jobs by boosting fuel-efficient 
vehicle production in Spain. The scheme provided a 2,000 EUR subsidy to consumers for scrapping 
their old, high polluting vehicles, and was co-financed by the local vehicle manufacturers (1,000 EUR), 
national government (500 EUR) and an Non-Governmental Organization (500 EUR). Interestingly, 
when prices before and after the scheme were compared, they found that after controlling for other 
factors, manufacturers increased their vehicle sale prices by 1,000 EUR, meaning that consumers 
received 50% of the benefit. Li et al. (2013) also evaluated the “cash-for-clunkers” scheme in the U.S 
but did not account for possible impacts on vehicle prices. 
Sallee (2011) assessed the effect of incentives on the price of EEVs using a representative 
sample of 15% of the Toyota Prius transactional sales in the U.S. between 2002 and 2007. Contrary to 
expectation, under a standard, competitive tax incidence model, where capacity was constrained, he 
found that government subsidies did not affect the prices paid for a Toyota Prius during this period. He 
explained the lack of price response by suggesting that Toyota purposefully did not absorb the value 
of the government subsidies in order not to stifle future demand for their vehicles. Although this 
hypothesis may be true, the discrepancy may also be attributed to the nature of the data. During the 
period of analysis, the government subsidy was initially worth US$ 2,000, which later increased to US$ 
3,400 after 2005. Looking at the Toyota Prius factory options during this period, an individual could 
spend an additional US$ 6,400 (24% of the base model price) on upgrades. Given that the 
transactional data only reported paid prices without details regarding factory options, it may have been 
difficult to disentangle changes in prices arising from factory options versus price increases, 
particularly given that approximately half of the potential factory upgrade cost was equal to the policy 
incentive.  
These five case studies provide evidence that incentive policies can impact both demand for and 
prices of products across various markets, including EEVs, with one available study.  As well as a 
shortage of studies focused on EEVs, additional and important gaps remain in the literature regarding 
whether certain government incentive policies are less prone to price responses than others; results of 
which may yield insight into what policies are more likely to be subsumed into prices offered by 
suppliers versus those that will be left to influence demand.  
It is the aim of this paper to address these research gaps using panel data on consumer EEV 
sales from 15 metropolitan regions from Europe, North America, and Asia. Complementary to Sallee 
(2011), we analyze data from 2008-2012.  
3.  Data and exploratory analysis 
A significant barrier to investigating the effect of different incentive policies on EEV consumer 
demand and market prices is the lack of publically available data at the appropriate spatial (regional) 
scale. In designing this study our goal was to collect at least four years of consecutive data across 25 
metropolitan regions, however, this proved difficult. Ultimately, with the assistance of numerous helpful 
contacts within local governments, academia, and the NGO sector, we were able to obtain non-fleet 
EEV sales and regional economic data for 15 metropolitan regions around the world between the 
years 2008 and 2012. An additional 9 regions were originally included, but had to be excluded from 
the final model due to incomplete data. Table 1 provides the sources and units used for each variable 
included in the dataset. The main limitation of this dataset is that is has been compiled using different 
sources for each region. Efforts have been made, where possible, to check reported statistics across 
multiple sources for each region. Significant time was also spent insuring that collection and reporting 
methods were consistent, or were accounted for when inconsistent. 
The three main parameters listed in Table 1 serve as dependent variables and include Annual 
EEV Marginal Demand (MD), Annual EEV Aggregate Demand (AD), and EEV Price Premium.  
The MD variable describes the percentage of consumer sales of EEVs in each year of 
observation. This value fluctuates from year to depending on short-term demand, and thus captures a 
relatively short-term (annual) market indicator. 
AD is the cumulative number of EEVs in the fleet, and reflects a longer-term condition of the 
EEV market. This second market variable AD is thought to capture the overall market momentum 
compared to MD. For instance, a 10% EEV AD market share with 2% MD in the most recent year is 
thought to be much different than a 3% EEV AD with 2% MD in the most recent year - as there would 
be a far greater number of EEV’s active in the former market compared to the latter, despite current 
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sales being the same in both. As such, we might anticipate that MD is affected also by AD, or current 
‘market momentum’. 
Finally, the EEV Price Premium variable describes the normalized price difference between the 
listed dealer price of a new Toyota Prius (EEV) base model and a new Toyota Corolla (ICEV) base 
model – see Equation 1: 
 
EEV Price Premium = A − B( )B
where:
A =  Dealer-listed Price of Toyota Prius
B =  Dealer-listed Price of Toyota Corolla
(1)  
Table 1 – List of data variables collected for each region, including units and data source 
Variables Units Source/s 
Annual EEV Marginal Demand  
(Number of new EEVs sold/  
Total annual vehicle sales) 
% 
National Statistics Offices 
National Motoring Departments 
Local NGO/Lobby groups 
Local Contacts 
Annual EEV Aggregate Demand  
(Number of EEVs active/  
Total number of vehicles in fleet) 
% 
National Statistics Offices 
National Motoring Departments 
Local NGO/Lobby groups 
Local Contacts 
EEV Price Premium  
(Average listed local dealer price of a new Toyota 
Prius each year MINUS 
Average Listed local dealer price of new Toyota 
Corolla each year) DIVEDED BY 
(Average listed local dealer price of a new Toyota 
Corolla each year) 
%  
Local Toyota Dealership Websites 
(with the assistance of the Internet 
Archives’ Wayback Machine) 
Gross National Income Per Capita US$  
National Statistics Offices 
Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
World Bank 
Average Disposable Income Per Person US$ 
National Statistics Offices 
Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
World Bank 
Inflation Rate p.a. % World Bank 
Average 12-month Petrol Price US$/liter 
International Energy Agency 
World Bank 
Population Density Persons/km2 
National Statistics Offices 
Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
Previous Years Annual EEV Aggregate Demand  
(Previous Years’ Number of EEVs active/  
Total number of vehicles in fleet in previous year) 
 
National Statistics Offices 
National Motoring Departments 
Local NGO/Lobby groups 
Local Contacts 
Incentive Policies Dummy Variables 
Local Government websites 
Local NGO websites 
Local Contacts 
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Our motivation for creating this variable is multifold. Firstly, by using this normalized difference in 
listed prices, the relative cost of an EEV common across all markets is compared to the cost of a 
petrol car common across all markets. Secondly, the EEV Price Premium captures in a single variable 
what consumers will pay relative to a well-known and top selling petrol alternative. Finally, by using 
listed prices of both the Prius and Corolla to calculate the variable, we avoid possible bias associated 
with transactional data, which include the embedded costs of factory fitted options (e.g. see Sallee 
(2011)). This bias is particularly unwanted when trying to assess how different incentive policies affect 
EEV Price Premiums and to what extent.  
The potential drawbacks of the EEV Price Premium calculation, as implemented in this study, 
include: different dealer markups that might exist (we believe to be minimal in these low profit margin 
offerings), and lack of reflection of potential other EEV market offerings that may not be captured by 
the Toyota Prius. In a future study, we could check the results documented here with other potential 
forms of the price premium calculation. 
Figure 1 shows how the EEV Price Premiums changed between 2008 and 2012, on average, 
across the regions included in this study. During the analysis period, the price premium varied 
significantly in some cases and did not remain constant in any region examined.  
 
 
Figure 1 –EEV Price Premiums by Country 
Despite this variable capturing the normalized price difference between the same two vehicles in 
each market i.e. a Toyota Prius and a Toyota Corolla, there is no consistent trend across the regions, 
with some appearing somewhat stable (Germany), some rising considerably (Hong Kong), and others 
dropping (Singapore). This suggests that different factors in each market had effects on EEV Price 
Premiums. Importantly, a lack of consistent trend across or within regions suggests that spurious 
correlation of price premiums and other factors is unlikely. In the analysis that follows, we aim to 
identify factors that relate to variations in EEV Price Premiums across regions. 
3.1  Description of Incentive Policies 
Table 2 provides an overview of the incentive policies offered to consumers in each region of 
this particular study – categorized by country. In general there are a wide range of policies offered 
across the regions, creating challenges to isolate their individual effects on EEV markets.  
One of the challenges in analyzing the effects of different incentive policies on EEV markets is 
the shear breadth and variation of government schemes. In order to make policies across regions 
comparable, and to simplify analysis, the incentives are aggregated into four categories depending on 
how and when the incentive affects the consumer: 
A. One-off subsidies (cash rebates, income tax credits); 
B. Purchase cost reductions (reduced/exempt from sales tax, import duty, registration tax); 
C. Running cost reductions (reduced/exempt annual vehicle tax, emissions tax); and, 
D. Usage-based benefits (exempt from tolls; congestion charges; parking fees). 
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The main motivation behind this grouping was to facilitate a better understanding of how 
different types of policies affect EEV markets. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) suggest that different 
types of incentives indeed have different market effects. This specific categorization differentiates 
between one time and ongoing savings, and operating versus non-operating benefits.  
Table 2 - Overview of range of incentive policies active in each metropolitan region 
Metropolitan 
Regions by Country Incentives 
Norway  
(Asker, Trondheim,  
Bergen, Oslo) 
Norway’s extensive list of incentive policies may be why it has one of the 
highest MD rates of EEV vehicles. These incentives include: No value-added 
tax (VAT) for BEVs (worth approx. 5,000 EUR); Bus lane access; toll road 
and congestion charging exemptions; no import duty; no annual vehicle tax; 
free parking in public car parks; free domestic vehicle ferries; and no vehicle 
registration tax. 
Sweden  
(Stockholm, 
Gothenburg, 
Jönköping, Malmo)  
Sweden was one of the earliest promoters of EEVs. Major policies include: 
EEV owners exempt for first 5 years of registration fees, congestion tax 
exempt (mainly concerning Stockholm owners) and free inner-city parking 
(Stockholm, Gothenburg, Jönköping). From 2007 to 2009 a green vehicle 
cash rebate also existed: vehicles emitting less than 120g/km CO2 emissions 
received 10,000 SEK (1,100 EUR). This was later turned into an income tax 
reduction. Gothenburg also had free inner-city parking until late 2010.  
Germany  
(Dusseldorf, Munich,  
Stuttgart, Frankfurt) 
Germany undertook a different approach to other regions; no direct EEV 
subsidies were implemented but substantial funding was directed to EEV 
research. The only incentive policy is a 10-year exemption from the CO2-
emissions based circulation tax, worth up to 170 EUR per year. 
U.S.A.  
(California) 
The US, particularly California, also has had a number of incentives for 
EEVs include: federal tax offsets worth up to US$ 3,400 up to 60,000 
vehicles per manufacturer (expired 2011); one-time national tax credit, worth 
up to US$ 7,500 depending on battery capacity for a PHEV; California also 
had initiatives to get cash rebates of US$ 1,500 for a PHEV. Additionally 
there were numerous free parking schemes for EEVs in several cities, as well 
High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane exemptions and insurance discounts. 
Hong Kong 
In the densely population country of Hong Kong, the main incentive involved 
a waiving of the first registration fee is waived, which is significant with a 
value of US$ 6,000-9,000. 
Singapore 
The sole incentive in Singapore was a rebate provided to offset the first 
registration fee, which was equal to 40% of the open market value of the 
vehicle. Given the high vehicle registration fees in Singapore, this single 
policy had a high monetary worth. 
4.  Methodology 
The following section of this paper details the research design and methodology adopted for the 
analysis. As mentioned previously, we obtained panel data from 15 different metropolitan regions over 
a 5-year period to answer the study questions. We start this section by providing a conceptual 
overview of the problem, followed by a description of the estimation procedure. 
4.1  Conceptual overview 
As shown in Figure 2, we assume that incentive policies (1) designed to promote demand for 
EEVs have direct effects on the Annual EEV Marginal Demand (2) and the current Annual EEV 
Aggregate Demand (5). One of the main research aims of this paper is to understand how different 
incentive policies (1) affect EEV prices, or in this case, the EEV Price Premium (4). 
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Figure 2 – Conceptual Model of Factors Influencing EEV Price Premium, Annual EEV Marginal Demand 
and Annual EEV Aggregate Demand 
Rather than use average price of an EEV in each metropolitan region, we have defined a price 
premium variable which describes the normalized cost difference between a new Toyota Prius (EEV) 
and its’ ICEV counterpart – a new Toyota Corolla. In doing so, our ambition has been to reduce the 
possible Supply-Chain Factors (3) that may affect EEV price, as well as to see whether different 
incentive policies have assisted in reducing the gap between EEV and ICEV prices, or have 
exacerbated it. Nonetheless, some unobserved supply-chain factors might still explain some 
differences in price premiums between each region; however, we do not consider these here. It should 
be noted that 13 out of the 15 metropolitan regions analyzed are located in countries that manufacture 
EEVs. This characteristic of the dataset further reduces the number of confounding supply-chain 
factors, particularly given that Sierzchula et al. (2014) found that local EEV manufacturing presence is 
positively correlated with EEV demand.   
It is assumed that various economic (6) and demographic (7) factors have influenced the price 
premium of EEVs (4), the Annual EEV Marginal Demand (2) and the current Annual EEV Aggregate 
Demand (5). Furthermore, we assume that the Annual EEV Aggregate Demand of the year prior (8) 
would also affect the current year’s EEV marginal demand (5). We assume that such a mechanism 
took place due to economies-of-scale and/or higher levels of awareness of EEVs in the public. 
The final relationships displayed in Figure 2 shows the potential endogenous relationship 
between the EEV Price Premium (4), and the marginal (2) and aggregate (5) demand for EEVs – see 
dotted lines in Figure 2. If different incentive policies (1) have affected the EEV Price Premiums (4) 
whilst affecting demand for EEVs – marginal and aggregate (2 & 5), it could also be true that these 
three factors interact. Ignoring this potential endogeneity would lead to biased parameter estimates. 
Based on the relationships depicted in Figure 2, the collected panel data require a system of 
linear equations modeling approach, with EEV Price Premium (4), Annual EEV Marginal Demand (2) 
and Annual EEV Aggregate Demand (5) as dependent variable.  
To estimate the parameters for this system of equations we combine three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) regression with an error-components variant to account for the panel nature of the data, 
resulting in an error-component three-stage least squares (EC3SLS) regression model (Baltagi, 1981). 
4.2  Analyzing a system of interrelated equations based on panel data 
When analyzing an interrelated system of equations including EEV Price Premium, AD, and MD 
described previously, instrumental variable (IV) methods such as two-stage (2SLS) and three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) regression are typically adopted.  IV methods are efficient when the error terms 
are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over individual observations ! and time periods !, 
which is not the case here due to the repeated observations of the 15 regions in our sample. In order 
to allow for heteroscedasticity or serial correlation that generally exists amongst panel data, the 3SLS 
estimation procedure is modified to account the error-component structure within the variance-
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covariance matrix of the equation system. An estimation procedure that can appropriately account for 
this structure is known as error-component three-stage least squares (EC3SLS). For necessary 
background information on single-equation panel data models or general IV methods, please refer to 
Baltagi (2008), Hsiao (2003) and Washington et al. (2011). 
The estimation of a systems of equations with error components is a specialized topic described 
in Baltagi (1981), denoted error-component three stage least squares (EC3SLS). To illustrate the 
procedure, consider the following system of equations: 
 
y = Zδ + u
where:
y = ′y1,..., ′yM( )′ ,u = u1,..., ′uM( )′ ,δ = ′δ1,..., ′δM( )′ ,Z = diag Z j⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
with Z j = Yj ,Xj⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  of dimension NT × gj + kj( ), for j = 1,...,M .
 
 
In this system there are !
gj  included right-hand side !
Yj , and !
k j  included right-hand side !
X j  for 
the system of !M  equations with !N  observations and !T   time periods. 
Focusing on the !jth  equation,  !y j =Yjα j + X jβ j +uj , j =1,2,...,M ,  
 
with additive error components structure given by: 
 
uj = Zµµ j + Zλλ j + vj ,  j = 1,...,M ,  
 
and where: Zµ = IN ⊗ eT ,  Zλ = eN ⊗ IT ,  IN  and IT are identity matrices of the order ! and !, 
whilst !! and !! are vectors on ones of the order ! and !. !!! , !!! !and$!!! are all random vectors 
representing individual-specific, time-period specific and random error terms, respectively. The 
operator ⨂ represents the Kronecker product. Baltagi (1981) shows that the EC3SLS estimator based 
on a system of equations with error components of the form above can be expressed as a weighted 
combination of three 3SLS estimators: within-groups, between-groups, and within-and-between 
groups. The full derivation of the EC3SLS estimator is described in Baltagi (1981). 
The EC3SLS method first involves transforming ! such that all sample parameter values are 
recalculated as deviations from their respective overall means, !∗. This transformation is based on the 
understanding that the generalized least squares (GLS) estimator (used in the third stage of 3SLS) of 
the slope coefficients is invariant against centering the data on the sample means (as shown by Hsiao 
(2003)). Given this transformation and the presence of an intercept term, constant terms are not 
identifiable – thus their absence from the estimation results in Section 5.0.  
The matrix of transformed terms,!Z * , is subsequently used to obtain a further three matrices: 
Matrix 1.) The average parameter values between groups repeated for each group i.e. 
the average values of each parameter for each cross-sectional unit (N) over all 
time (T); 
Matrix 2.) The average parameter values between time-periods repeated for each group 
i.e. the average values of each parameter for each time period (T) across all 
cross-sectional units (N); and, 
Matrix 3.) The average parameter values within-groups-and-time-periods i.e. the 
transformed matrix (!∗) minus matrices 1 and 2. 
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The EC3SLS estimator is then a weighted average of the 3SLS estimates of these three 
matrices: 
δ EC 3SLS = aˆ1δ 3SLS(1) + aˆ2δ 3SLS(2) + aˆ3δ 3SLS(3)  (5) 
where:
aˆh = Hˆ  −1 Z (h ′) Σˆ(h)( )−1 ⊗PX (h )⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥Z (h){ }  for h = 1,2,3
Hˆ = Z (h ′) Σˆ(h)( )−1 ⊗PX (h )⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥Z (h){ }h=1
3
∑
δ 3SLS
(h) = Z (h ′) Σˆ(h)( )−1 ⊗PX (h )⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥Z (h)⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
 −1
Z (h ′) Σˆ(h)( )−1 ⊗PX (h )⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥ y(h)⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
 for h = 1,2,3
with aˆ1, aˆ2, aˆ3  summing to an identity matrix.
 
The EC3SLS estimator is more commonly written as:  
δ EC 3SLS = Z (h ′) Σˆ(h)( )−1 ⊗PX (h )⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥Z (h){ }h=1
3
∑⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
 −1
× Z (h ′) Σˆ(h)( )−1 ⊗PX (h )⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥ y(h){ }h=1
3
∑⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
 
with the variance-covariance matrices Σˆ(h),  for h = 1,2,3,  estimated using the residuals of the 
2SLS procedure, which is applied on each equation of the transformed matrices. Again, for a more 
detailed overview of this procedure, please refer to Baltagi (1981). 
The EC3SLS estimator, being a weighted combination of three 3SLS estimators (between 
groups, between time-periods and within-groups-and-time-periods) yields efficient parameter 
estimates of a system of interrelated equations, with cross-correlated error terms, and accounting for 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity arising from EEV market trend data within cities observed 
across multiple years. Although this estimation procedure does enable estimation of a system of 
equations based on panel data, it is restricted to balanced datasets. This restriction arises from the 
matrix transformations that are performed during the EC3SLS procedure, and resulted in a reduction 
of our panel dataset from 24 cities down to 15 cities with observations for the entire 5-year period 
between 2008 and 2012.  
The model estimations were carried out using the statistical software package STATA; however, 
given that no EC3SLS package currently exists for this software, we authored custom STATA code to 
obtain parameter estimates.  
It should also be noted that, as is the case with all instrumental variable methods, the estimates 
produced are only reliable if an appropriate set of instruments are specified. Through the iterative 
process of modeling this system of equations, regular checks were carried out to ensure that 
instruments were independent of the error terms. Effort was also made to check the sensitivity of the 
model to specification changes, and the difference in estimates obtained through the use of single-
equation methods, such as individual error-component regressions for each of the included equations.  
The next section of this paper details the estimation results. 
5.  Results 
A large number of model specifications were tested and compared on theoretical appeal, 
plausibility of effects, and overall goodness of fit. The results of the finally selected EC3SLS estimated 
model are detailed in Table 3. In general the models provide insight into what policies lead to higher 
EEV marginal and aggregate demand, how the dependent variables are related, and how other 
market forces impact EEV prices and demand.  
Focusing on the first equation in the table, Annual EEV Marginal Demand (MD), a positive 
relationship exists between EEV demand and that of Gross National Income (GNI).  Inflation rate is 
negatively related with MD, suggesting that high time value of money discourages demand, as 
expected.  Further, as population density increases so does EEV MD. This is likely to capture that 
EEVs are best suited in more urbanized environments (high congestion, low average trip lengths, high 
cost of fuel). As found by Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011), Beresteanu and Li (2011) and Martin 
(2009), a statistically significant positive relationship exists between petrol prices and EEV MD. 
Precisely, a US$ 1 increase in petrol price (per liter) results in a 1.6 percentage point increase in 
annual market penetration (MD). Clearly high fuel costs incentivize the purchase of EEVs.  
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An interesting finding is that the prior years’ EEV Aggregate Demand (AD) is positively related 
with EEV MD. This finding suggests that a greater awareness through increased exposure in the 
market to EEVs contributes positively to EEV MD.  
Although all policy type variables were tested, the only statistically significant policy type effect in 
Equation 1 is for one-off, up-front subsidies (Type A incentives). A positive relationship between this 
policy type and EEV MD exists; a finding consistent with Diamond (2009), Martin (2009), Beresteanu 
and Li (2011) and Sierzchula et al. (2014), but differing from Musti and Kockelman (2011) and Riggieri 
(2011). The results suggest that demand for EEVs on average is 1.02 percentage points higher when 
such incentives are on offer to consumers. 
Referring to the endogenous parameter in Equation 1, the EEV Price Premium has a negative 
and statistically significant relationship with EEV MD, with a 1% increase in the EEV Price Premium 
resulting in a 0.02 percentage point decrease in MD. This finding provides evidence to support the 
relationship alluded to between (2) and (4) in Figure 2 and suggests that the higher the EEV Price 
Premium the lower the EEV MD. This finding is in line with expectation, when EEVs are less price 
competitive relative to ICEV models – the lower we would expect consumer demand. 
Upon inspection of Equation 2 – EEV Annual Aggregate Demand (AD): as was the case for EEV 
MD, increasing GNI and decreasing inflation rates are positively associated with EEV AD. Population 
density is also positively associated with EEV AD, but with a lesser magnitude effect than in Equation 
1. The average cost of petrol is again positive and significant for EEV AD, with a US$ 1 increase in 
petrol price (per liter) resulting in a 0.35 percentage point increase in AD. Because AD is the 
cumulative demand for EEVs, we would expect the effect of petrol price to be smaller than for MD. 
Incentive policies appear to play larger roles influencing aggregate demand compared to 
marginal demand. Both incentive Types A and B were statistically significant and positively related to 
EEV AD. In markets where Type A incentives were present, AD is 0.26 percentage points higher on 
average, whereas for Type B incentives AD is 0.27 percentage points higher on average. This finding 
for Type B incentives is line with the results of Chandra et al. (2010). The endogenous variable, EEV 
Price Premium, is again statistically significant and negative with a 1% increase in EEV Price Premium 
resulting in a 0.01 percentage point decrease in AD. Similarly to MD, this finding shows that the higher 
the EEV Price premium, the lower the overall Fleet Penetration (AD), however, the effect of an 
increase in price premium is about half for AD as it is for MD. 
Finally, we turn the focus to Equation 3 - EEV Price Premium. Similar to the effects found by 
Langer and Miller (2009), Busse et al. (2009) and Beresteanu and Li (2011), we find that a US$ 1 
increase in petrol price (per liter) would result in a 19.66% increase in the EEV price premium. In other 
words, this increase would widen the gap between EEV and conventional vehicle prices by 19.66 
percentage points.  
Average disposable income per capita was included in this regression, as it was found to be 
significant in both the 3SLS and individual error component estimations, however, although positive, 
was not statistically significant in the final EC3SLS model. Increasing inflation is found to decrease the 
price premium (-3.85) whilst higher population density is related with a higher price premium (+4.49). 
All four types of incentives are statistically significant in Equation 3. The estimation results show 
that when purchase cost reductions (Type B), longer-term reductions (Type C) and usage-based 
benefit incentives (Type D) have been offered, the EEV price premium is lower by -11.9%, -18.7%, -
7.8% respectively.  In contrast, the parameter for up-front subsidies (Type A), such as cash rebates, is 
associated with higher EEV price premiums by +11.3%.   
These results suggest that for EEV incentive policies that have a monetary value that is easy to 
equate at the point of sale, such policies tend to lead to increases in EEV prices, relative to their 
comparable ICEV models; capturing at least partially, the incentive’s monetary benefit. Other types of 
incentives are either harder to absorb into vehicle price increases e.g. sales tax waivers (Type B) or 
harder to quantify due to their longer term impacts such as annual emission fee waivers (Type C) or 
because of their differential effect on consumers, such as free road tolls (Type D), and thus appear to 
have the negative association with price premiums. This finding could suggest that in markets with 
type B, C, and D incentive policies increasing demand for EEVs, dealers have reacted with 
competitive pricing of EEVs to attract sales. Alternatively, these effects could be partially offsetting the 
positive correlation between petrol prices and government incentive policies.  
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Table 3 - Estimation results from EC3SLS model 
 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Equation 1: Annual EEV Marginal Demand (percentage points) = 
 
 
Gross National Income per capita (10k USD/person) +1.0160 0.1629*** 
Inflation (%) -0.6852 0.1197*** 
Population Density (10k persons/ km2) +0.2389 0.0925*** 
Average Annual Petrol Price (US$/liter) +1.6479 0.3913*** 
One-off subsidies (Incentive Type A) +1.0268 0.3123*** 
Prior Year Annual EEV Aggregate Demand (%) +1.3505 0.2126*** 
EEV Price Premium -0.0216 0.0102** 
Equation 2: Annual EEV Aggregate Demand (percentage points) = 
Gross National Income per capita (10k USD/person) +0.2577 0.1189** 
Inflation (%) -0.0883 0.0297*** 
Population Density (10k persons/km2) +0.0633 0.0362* 
Average Annual Petrol Price (US$/liter) +0.3501 0.1537*** 
One-off subsidies (Incentive Type A) +0.2639 0.1180** 
Purchase cost reductions (Incentive Type B) +0.2706 0.1326** 
EEV Price Premium -0.0096 0.0038*** 
Equation 3: EEV Price Premium (percentage points) = 
 
 
Average Disposable Income Per Person (10k USD/person) +0.29 0.42 
Inflation (%) -3.85 0.82*** 
Population Density (10k persons/ km2) +4.49 0.49*** 
Average Annual Petrol Price (US$/liter) +19.66 2.92*** 
One-off subsidies (Incentive Type A) +11.28 2.67*** 
Purchase cost reductions (Incentive Type B) -11.88 2.79*** 
Long-term cost reductions (Incentive Type C) -18.73 1.71*** 
Usage-based benefits (Incentive Type D) -7.80 1.39*** 
EEV Annual MD (%) -3.68 0.40*** 
Key: *** = significant at ! ≤ !.!"; ** = significant at ! ≤ !.!"; * = significant at ! ≤ !.! 
Nb. R2 has no statistical meaning in the context of IV methods, such as EC3SLS, and therefore has not been 
reported. For IV models, some regressors act as instruments when parameters are estimated, however, the 
instruments for the endogenous right-hand side variables are not estimated. As a consequence, the residuals 
are computed based upon regressors that are different from those used to fit the model and the residual sum of 
squares (RSS) is no longer constrained to be smaller than the total sum of squares (TSS). In general, IV models 
are considered appropriate when they produce reasonable estimated parameters with acceptable standard 
errors. Each of the three equations were estimated individually, ignoring endogeneity, with the following R2 
values produced: Equation 1: 0.733, Equation 2: 0.183, Equation 3: 0.647.  
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After controlling for the effects of population density, inflation, fuel prices, and incentive policies, 
regions with lower MD have higher price premiums i.e. a 1 percentage point decrease in MD results in 
a 3.7% increase in the EEV Price Premium. There are a couple of possible explanations for this 
finding. First, where EEV demand is low, due to economies-of-scale, the price of EEVs would be 
substantially higher than comparable ICEVs. That is, the costs associated with delivering and selling 
EEVs in a low demand market are increased as a result of sales staff training costs, mechanic up-
skilling costs, marketing and advertising costs, shipping and delivery costs, etc., all of which have not 
benefited from economy of scale. Another explanation is that factors outside the market are at play, 
such as prices set to limit sales, or supplies limited and prices subsequently set high despite low 
demand. These latter explanations are speculative and based on anecdotal evidence.  
Finally, looking at estimates across the demand and price equations, the policy group that leads 
to an increase in EEV price premiums (Type A) also leads to an increase in demand for EEVs (MD 
and AD). This suggests that this type of incentive is attractive to both suppliers and consumers, with 
the value of this policy partially captured through demand and through price. 
6.  Discussion 
EEV markets around the world are dynamic, with vehicle manufacturers setting purchase prices 
based on numerous factors, with some potentially unknown (e.g. internal incentives, business 
strategies, etc.). In this analysis we were particularly interested in quantifying the effects of 
government incentive policies on EEV demand and price. The different government incentive policies 
were aggregated into four categories based on how and when they affect consumers. 
In this analysis, all four types of incentive policies have been found to have statistically 
significant relationships with EEV price premiums. On average, price premiums were lower in regions 
where Types B, C and D were implemented, and higher where Type A incentives had been 
implemented. Specifically, EEV premiums were 11.3% higher on average in markets where one-off 
purchase price reductions were in place suggesting that this incentive type is perhaps most easily 
absorbed into vehicle price by vehicle manufacturers. 
This is an important finding given the prominence of Type A incentives introduced around the 
world, and is in line with literature finding similar market effects in solar photovoltaic (Podolefsky, 
2013) and vehicle retirement scheme (Jimenez et al., 2011) markets. This finding is, however, in 
contrast to Sallee (2011) who did not find this effect when analyzing transaction data of Toyota Prius 
sales in the USA between 2002 to 2007. In this study he suggests that Toyota did not increase its EEV 
prices in order to preserve future demand for EEVs. It is also possible that such an effect could not be 
detected when using transaction data because factor upgrade option costs are confounded in sales 
prices. This current study computed price premiums based upon the normalized difference between 
dealer listed base prices of a new Toyota Prius (EEV) and its ICEV equivalent, a new Toyota 
Corolla—thus removing potential effects of factory options.  
Using the estimation results from Equation 3, the effects of different policy incentives on price 
premiums and MD is shown in Figure 3. EEV price premiums are highest with a US$ 1 increase per 
liter in fuel price, followed closely by the introduction of a Type A incentive.  
An increase in the price premium by the same amount as the Type A incentive would require a 
57.4 cent (US$) increase in average fuel price per liter. In other words, EEV dealers on average saw 
an equivalent market opportunity to raise EEV prices by the offering of Type A incentives as a 57.4 
cent (US$) fuel price increase. In contrast, incentive Types B, C, and D led to lower price premiums on 
average. It is possible that these incentives coincided with increased market competition, and/or 
otherwise contributed to or coincided with economies of scale in these markets.  
It is possible that the differences in EEV price premiums that we identified may have been 
influenced by other factors. Given the complex relationships existing in the market between supply 
and demand, as well as profit margins, market responses by vehicle manufacturers are potentially 
more complicated than capture by our model, particularly from endogenous potentially unobserved 
factors like internal market strategies. However, given the fairly comprehensive set of controlled 
exogenous factors in the model a model specification that allows for endogeneity, the sample size and 
number of unique cities, and lack of spurious trends in the price premium data, we are confident that 
these effects capture average t effects that indicate how policies have influenced these markets.   
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Figure 3 – Price Premium as a function of Marginal Demand for various scenarios 
Focusing on the demand side of the model – Equations 1 and 2 – only incentive Type A is 
statistically significant and positively related to MD, and Types A and B are statistically significant and 
positively related to AD. So EEV markets with Type A incentives have higher EEV price premiums 
(+11.3 percentage points) on average, but they also have higher Annual EEV sales with 1.4 
percentage point increase in MD and 0.3 percentage point increase in AD on average. This finding is 
in contrast to markets where Type B incentives are present, which have 0.3 percentage point higher 
AD and 11.9 percentage point lower EEV price premiums on average. Type A incentives appear to be 
effective in increasing the demand for EEVs, as suggested by Diamond (2009), Martin (2009) and 
Sierzchula et al. (2014). These same policies also increase EEV price premiums, suggesting that both 
consumers and suppliers respond to Type A incentives. Further research is needed to understand the 
mechanisms by which suppliers are responding to government incentives to raise EEV prices.   
The effect of Type B incentives is in line with expectations. Given that these policies reduce EEV 
purchase costs i.e. sales tax waivers, etc., they result in increased AD.  These policies may be directly 
or indirectly paid to dealers and simply passed on to consumers. For example, a sales tax waiver 
could be a government that does not collect sales tax on EEVs from a dealer or reimburses a dealer 
for sales tax on the vehicle—thus benefiting the dealer directly.  Also, the sales tax rebate may be 
linked to base prices—and thus increased prices may result in the marginal tax to be paid by the 
dealer, dis-incentivizing a sales price increase. Again, further research is required to better understand 
the underlying mechanisms involved.  
In terms of the endogeneity, higher EEV price premiums lead to lower EEV MD and AD, whilst 
lower annual EEV sales (MD) lead to higher EEV price premiums. This endogeneity has wider 
repercussions for the indirect effects of policy incentives. As shown in Figure 4, due to the existence of 
endogeneity between EEV price premium and marginal demand, a policy that affects one of the 
variables indirectly affects the other.  
Take Type A incentives first – in Figure 4 we can see the average direct effects of this group of 
policies on price premium (+11.28) and marginal demand (+1.03). The increase in price premium, 
however, in turn leads to an indirect reduction to marginal demand, which in turn leads to a further 
increase in MD. Although these indirect effects are somewhat countered by Type A incentive’s positive 
affect on MD, after taking into account indirect effects, Type A incentives in fact lead to a 8.1% 
increase in price premium, but only a 0.86 percentage point increase in MD. In contrast to the 
mechanism at play for incentive Type A, again referring to Figure 4, whilst incentives Types B, C, D do 
not directly affect MD, due to the endogenous relationship between MD and price premium, each of 
these policy types leads to a increase in MD as well as a decrease in price premium. The increase in 
MD for each of these policies, however, is less than that of incentive Type A. 
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Figure 4 – Indirect effects of different government incentives on Price Premium and Marginal Demand 
due to Endogeneity 
 
Referring to Figures 5 and 6, a 1% decrease in inflation rates or an additional 10,000 
persons/km2 has approximately the same positive effect on AD (+0.088; +0.063 respectively) – 
relative to the ‘No Incentives’ scenario. A 1% decrease in inflation, however, has almost three times 
the effect on MD compared to an increase in population density by 10,000 persons/km2 – again, 
relative to the ‘No Incentives’ scenario. 
An important and insightful finding is that a prior year’s AD influences the current years’ MD. 
This significant effect suggests the presence of a ‘market momentum’ or ‘marketing effect’, and 
emphasizes the importance of growing the EEV market to attract additional market share.  
In terms of exogenous variables included in the model: 
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- Higher fuel prices lead to increased EEV demand, with a +1.7 increase in MD and +0.4 
increase in AD, consistent with findings of Martin (2009); 
- Higher fuel prices lead to +19.7 higher EEV price premiums, as found by, Busse et al. (2009) 
and Beresteanu and Li (2011); 
- Generally demand for EEVs in relatively higher in regions with higher GNI, higher population 
density, and lower inflation rates – with lower inflation rates having a greater affect on MD 
than population density (see Figure 5); and, 
- Higher shares of EEVs in the vehicle fleet in the previous year appears to increase MD in the 
current year, capturing possible effects of market momentum, marketing effects, and 
increase general EEV awareness. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Marginal Demand as a function of Price Premium for various scenarios 
 
Figure 6 – Aggregate Demand as a function of Price Premium for various scenarios 
7.  Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research 
In this study we investigated the effects of a range of incentive policies introduced by 
governments to encourage the uptake of EEVs on both the demand for and price of EEVs using a set 
of panel data from 2008 to 2012 from 15 metropolitan regions. Error-Component Three-Stage Least 
Squares (EC3SLS) regression was used to estimate a system of equations on three dependent 
variables: Annual EEV Marginal Demand (MD); Annual EEV Aggregate Demand (AD) and EEV Price 
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Premium – a proxy for the price ratio between an EEV and a comparable ICEV. This model system 
allowed the testing of hypothesized endogeneity between price and demand. 
In order to quantify these relationships, we developed a model system capturing relationships 
between MD, AD and EEV Price Premium, controlling for the effects of socio demographic and 
economic factors, and accounting for the effects of four different types of government incentives. 
Up-front one-time subsidies (Type A), such as cash rebates, appear to increase EEV MD and 
AD by 1.4 and 0.3 percentage points on average respectively. This type of policy also appears to lead 
to an increase in EEV price premiums by 11.3% on average. In contrast, purchase cost reductions 
(Type B) increase EEV AD by 0.3 percentage points on average and decrease EEV price premiums 
by 11.9% on average. Similarly, longer-term cost reductions (Type C) and usage-based benefits (Type 
D) also appear to be offered in markets with lower EEV price premiums by 18.7% and 7.8% on 
average respectively. The evidence suggests that consumers are sensitive to cash rebates, and EEV 
dealers are partially absorbing the value of monetary incentives through increased EEV prices. 
The price of petrol would need to increase by 75-88 cents (US$ per liter) to have the same effect 
on EEV demand as incentives. Increased fuel prices are also associated with increased EEV price 
premiums, above that of Type A incentives. Fuel tax increases paired with targeted government 
incentives could lead to substantially increased demand for EEVs, albeit with price premium impacts. 
As hypothesized, endogeneity exists between EEV demand and price as captured in our model, 
with higher price premiums associated with reduced EEV Demand (MD: -0.02, AD: -0.01), and lower 
EEV MD increasing price premiums (+3.7). This finding is particularly useful for other researchers 
analyzing the effects of incentive policies on the EEV market—as omission of these effects would lead 
to econometric inefficiencies and bias. 
Market AD or momentum appears to play a role in influencing MD. The marketing impact of an 
increased share of EEVs assists in improving MD, emphasizing the importance of EEV visibility within 
the vehicle fleet. For this reason government or private sector (e.g. taxis) adoption of EEV fleets may 
serve to increase visibility and MD.  
There are numerous other factors that could affect manufacturer and dealer responses to 
government incentives when pricing EEVs, however, given the strength of the findings of this study 
comprised of 15 international regions observed across several years, there is ample evidence 
supporting a significant influence of endogeneity and policy incentives in EEV MD and AD. 
Consumers may not be the only beneficiaries of monetary incentives provided to encourage an 
uptake of EEVs, as EEV markets are complex and suppliers respond also to price signals in the 
market.  Numerous policies appear to be reducing the price premium between EEVs and ICEVs, thus 
increasing the competiveness of EEVs. It is also possible that due to bundling of policies in regions 
throughout the sample, we have not been able to disentangle the separate effects of each incentive 
type upon EEV demand. It is also possible the policy grouping scheme we applied fails to capture the 
important underlying common features within each group. We aim to address these potential 
limitations given an opportunity to expand the current dataset to include additional regions, years and 
explanatory factors. 
One might also expect that not every potential factor affecting demand and price are included in 
our model, despite our attempts to capture the predominant factors. For example, while this study 
focused on private purchases, it could be the case that the policies implemented in different regions 
had significantly different effects on fleet-purchases – which generally form a large proportion of net 
vehicle sales, and in turn could affect the profit margins of EEVs, with spillover effects, negative and 
positive, on private-buyers. The model also fails to capture the effects of marketing campaigns and 
changes in environmental awareness and behavior that could have affected both EEV price and 
demand. Finally, we expected all incentive groups to have an effect on EEV demand. Given this was 
not the case, we are cautiously optimistic that an expanded dataset including regions within North 
America, Europe and Asia, could lead to a more robust analysis. 
As this is the first publication based upon this set of panel data, we intend to continue to build on 
the number of regions, years and parameters included, with the ultimate aim of compiling a 
comprehensive series of data for 50 metropolitan regions over several years. It is hoped that through 
these future efforts we will address the shortcomings of this analysis. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
As highlighted in this thesis, the transport sector has a key role to play in 
reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and encouraging 
individuals to consider the sustainability of their choices. Transportation is a 
service that almost every human being on the face of the planet encounters 
each and every day – whether it be in figuring out how to get to work or 
school, to buy food to eat or go to the beach. Given its prevalence in every 
day of human life, transport presents a unique opportunity to policy-makers 
to influence behaviours, and hopefully transform them to be more 
sustainable. 
The consequences of emissions are real, both in terms of the impacts on our 
environment, and on our own health. Changing human behaviour, however, 
is a slow process. Such a transition will take time, so it is more important 
than ever, that policy-makers consider how they can influence consumer 
behaviour, and encourage a transition towards a more sustainable transport 
system, and in turn, a more sustainable society. 
Encouraging a transition within vehicle fleets towards energy efficient 
vehicles is just one program available to policy-makers to have a significant 
impact in terms of reducing transport emissions. Although alternative 
options also exist, in vehicle-dependent nations, such as Australia, we are 
unlikely to give away our vehicle needs in the near future, and as such, this 
means that the very vehicles we are dependent upon must change to be more 
energy-efficient. 
Incentive policies are not the only means available to policy-makers to 
encourage a transition towards EEVs, however, they are relatively simple to 
implement, particularly when compared with other measures, such as 
increased fuel taxation, that in turn, could introduce other distortions into 
the market, including distributional equity effects. As has been mentioned in 
this thesis, the most successful climate policy packages adopt a multi-faceted 
“carrot-and-stick” approach (Robalino and Lempert 2000). Whilst the 
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“sticks”, such as fuel taxation, have been in place for many years, research 
into “carrot” policies, such as government incentives, is less advanced. 
The principal aim of this thesis has been to evaluate how different incentive 
policies have affected the demand for, usage of and pricing of EEVs in 
different markets around the globe. In the process of doing so, this thesis has 
also examined a number of other issues, including the demographics of 
individuals who have chosen to purchase EEVs; how EEV adoption has 
actually affected vehicle emissions; the endogenous relationship between 
EEV demand and price; and how other factors appear to influence EEV price 
and demand, particularly in comparison to the effects of government 
incentives.  
These issues have been addressed through three separate research projects, 
undertaken in order to analyse the various factors at play within the EEV 
market. These three projects have culminated in the production of the three 
articles included in this thesis. 
This final chapter provides a summary of the findings, and their 
implications, across the three articles included in this thesis. The significance 
of these findings is also discussed, particularly in terms of contributions to 
both academic knowledge and to the public policy arena.  
The limitations of this study are detailed in Section 7.3, with suggestions for 
future work in this research field outlined in Section 7.4.  
Finally, this thesis concludes with a summary of recommendations 
specifically directed at policy-makers considering how to encourage the 
adoption of energy efficient vehicles.  
7.1 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis, and the associated production of the three articles included, has 
resulted in the revelation of a number of interesting and novel findings in 
respect to the field of energy efficient vehicle research. These findings, and 
their subsequent implications, have been summarised below in terms of the 
original research questions outlined in Chapter 1. 
  
Chapter 6: Conclusions 171 
What types of consumers have chosen to purchase EEVs? 
As outlined in the literature review of this thesis (Chapter 2), a number of 
studies investigating consumer preferences for EEVs already exist. The 
majority of these studies, however, are based upon stated-preference 
surveys, where individuals have been asked to make hypothetical choices 
amongst different sets of alternatives. Although such methods are generally 
considered to be robust, there is always some error introduced when a 
researcher forces an individual to make a choice, in a hypothetical future 
scenario, particularly amongst alternatives that may not even exist or be 
widely available on the market today. 
As such, one of the true strengths of the three analyses detailed in this thesis, 
are the revealed preference datasets that they examine. These datasets are 
comprised of actual consumer choices, and as such, allow us to take a 
retrospective view on decisions that individuals have actually made. Of 
course, however, this does not necessarily mean that these individuals will 
make the same decisions again in the future, but it does allow us to learn 
lessons from the experiences of policy-makers’ past efforts in this field. 
Specifically in relation to what types of consumers have chosen to purchase 
EEVs, in Article I’s analysis of new vehicle owners in Stockholm Country 
during 2008, it was found that: 
- Owners under the age of 30 preferred light, conventional vehicles, 
regardless of purchase price; 
- Females were most likely to purchase light, cheap, conventional 
vehicles, of which, low CO2 petrol/diesel models were most popular 
– remembering although these vehicles were defined by some 
groups as EEVs, they were not exempt from the congestion tax in 
Stockholm; 
- Higher income earners tended to purchase more expensive vehicles, 
regardless of vehicle size or whether they were exempt from the 
congestion tax or not; 
- Owners living close to or in the inner-city, preferred smaller, exempt 
EEVs – electric vehicles in particular; 
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- Exempt EEV owners also owned less vehicles – whereas non-exempt 
vehicle owners, tended to own more vehicles in total; and finally, 
- Individuals with higher numbers of children preferred larger 
vehicles. 
These results were obtained from three multinomial logit models, differing in 
how alternatives were aggregated in the choice set. The varying aggregation 
of alternatives was undertaken in order to distinguish between preferences 
for different fuel types, vehicle purchase prices and vehicle size. 
Overall the results from these discrete choice models suggest that the 
individuals with the highest propensity to purchase an EEV in Stockholm in 
2008 were: 
- Over 30 years old; 
- Male; 
- Lived close to or in the inner-city; 
- Had less children;  
- Had lower incomes in the case of flexi-fuel vehicles and higher 
incomes in terms of electric vehicles; and, 
- Had longer home-work trip distances. 
These findings are in contrast to: 
- Hackbarth and Madlener (2013) and Ziegler (2012) who found 
that younger individuals in Germany were most likely to 
purchase EEVs; 
- Mabit and Fosgerau (2011) and Dagsvik et al. (2002) who 
found that females, in both Denmark and Norway, were more 
likely to purchase EEVs; and, 
- Campbell, Ryley and Thring (2012) who found that 
individuals living further away than the city centre had the 
highest likelihood of purchasing an EEV; 
However, the results of Article I do support: 
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- Bhat, Sen and Eluru (2009) and Kahn (2007) – with inner-city 
residents having higher environment preferences and in turn, 
preferring EEVs; and, 
- Flamm (2009) who found that fuel-efficient vehicle owners 
have fewer vehicles in total, compared to conventional 
vehicles’ owners. 
It should be noted that Ziegler (2012) did find that males were more likely to 
purchase hydrogen vehicles than females, however, did not find a 
statistically significant relationship between gender and other types of EEVs.  
There probably is no stereotypical EEV buyer across the globe. The literature 
in this field tends to show that the demographic characteristics of consumers, 
appears to vary depending on which city or country they live in, and 
depending on the year of analysis. This is quite obvious when comparing the 
findings in the literature listed above for the neighbouring countries of 
Norway, Denmark and Germany. 
The findings of Article I do, however, raise questions regarding the 
differences in findings between stated preference and revealed preference 
studies. A key difference that could have led to the discrepancies outlined 
above is the fact that these SP-studies sampled the preferences of individuals 
in buying a hypothetical vehicle in the future; this is in comparison to the 
dataset in Article I, that reveals owners who actually have purchased a new 
EEV. On the other hand, given that the listed owner in the RP data, used in 
Article I, may not in fact have been the vehicle’s predominant user, or even 
the person who purchased the vehicle, the difference in preferences could 
instead reflect variations between vehicle owners and users. Presumably, this 
demarcation would have a significant impact on the demographic averages 
observed. 
As mentioned previously, it cannot be ignored that many of the SP-based 
findings in the literature are based on surveys where individuals have been 
forced to make decisions; decisions that they may not necessarily make in the 
real world. These results could suggest that, particularly in new markets, 
such as in the case of EEVs, the preferences revealed by the general 
population in SP studies, may not in fact reflect the demographics of “early-
adopting” individuals who have actually purchased EEVs.  
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As the market continues to mature, further research into this peculiarity can 
be undertaken using newer SP and RP-datasets, potentially even within 
Stockholm, to compare with the findings of Article I, and more generally. 
How has the government incentive of an exemption from congestion 
pricing affected consumer demand for EEVs in Stockholm? 
Riggieri (2011) found in her analysis of EEV sales in the U.S.A., that High-
Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane exemptions for these vehicles, a Type D 
incentive, had a statistically significant and positive effect on consumer 
demand. 
Focussing on the main Type D incentive analysed in this thesis – that of the 
congestion tax exemption for EEVs in Stockholm – the analysis detailed in 
Article I showed that this particular policy increased the marginal demand 
for EEVs by 1.82 percentage points (+/- 0.3; 95% C. I.) to a total share of 
18.8%. This represented a 10.7% increase in EEV sales in Stockholm County 
during 2008, equivalent to approximately 519 additional exempt EEVs. 
In order to verify these results, a secondary analysis was undertaken through 
which the changes in marginal demand for EEVs in Stockholm were 
compared with changes in demand in Sweden’s second largest city – 
Gothenburg – where congestion pricing was not active. Through this 
analysis, it was found that the marginal demand for EEVs in Stockholm 
increased by 1.76 percentage points more than in Gothenburg from 2007 to 
2008, providing strong evidence to support the findings of the primary 
analysis in this article. 
These results suggest that a congestion tax exemption can be effective in 
inducing demand for EEVs, and this certainly was in the case of Stockholm, 
substantially increasing the number of EEVs sold during 2008.  
What was not clear from this analysis, however, was how this incentive 
policy also affected vehicle usage rates and product pricing. Although the 
latter could not be studied using this dataset, the former is addressed in 
Article II. 
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Do EEV owners drive further than their demographically-similar 
conventional vehicle counterparts? 
The first approach adopted in Article II, using propensity score matching 
(PSM), used the treatment factor of EEV ownership to compare the usage 
rates of demographically-similar EEV and conventional vehicles. Through 
this process it was found that in the case of all driver groups, EEV drivers 
tended to drive further on average than their conventional vehicle 
counterparts. This difference in annual usage was greatest amongst those 
who commuted across the cordon boundary for work at 4.7 to 12.2%. For 
individuals not commuting across the cordon boundary, the rebound effects 
of EEV ownership were lower at 1.5 to 3.4%. It was not clear from this first 
approach, however, the extent of these rebound effects that were attributable 
to EEV ownership, or in the case of the boundary crossing owners, the 
congestion tax exemption. The different approach to quantifying the effect of 
EEV ownership (Approach 3) found that EEV owners crossing the cordon 
boundary only drove 2.4-3.3% further due to owning an EEV, with the 
remainder of the increase in usage attributable to the congestion tax 
exemption. 
In general, despite differences in the estimates obtained, the magnitude of 
these rebound effects support the findings in the literature in regards to the 
adoption of energy-efficient products (Gillingham et al. 2013; Greening, 
Greene and Difiglio 2000; Schipper and Grubb 2000). The effects were 
greater, however, than the negligible difference in usage rates found between 
Prius owners and other vehicle owners in California, U.S.A., by Afsah and 
Salcito (2012). 
Despite the fact that the rebound effects of EEV ownership were reasonably 
minimal, given the adoption of EEVs has led to some level of increase in 
usage rates, on average, the overall reduction in emissions due to this 
transition would be partially offset. Article II also examines to what extent 
the emissions reductions were offset – as discussed below. 
Finally, it should be considered, that given the increase in usage rates for 
EEV owners, it is not possible to know how these increases in annual 
kilometres travelled affected other road users, and in turn, led to changes in 
their vehicle emissions. It is for this reason, complimentary to the possible 
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offsets in emissions reductions, that policy-makers carefully consider how 
incentives to induce the uptake of EEVs, may also induce behavioural 
change, and potentially partially erode desired policy outcomes. 
How has the government incentive of an exemption from congestion 
pricing affected vehicle usage rates in Stockholm? 
The greatest difficulty in trying to estimate the effect of the congestion tax 
exemption for EEVs on usage rates arose due to this factor affecting vehicle 
owner groups across both Treatments 1 and 2. Those owners assumed to be 
affected by the policy were EEV owners who commuted across the cordon 
boundary. In order to assess the effect of the policy on usage rates it was 
necessary to compare usage between groups affected/not affected by the 
policy. Three approaches were adopted in order to do so – and in the 
process, as mentioned above, also provide estimates of the rebound effects 
spurred by EEV ownership. 
As was done in Article I, Approach 1 involved dividing vehicle owners 
based on their home and work locations, and comparing usage rates using 
the treatment of EEV ownership (as described above).  Using a difference-in-
differences approach, pairs of groups with the same home location relative to 
the cordon boundary were then compared, with the only difference between 
the two being whether they crossed the cordon boundary or not. Given the 
main difference between these groups was essentially whether the 
congestion tax exemption applied or not, any difference in usage could be 
attributed to the policy’s effect on usage rates. The comparison performed for 
vehicle owners living inside the cordon is shown in Figure 10 below. 
 Figure 10 – Comparison of ATETs obtained for Treatment 1 – EEV ownership, in order to 
estimate effect of the congestion tax exemption on usage rates of EEV owners living 
inside the cordon. 
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By assuming that the treatment of EEV ownership affected crossing/non-
crossing EEV owners equally, an estimate of the congestion tax exemption’s 
effect on usage rates could be obtained. In terms of EEV owners living inside 
the cordon, the congestion tax appears to have increased usage by 10.7%, and 
for the EEV owners also crossing the boundary but living outside the cordon, 
the policy appears to have increased usage by 0.9% - a considerably smaller 
effect.  
In order to scrutinise these findings, a counter-hypothesis was developed to 
the assumption listed above. It was possible that these differences in usage 
rates were not due to the effect of the incentive policy, but instead due to the 
fact that owners commuting across the boundary may systematically travel 
further than those that do not. This would mean that the treatment of EEV 
ownership would not affect crossing/non-crossing EEV owners equally.  
In order to analyse this counter hypothesis, the propensity score matching 
procedure was modified so that the treatment was changed from EEV 
ownership to commuting across the boundary. As such, demographically-
similar vehicle owners who lived in the same location relative to the cordon 
boundary, and owned the same type of vehicle, were compared, with the 
principal difference being that of the treatment i.e. whether they commuted 
across the boundary or not. 
As shown in Figure 11, in this second approach it was found that for vehicle 
owners living inside the cordon, EEVs owners commuting across the cordon 
travelled 22.3% further; whilst conventional vehicle owners travelled 14.9% 
further due to the treatment of crossing the cordon boundary. For vehicle 
owners living outside the cordon boundary: crossing EEV owners in fact 
travelled -5.3% less; whilst crossing conventional owners travelled -7.0% less 
due to the treatment effect. 
Intuitively from these results, given the tax exemption applied to the EEVs 
commuting across the cordon boundary, the difference in additional usage 
rates between conventional/EEV owners crossing the boundary could be 
attributed to the congestion tax exemption. As such, it was determined that 
the policy increased the usage of EEV owners living inside the cordon and 
commuting across the boundary by 6.8% (as compared with 10.7% in the 
principal analysis) and by 1.6% (as compared with 0.9% in the principal 
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analysis) for EEV owners living outside the cordon and commuting across 
the boundary.  
Figure 11 – Comparison of ATETs obtained for Treatment 2 – Commuting across the 
congestion pricing cordon boundary, in order to estimate effect of the congestion tax 
exemption on usage rates of EEV owners living inside the cordon. 
With this secondary analysis, of course this difference again could be 
attributed to other factors – principally that the treatment effect of 
commuting across the cordon boundary affects EEV and conventional 
vehicle owners differently. As such, although these two approaches provided 
insight into the effects of each treatment on groups not affected by the 
congestion exemption, it was still unclear as to how significant this policy 
was in terms of inducing behavioural change. In a final attempt to estimate 
this effect, and third approach was adopted. 
In the third, and final approach, to estimate the effect of the congestion tax 
exemption on EEV owners commuting across the boundary, as well as the 
effects of the two treatment factors, the results from the two prior approaches 
were combined with an additional comparison. This final comparison 
involved using PSM to determine the difference in usage rates between the 
two most different owner groups – EEV owners commuting across the 
boundary, and conventional vehicle owners not crossing the boundary. In 
doing so, an estimate of the total effect of EEV ownership, commuting across 
the boundary and the congestion tax exemption, on usage, could be obtained 
and compared with the usage differences obtained in Approaches 1 and 2 – 
see Figure 12. 
As a result of this third approach, the congestion tax exemption was found to 
increase usage rates of EEV owners living inside the cordon and crossing the 
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boundary for work by 9.3% (compared with 10.7% for Approach 1 and 6.8% 
for Approach 2). For EEV owners living outside the cordon and crossing the 
cordon boundary for work, the policy appears to have increased annual 
usage by 1.3% (compared with 0.9% for Approach 1 and 1.6% for Approach 
2).  
 Figure 12 – Estimating effect of EEV ownership, crossing the cordon and the congestion 
tax exemption on usage rates of EEV owners living inside the cordon. 
Additionally, Approach 3 found that EEV ownership in fact had a larger 
effect on the usage rates of EEV owners living inside the cordon and 
commuting across the boundary (+2.4%) compared with those not crossing 
the cordon (from Approach 1: +1.5%). The opposite was true, but to a lesser 
extent, for EEV owners living outside the cordon, with EEV ownership 
increasing usage rates of owners crossing the boundary by 3.3%, compared 
with the 3.4% (from Approach 1) increase for EEV owners not crossing the 
boundary. 
For researchers in this field, Article II is a useful comparative study for 
research efforts, complementary to Small’s (2012) study into the similarly  
minimal usage rebound effects of “fee-bate” incentives in the U.S.A. 
Overall, the analysis detailed in Article II, reveals that a Type D incentive i.e. 
a congestion tax exemption, has led to significant increases in vehicle usage 
rates in Stockholm. In turn, policy-makers need to ensure that such rebound 
effects do not substantially offset emissions reductions when implementing 
similar incentive programs. Did this happen in terms of the case study of 
Stockholm? The following section details the results of analysing the changes 
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in emissions due to the transition to EEVs, as well as the offsets in emissions 
reductions due to the rebound effects of EEV ownership and the congestion 
tax exemption. 
How have EEV ownership and the congestion tax exemption affected 
vehicle emissions? 
Given the findings of vehicle owners increasing usage rates after adopting an 
EEV, and further increases due to the congestion tax exemption, it was 
extremely important, from a policy perspective, to understand to what extent 
these rebound effects offset the desired reduction in vehicle emissions. The 
analysis detailed in Article II shows that the adoption of EEVs resulted in 
average CO2 reduction per person of 49.6%. 
Taking into account the rebound effects, however, the study finds that 
vehicle emissions could have been decreased by a further 2.3% if increases in 
usage had not occurred. A total of 1.6% of this offset was due to the rebound 
effect of EEV ownership, whilst the remaining 0.7% was due to the 
congestion tax exemptions’ average effect across the EEV owner population.  
Despite these offsets, the overall ambition of reducing emissions through 
encouraging a transition to EEVs appears to be well served in this incentive 
policy case study. As mentioned previously, however, this does not account 
for potential secondary emissions effects due to the effect of increase usage 
rates on other, less efficient vehicle owners using the road network 
How do different types of government incentives affect the pricing, 
aggregate demand (fleet penetration) and marginal demand (annual 
sales) for EEVs? 
Although Article I exposed the effects of a particular incentive policy on 
consumer demand for EEVs, Article III builds on this work by analysing a 
separate set of panel data for 15 different metropolitan regions between 2008 
and 2012. By analysing data for multiple regions, the effects of different types 
of incentive policies could be analysed. Given this data was also collected as 
part of this PhD candidature, other factors, not previously considered in 
Article I, could be included in the analysis, such as: inflation, population 
density, fuel prices, and importantly, product pricing. The modelling process 
was carried out using a unique method of analysing systems of equations 
based on panel data, known as Error-Component Three-Stage Least Squares 
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(EC3SLS) regression. In turn, Article III makes a significant contribution to 
academic knowledge, in providing an example of the practical applications 
for this unique method. 
Through this analysis it was found that, surprisingly, only two types of 
incentives had a direct effect on EEV demand. Type A incentives, such as 
cash rebates, appear to have led to a 1.4 percentage point increase in 
marginal demand (MD) on average, and a 0.3 percentage point increase in 
aggregate demand (AD) on average. This finding is in line with the studies of 
both Martin (2009) and Beresteanu and Li (2011) who found that Type A 
incentives have a significant effect on consumer demand for EEVs in the 
USA. This finding, does however, lie in contrast to the findings of Article I, 
which did find a significant effect for Type D incentives. This discrepancy, 
however, could be due to the different time periods analysed, or the fact that 
many of these types of incentives, such as the congestion tax exemption in 
Stockholm, were phased out early in the panel data time period of analysis – 
largely due to their effectiveness. 
Turning to the effect of different incentives on pricing, an innovative proxy 
was used to represent the price gap (or premium) between EEVs and 
comparable conventional vehicles. This variable was constructed as the 
normalised purchase price difference, listed by the dealer, between a 
common EEV – that of the Toyota Prius, and its conventional counterpart – 
the Toyota Corolla. 
Differing to the findings for demand, all types of incentive policies were 
found to have an effect on the EEV price premium. Interestingly, Type A 
incentives, the group that had the greatest effect on EEV demand, in fact also 
led to an increase in EEV price premium by 11.3 percentage points, on 
average. Incentive Types B, C and D all led to decreases in the price premium 
on average, at -11.9 percentage points, -18.7 percentage points and -7.8 
percentage points, respectively. 
So what caused this discrepancy in terms of how different types of incentive 
policies appear to have affected EEV price premiums? One theory, as pointed 
out in Article III, is that Type A incentives, such as upfront cash rebates, 
could be more easily quantified by vehicle manufacturers at the point of sale, 
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and as such, the policy benefit, although designed for the consumer, appears 
to have been partially absorbed by vehicle manufacturers.  
Further evidence for this theory is provided upon analysis of the effects of 
Type B incentives. Compared with Type A incentives, Type B incentives, 
whilst also increasing aggregate demand (+0.3 percentage points), in fact, 
reduced the price premium. The positive effect of Type B incentives on 
consumer demand for EEVs has also been identified by Chandra, Gulati and 
Kandlikar (2010) in their analysis of EEV sales in Canada. 
Given Type B incentives largely consisted of policies, such as sales tax 
waivers, it is understandable that such incentives could not as easily be 
captured in price changes. This type of incentive appears to have genuinely 
increased demand for EEVs, whilst in fact decreasing the price gap 
(premium) between EEVs and conventional vehicles. 
With different types of incentives affecting both price and demand for EEVs, 
it was important to understand whether these two factors were endogenous, 
in order to understand where incentive effects, such as decreases in the price 
premium, indirectly had an effect on consumer demand. This particular issue 
is also addressed in Article III and outlined below. 
Are EEV demand and price endogenous?  
As mentioned previously, it is important for policy-makers to have a good 
understanding of how the EEV market operates, and in turn, how different 
incentive policies (and other demographic and economic factors) affect 
demand and price, both directly and indirectly. 
The unique method adopted in the analysis detailed in Article III – known as 
EC3SLS – allowed for an estimation of the endogenous relationship between 
marginal demand and price premium. It was found that a                                  
1 percentage point increase in price premium would lead to a 0.02 percentage 
point decrease in marginal demand, and have half that effect on aggregate 
demand, leading to a 0.01 percentage point decrease. This difference in 
effects was expected given aggregate demand represented fleet penetration, 
and as such, captured the cumulative demand for EEVs, as compared to 
marginal demand that captured the share of annual EEV sales – which would 
be more sensitive to price premium changes. 
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Looking at the effect of marginal demand on price premium, in fact a              
1 percentage point increase in marginal demand would result in a 3.8 
percentage point decrease in price premium. Given the average marginal 
demand over the 5 year time period and 15 regions analysed was 1.67%, such 
an increase in marginal demand would be substantial (59.8% increase in 
number of sales). Given an increase in marginal demand by this magnitude, 
we would expect, as a consequence, a decrease in price premiums.  
Given the endogenous relationship identified through this study, it was also 
important to understand how these relationships impacted upon the effects 
of different policy effects. 
For Type A incentives, the endogenous relationship between price and 
demand in fact meant that, including both direct and indirect effects, this 
policy type only led to a 8.1 percentage point increase in the price premium 
(direct effect: +11.3), however, in fact only increased marginal demand by 0.9 
percentage points (direct effect: +1.4). This meant that although the policy 
type still had a significant impact on demand taking into account the indirect 
effects due to increased price premiums, the actual policy effect on demand 
was approximately 35% less than initially estimated. Such a finding has 
significant repercussions; both within the academic literature, and for policy-
makers, in revealing that the endogenous relationship between EEV demand 
and price is significant, and can have a substantial impact of the effectiveness 
of different policies. 
Interestingly, when we look at how the endogenous relationship affects the 
other three types of policies, we find that these policy types lead to indirect 
effects upon the marginal demand for EEVs. Specifically, by accounting for 
the endogenous relationship between price and demand we can see that, on 
average: 
- Type B incentives: increase marginal demand by 0.3 percentage 
points, and decrease price premium by 12.9 percentage points; 
- Type C incentives: increase marginal demand by 0.4 percentage 
points, and decrease price premium by 20.4 percentage points; and 
finally, 
 184 Chapter 7: Conclusions 
- Type D incentives: increase marginal demand by 0.2 percentage 
points, and decrease price premium by 8.5 percentage points. 
It can be seen from these findings that in fact all types of incentive policies 
appear to increase consumer demand for EEVs, however, the mechanism by 
which they do so differs. The findings of Types B and C increasing demand 
are in line with that of Diamond (2009), whilst the positive effect of type C on 
demand is echoed by Riggieri (2011). 
Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) find that Type A policies have a greater 
impact on demand than Type B incentives, as found here, however, they find 
the Type B incentives have a greater impact on demand than Type C 
incentives, which is opposite to the findings in Article III. 
Overall, the results presented here are particularly relevant to policy-makers 
considering introducing different types of incentives to encourage the 
adoption of EEVs. As detailed, the direct effects of these policies does not 
always tell the whole story, and given the endogenous relationship identified 
between EEV demand and price, it is suggested that all future studies in this 
field attempt to capture this effect in order to properly assess both the direct 
and indirect effects of government incentives. 
How have demographic and economic factors, such as fuel prices, 
affected EEV demand and pricing, compared with government 
incentive policies?  
The final research question of this thesis was included in order to provide 
both policy-makers and other researchers in this field with a better 
understanding of how different demographic and economic factors also 
influence EEV demand and pricing. A few other studies have already 
attempted to quantify some of these other effects – specifically fuel price 
changes – on EEV demand and pricing. The findings of these studies are 
compared with those outlined in Article III, and have been summarised 
below. 
Although some studies, such as Riggieri (2011), have not found conclusive 
evidence to suggest a link exists between higher fuel prices and increased 
demand for EEVs, other studies, such as Beresteanu and Li (2011) have 
observed substantial effects. Specifically, the latter study found that a US$ 1 
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increase in petrol prices (per litre) in 2006 would have resulted in a 176% 
increase in EEV sales.  
In Article III, higher fuel prices are also found to increase demand for EEVs – 
a US$ 1 increase in petrol prices (per litre) would lead to a +1.7 percentage 
point increase in marginal demand and a +0.4 percentage point increase in 
aggregate demand. Using the average MD and AD figures in the dataset of 
1.67% and 0.53%, respectively, this effect would represent a 102% increase in 
annual EEV sales, and a 76% increase in the number of EEVs in the vehicle 
fleet – findings in line with those of Beresteanu and Li (2011). 
Shifting focus to the effect of increases in fuel prices on EEV pricing, again a 
number of studies have investigated this issue. Busse, Knittel and 
Zettelmeyer (2009) found that a US$ 1 increase in petrol prices would 
increase the price of the Toyota Prius by 17.2%, whilst Beresteanu and Li 
(2011) found that this increase in petrol prices would lead to a 24.8% increase 
in the price of the Toyota Prius. In line with these findings, the model 
developed in Article III shows that a US$ 1 increase in petrol prices would 
lead to a 19.7 percentage point increase in the EEV price premium i.e. a 19.7 
percentage point increase in the price gap between a Toyota Prius (EEV) and 
a Toyota Corolla  (conventional vehicle). 
So how do these effects compare with the impact of different policies? This is 
an extremely relevant question given that fuel taxation is seen as an 
alternative mechanism by which governments can encourage the adoption of 
more fuel-efficient vehicles. Based on the results listed above (excluding 
indirect effects): 
- US$ 0.57 increase in petrol prices would have the same effect as 
Type A incentives on price premium; 
- US$ 0.88 increase in petrol prices would have the same effect as 
Type A incentives on marginal demand; 
- US$ 0.75 increase in petrol prices would have the same effect as 
Type A incentives on aggregate demand. 
As discussed previously, however, these increases in fuel prices would 
ultimately also increase EEV price premiums and partially offset the increase 
in consumer demand. The average petrol price (per litre) in the dataset was 
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US$ 1.77 – meaning that these changes in fuel prices represent a 35-50% 
increase in the fuel price. For incentive Types B, C and D, the required 
increase in fuel price would be closer to 15-20%. Increased fuel taxation 
could, realistically, get close to these figures, however, the distributional 
equity effects of increasing fuel prices for the entire population, without 
subsidisation of alternatives, would likely be substantial, particularly in 
countries like Australia, with low population densities.  
Although some increases in fuel prices would be positive for policy-makers 
endeavouring to increase demand for EEVs, it is the recommendation of this 
study that the revenue raised through any increases in fuel taxation are used 
to subsidise EEV purchases in order to offset any increases in EEV price 
premiums, and minimise the distributional equity effects – in a carrot-and-
stick approach. This is an alternative program to that of the “fee-bate” 
schemes, analysed by Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) and Musti and 
Kockelman (2011). 
Finally, a few other demographic and economic factors that appear to affect 
EEV price and demand are: 
- Fleet Penetration in the previous year leads to higher marginal 
demand; possibly due to higher awareness of EEVs or 
economies-of-scale; and, 
- Higher population density and lower inflation rates lead to 
increases in marginal and aggregate demand, in terms of EEV 
price premiums. 
Equipped with this knowledge, policy-makers and researchers alike can 
better design and investigate future incentive policies in this field, taking into 
account the wider effects of other demographic and economic factors on EEV 
demand and pricing. 
7.2  SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS 
The analysis results detailed in this thesis are useful to both policy-makers 
and researchers in the field of transport research, particularly in terms of the 
energy efficient vehicle market.  
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As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, although a number of studies 
have already analysed the stated preferences of consumers towards EEVs, 
this thesis, particularly through Article I, contributes to providing details of 
the demographics for individuals who have actually chosen to purchase an 
EEV. This is done through the analysis of new vehicle registrations in 
Stockholm County during 2008. This information is particularly significant 
when considering the design of future government incentives, and EEV 
consumer surveys, in terms of better targeting these initiatives.  
The scarcity of literature investigating the usage rates, and potential rebound 
effects of EEVs, spurred the production of Article II. The findings of this 
paper are particularly significant, given that rebound effects have been 
identified – with EEV owners driving up to 12.2% further than their 
demographically-similar conventional vehicle counterparts. Although the 
repercussions on emissions reductions seem to be minimal (-2.3%), it does 
highlight the need for policy-makers to thoroughly investigate the impacts of 
incentivising the adoption of EEVs, not only on demand and pricing, but also 
in terms of vehicle owner behaviour and usage. This is one of the first 
research publications on this topic, and as such, will form a useful case study 
for future analyses. 
Another topic in the field of EEV research that has not yet been investigated 
is that of the endogenous relationship between EEV demand and price. 
Article III directly addresses this need through the modelling of panel data 
for 15 regions around the world, using a unique analysis technique known as 
Error-Component Three-Stage Least Squares (EC3SLS) regression. Through 
this process, the study identifies statistically significant relationships 
between EEV demand and price, which is of great significance, particularly 
in terms of assessing the effectiveness of different government incentives. 
The discovery of this relationship meant that incentive policies not only have 
direct effects on EEV demand and price, but also can indirectly affect these 
factors through the endogenous relationship that is present. Article III is the 
first such study to investigate this issue, and as such, its findings are of 
paramount significance to both policy-makers and researchers investigating 
the effects of different types of EEV incentives on the market. 
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Articles I and II make significant contributions to the case study of 
Stockholm in terms of EEV policy analysis – and only strengthen the 
evidence supporting this region’s effort to encourage the uptake of EEVs. 
Article I shows that the congestion tax exemption was significant in terms of 
increasing marginal demand for EEVs – resulting in an additional 519 EEVs 
sold in 2008. Article II builds on this work to show that, although some 
rebound effects were present in Stockholm, due to EEV ownership and the 
influence of the congestion tax exemption, overall, these moves have resulted 
in a 49.6% reduction in the direct emissions of EEV vehicle owners. This 
evidence further strengthens the argument for the adoption of incentivising 
EEVs as a policy tool for reducing emissions in the transport sector. 
Lastly, taking a broad view across the three articles included in this thesis, it 
is clear that this body of work makes a substantial contribution to the public 
policy arena, with a number of significant findings. This is particularly 
important given that the main purpose of this document is to equip policy-
makers, from around the world, with additional insight into the effects of 
different types of government incentive policies on the demand, usage and 
pricing of energy efficient vehicles. 
Articles I and II demonstrate the effect of a Type D incentive (congestion tax 
exemption) on both the demand and usage of EEVs, using a specific case 
study. Article III expands on this work by analysing different types of 
incentive policies – categorised into four groups – in terms of their effect on 
EEV demand and pricing in a number of markets around the world. This 
particular study sheds further light on the ‘true’ effects of incentive policies. 
Although some incentive types appear to have a substantial impact on EEV 
demand, some also can increase the EEV price premium, such as Type A, and 
in turn offset some of these increases in consumer demand. These findings 
again are significant in contributing to the body of literature that has 
analysed the effects of different types of policies in the EEV market. It also 
makes novel contributions to academic knowledge by exploring the effects of 
different government incentives on EEV pricing – a topic that has largely 
been ignored. 
The main significance of the findings in this study is that they provide 
policy-makers with the additional information they require to better 
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understand the potential impacts of different types of government incentives 
on EEV demand, usage and pricing. With this knowledge, they can design 
efficient, targeted, multi-faceted “carrot-and-stick” programs, which take 
advantage of both the positive effects of incentive policies (“carrots”) and the 
positive effects of other factors, such as increased fuel prices (“sticks”), 
maximising the benefits of EEV adoption, whilst minimising market 
distortions and distributional equity effects. 
7.3 LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT STUDY 
Despite the number of significant findings outlined in this thesis, as well as 
their implications for researchers and policy-makers alike, there are, of 
course, some limitations. Firstly, this thesis makes no attempt to determine 
which types of vehicles, or EEVs, are the most environmentally-friendly; nor 
is it suggested which type should be encouraged. These factors are 
superfluous to the main ambitions of this study. They are, however, 
nonetheless critical issues that deserve proper attention. 
Focussing firstly on the two articles analysing the case study of Stockholm 
(Articles I and II), although revealed preference data was used, it is 
impossible to know whether the registered owner of these vehicles was in 
fact the predominant user or even the decision-maker when it came to the 
vehicle purchase. This could be one reason as to why some discrepancies 
were found in terms of EEV owner demographics, when compared with 
some stated preference data publications. It may, however, also simply be 
due to geographical differences between the regions analysed. 
Another shortcoming of the first two articles is that the research design fails 
to capture the effect of the congestion tax exemption on non-commuting 
trips. Given the data that was presented, assumptions had to be made in 
regards to which individuals were most likely to be affected by this policy. 
As such, the results are based on the assumption that owners not crossing the 
congestion pricing cordon boundary were not affected by the exemption 
incentive. This assumption, in reality, is likely stretched. If anything, 
however, this suggests that the estimates provided, particularly in terms of 
the policy’s effect on consumer demand, are conservative and underestimate 
the total impact of this government incentive. 
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In terms of Article III, aggregate level data from multiple sources has been 
used – leading to a potential increase in error. The study was also confined to 
only 15 regions over 5 countries, that may not necessarily be representative 
of other regions – at least in the developed world – and as such further work 
needs to be carried out in terms of expanding this dataset and rerunning the 
documented analysis. 
Finally, this study is limited to the analysis of developed countries, yet 
transport emissions amongst developing nations are a significant issue. 
Given the substantial differences in demographic and economic factors 
between the regions analysed, and that of an average developing country, 
some of the findings enclosed may not be applicable to these nations. This 
warrants further work that specifically focuses on policy tools that could be 
used in developing countries to encourage a shift towards a more sustainable 
transport system. 
7.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
As outlined in the limitations of this study, there are several areas that 
remain unaddressed and where further investigative efforts are warranted. 
Specifically, additional RP-datasets need to be analysed in order to shed 
further light on the discrepancies in ‘typical’ demographics of EEV 
consumers that currently exist within the literature. Of course, the various 
SP-based studies are comprehensive in their analysis, but there is a need to 
compare these findings with that of RP-based studies, particularly given that 
the EEV market is still maturing, and the characteristics of individuals who 
actually purchase EEVs may differ somewhat from those who ‘think’ or 
‘want’ to purchase an EEV. 
The short-coming of Articles I and II in failing to capture the effect of the 
congestion tax exemption on non-commuters will be addressed in a future 
study to be compiled in the reciprocate PhD thesis being produced for KTH 
as part of this Double PhD program. This study analyses two waves of 
vehicle boundary crossing data for the two weeks before the tax exemption 
was phased out (mid-2012), and for the same two weeks after the policy was 
phased out (mid-2013). Although this investigation will focus on the phase 
out of this policy – as opposed to its introduction – comparisons will be made 
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in terms of how the exemption affected both vehicle crossings and the usage 
of EEVs. 
Finally, further work developing the dataset analysed in Article III is 
planned, with the ambition of expanding the panel data to include 30-50 
regions over a 5-6 year time period. Through this process, the validity of the 
findings documented in Article III will be examined, with additional focus 
placed on the indirect effects of different types of government incentives on 
EEV demand and price. 
7.5 FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY-MAKERS 
Encouraging a transition towards a more energy-efficient and sustainable 
vehicle fleet is a noteworthy endeavour for any policy maker to adopt. Given 
the current pressures of increasing emissions on the global climate, and the 
effects of this pollution on human health, it is more important than ever that 
policy-makers adopt programs and strategies that will move us in the right 
direction towards a more sustainable society. 
This thesis’s specific contribution to this issue is to equip policy-makers with 
both the evidence and knowledge required in order to design successful 
incentive programs. Its success will be measured by the efficient increase in 
the uptake of EEVs with minimum distortion to the market and minimum 
usage rebound effects. 
Firstly, for the sceptics and others interested in the environmental impacts of 
EEV adoption, Article II of this thesis details the changes in both user 
behaviour, and in turn, vehicle emissions, through the adoption of EEVs. 
Some rebound effects are identified, with particular EEV owners driving up 
to 12.2% further annually than their demographically-similar conventional 
vehicle counterparts. Despite the increased usage rates, through the adoption 
of EEVs, such owners have decreased their direct tailpipe emissions by 
49.6%, with rebound effects only offsetting emissions reductions by 2.3% - of 
which 1.6% was due to the rebound effects associated with EEV ownership, 
with the other 0.7% due to the congestion tax exemption. 
In particular, it was found that the congestion tax exemption (Type D 
incentive) did have a significant effect on the usage of EEVs. Although this 
incentive policy overall had a substantially positive effect on Stockholm’s 
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environment, this case study provides a cautionary warning to policy-
makers to carefully consider the design of incentive programs to ensure that 
any behavioural changes will not excessively erode the desired policy 
outcomes.  
From the results of this thesis, it can be seen that most types of government 
incentives do increase the demand for EEVs, however, it is the mechanism by 
which they do so that does in fact differ. Incentives such as cash-handouts or 
purchase rebates (Type A incentives) appear to have the greatest effect on 
demand, which is expected given consumers are provided with “no strings 
attached” cash which they can then use for whatever means they desire. One 
of the problems of this incentive type, however, is that it also appears to 
drive up the dealer-listed purchase price gap between EEVs and comparable 
conventional vehicles. It is suspected that, given the ease with which one can 
quantify the value of this incentive at the point of sale, vehicle manufacturers 
are in fact partially absorbing this type of government incentive by 
increasing EEV prices. As shown though, this is not the end of the story. 
It has been found that EEV demand and price are endogenous – price 
increases lead to decreased marginal demand, and vice versa. Specifically 
referring back to Type A incentives, this means that any increase in demand 
is partially offset, indirectly, through the increase in price premiums. 
In contrast, purchase cost reduction incentives, such as sales tax waivers 
(Type B incentive), whilst increasing aggregate demand, in fact reduce EEV 
price premiums, and in turn lead to further increases in consumer demand. 
Similarly, running cost reduction incentives, such as registration fee 
exemptions (Type C incentive), or usage-based benefits, such as toll road 
exemptions (Type D incentive), also lead to decreased EEV price premiums, 
and in turn, indirectly increase marginal demand. The direct effects of these 
policies on EEV consumer demand is, however, less clear. The literature in 
this field is also not conclusive in terms of the effects of each policy type. 
Article I of this thesis, however, does find that a congestion tax exemption 
(Type D incentive) has had a statistically significant effect on consumer 
demand for EEVs in Stockholm. 
It can also be seen through this study that other demographic and economic 
factors influence EEV demand and pricing. Lower inflation rates and higher 
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population density, tend to lead towards higher demand for EEVs, however, 
can also lead to higher EEV price premiums. 
Specifically referring to the effects of changes in petrol prices, this study 
shows that, depending on the type of incentive, fuel prices would need to 
increase by 15-50% in order to have an equivalent effect on consumer 
demand. An increase in fuel prices of this magnitude, however, would 
equally lead to a substantial increase in price premiums, particularly given 
that a US$ 1 increase in average petrol price (representing approximately a 
50% increase in average petrol prices across the 15 regions analysed in 
Article III) would result in a 19.7% increase in the price gap (or premium) 
between EEVs and comparable conventional vehicles. This is not to mention 
the significant distributional equity effects of increasing fuel prices to such an 
extent, for an entire population – particularly in a sparsely populated country 
like Australia – without subsidisation of alternatives. 
Taking all of these factors into consideration, as well as the knowledge 
acquired through other literature that has been documented in this thesis, it 
is recommended to any policy-maker considering the implementation of 
programs to incentivise the uptake of EEVs that they carefully consider the 
issues documented in this thesis. The overall findings of this study suggest 
that the most efficient and successful strategy a policy-maker could adopt in 
order to encourage the uptake of EEVs would be to progressively increase 
fuel taxation, and in turn fuel prices, using the subsequent revenue generated 
to introduce different government incentives for EEV adoption in a multi-
faceted “carrot-and-stick” approach.  
Given that Type A incentives do appear to distort the market, it is 
recommended that other incentive types be given precedence, but with 
careful attention paid to the potential effects of these policies on vehicle 
owner behaviour, particular in terms of Type D incentives. 
This multi-faceted approach should also be expanded to include “carrots”, 
“sticks” and “sermons”/”tambourines” – in this case, the sermons or 
tambourines being widespread information and marketing campaigns to 
educate the general public about the benefits of EEV adoption, not only 
economically, but also in terms of the wider environmental and social 
benefits. 
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By implementing a program on this basis, a policy-maker would have the 
best chance of ensuring that their incentive package is effective and targeted 
in terms of increasing demand for EEVs, and potentially cost-neutral due to 
the additional revenue raised through increased fuel taxes. Such a package 
would minimise the potential distributional equity effects caused by 
increased fuel prices, by subsidising the costs of alternative mobility options 
i.e. EEVs. Such a package would also ensure minimum distortion to the EEV 
pricing market and if carefully designed, little to no rebound effects in terms 
of vehicle owner usage rates.  
 
(Börjesson et al. 2012; Coad, de Haan and Woersdorfer 2009; D'Agostino 
1998; de Haan, Mueller and Scholz 2009; Golob and Hensher 1998; Gröna 
Bilister 2007; Hugosson and Algers 2010; Hultkrantz and Liu 2012; Jones and 
Dunlap 1992; McFadden 1974; Pydokke 2009; Swedish Petroleum Institute 
2012; West et al. 2007; Yacobucci 2007; Bollen and Davis 2009; Clark and 
Linzer 2015; Shankar, Mannering and Barfield 1995; Chao et al. 2014)
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Appendix A 
DOUBLE PHD MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
For reference purposes the memorandum of understanding signed between 
Queensland University of Technology (QUT) and the Royal Institute of 
Technology (Kungl. Tekniska Högskolan – KTH) has been included overleaf. 
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Double /Joint PhD Agreement 
between 
Queensland University of Technology (QUT) 
CRICOS Provider Number 00213J 
and 
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden 
School of Architecture and the Built Environment 
QUT is a statutory authority in the State of Queensland Australia, established by an Act of the Queensland 
Parliament in 1989. 
Background 
1. The universities participating in this Double I Joint PhD Agreement seek to enhance co-operation and 
collaboration between their researchers. 
2. Jake Elliott Whitehead (hereafter, the Student) wishes to conduct his doctoral research with the Queensland 
University of Technology (QUT) and with the Royal Institute of Technology (hereafter KTH). 
3. The doctoral research will be conducted under the respective and relevant doctoral degree rules and policies 
of KTH and of QUT. These rules shall take precedence over any interpretations of this agreement. 
4. This agreement sets out the arrangements agreed upon by both universities. 
Operative Provisions 
1. Enrolment 
1.1 The Student has requested admittance as a PhD candidate at School of Urban Development, Faculty of Built 
Environment and Engineering* at QUT and the School of Architecture and the Built Environment of KTH 
commencing in the academic year 2011 for a period of 4 years. The completed international PhD application 
form for QUT is attached. 
*from January 1, 2012, the Faculty of Built Environment and Engineering will be restructured and renamed 
as the Science and Engineering Faculty. 
QUT 
1.2 On receipt of an offer of admission by QUT Jake Elliott Whitehead must enrol prior to commencing the 
doctoral research at QUT. Jake Elliott Whitehead must comply with the conditions of enrolment of a Higher 
Degree Research student of QUT available in the Manual of Policies and Procedures in the following website: 
1 
http://www .mopp.q ut.ed u .au/ Appendix/a ppendix09 .jsp 
KTH 
1.3 Upon due application, and provided that he fulfils the current requirements for admittance and proof of 
financing according to the Swedish Higher Education Ordinance, KTH shall admit Jake Elliott Whitehead to the 
doctoral program at the School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE). 
2. Project title 
The following project, with the title /{Sustainable Metropolitan Transport Systems and Policies", shall be 
implemented under this Agreement. 
The project shall largely consist of an investigation into the various sustainable transport schemes, initiatives 
and policies implemented in Sweden and Australia, and a comparison of the approaches adopted in these 
countries. The project could involve an investigation into the potential modification of the 'cordon boundary' 
scheme, with an integration of a number of innovative and flexible policies that could potentially improve the 
sustainability of the transport network within the region. These policies could include differentforms of 
sustainable transport and active transport and potentially an innovative/different approach to congestion 
charging. Finally, there is scope within this project to investigate the potential integration of a personal carbon 
tax into the transport network. The project would involve analysing both the strategic level of policy decisions 
and the technical level of modelling such initiatives. Perspectives and case studies could be drawn upon from 
both Australia and Sweden, and used to compare the different situations present. 
3. Duration of research work 
3.1 The doctoral studies program will conclude on 1 March 2015. The parties may agree to an extension. The 
Student will spend no less than one year at each partner university. 
4. Enrolment fees, living allowances 
QUT 
4.1 Jake Elliott Whitehead will not pay tuition fee to QUT as part of the Research Training Scheme available to 
Australian students. 
KTH 
4.2 The Student undertaking this double PhD program will incur no tuition fee liability towards KTH as KTH does 
not require graduate research students to pay tuition fees. 
5. Travel support 
The student will be allocated funding by the supervisors at QUT and KTH for the purpose of travel undertaken 
by the student in the course of his research activities. 
2 
6. Supervision and infrastructure support 
6.1 The Student will pursue his research program under the supervision of a QUT supervisor, Prof. Simon 
Washington, Science and Engineering Faculty. 
6.2 At KTH, the Student will pursue his research program under the supervision of AndersKarlstrom and Joel 
Franklin, School of ABE. 
6.3 If any of the supervisors mentioned above is unable to perform supervision, replacement supervisors of the 
same academic standing may be appointed. 
6.4 Normal infrastructure support arrangements will be provided by each university, consistent with those 
provided to PhD candidates at that university and any relevant doctoral regulations which address this issue. 
7. Annual progress reports 
Both parties shall require the Student to deliver reports on the progress of his research. The reports shall be 
issued to both parties with intervals that may freely be set by the respective party. 
8. Medical Insurance 
8.1 The Student, while at QUT, will be required to obtain at his expense medical cover by Medicare (Australian 
Universal Health Care Insurance) and comply with health care requirements as stipulated for students in 
Australia. 
8.2 When at the KTH, the Student will be required to obtain appropriate insurance cover at his own expense. 
9. Examination 
QUT 
9.1 The thesis/research papers will be submitted and examined according to QUT Doctor of Philosophy policies 
and procedures as detailed in the Manual of Policies and Procedures in the following website: 
http:/ /www.mopp.qut.ed u.a u/ Appendix/appendix09.jsp 
KTH 
9.2 The thesis/research papers will be submitted and examined according to the policies and procedures at 
KTH including the completion of necessary coursework. 
10. Award 
10.1 The two universities undertake, based on their respective national rules, policies and procedures to award 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of QUT and the degree ofTeknologie Doktorsexamen of KTH in two 
independent diplomas. 
10.2 A decision by one university not to award the degree does not preclude the other university from 
awarding the degree. 
3 
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Appendix B 
DOUBLE PHD CANDIDATURE TIMELINE 
A timeline of this Double PhD Candidature has been included overleaf. The 
timeline details PhD Milestones, coursework completed, progression of the 
PhD Thesis, as well as the timing of various 
conferences/workshops/presentations and outputs. 
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Jake E. Whitehead
Double PhD Program (QUT-KTH) (Thesis by Publication) = QUT = KTH = QUT'and'KTH
Time Elapsed (in months for 4 year study program) 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54
Date Feb-Apr 2011 May-Jul 2011 Aug-Oct 2011 Nov-Jan 2012 Feb-Apr 2012 May-Jul 2012 Aug-Oct 2012 Nov-Jan 2013 Feb-Apr 2013 May-Jul 2013 Aug-Oct 2013 Nov-Jan 2014 Feb-Apr 2014 May-Jul 2014 Aug-Oct 2014 Nov-Jan 2015 Feb-Apr 2015 May-Jul 2015
PhD Milestones
Official'Start
Research'Proposal'(Stage'2)
Confirmation'of'Candidature'(QUT)/'Licentiate'Defence'(KTH)
Annual'Progress'Report
Final'Seminar/Dissertation
PhD'Thesis'Lodgement
Coursework
Advanced Information Retrieval Skills, QUT
Systems Analysis - Distance Course, KTH
Theory of Science and Research Methodology, KTH
Transport Modelling, KTH
Transport Policy and Evaluation, KTH
Advanced Transport Modelling, KTH
Sustainable Transport Literature Course, KTH
Statistical and Optimisation Methods for Engineers, QUT
Sustainable Practice in the Built Environment, QUT
Topics'in'Transport'Science'(Part'1'+'2),'KTH
Research Methods in Transport Science (Parts 1 + 2), KTH
Double Literature Course in Stated Preference Methods, QUT
Research Process
Title & Abstract
Introduction/Overview/Vision
Broad'Literature'Review
Research'Design'and'Methods
Paper'1:'Congestion'Tax'Exemption'Effect'on'Consumer'Demand'for'LEVs:'
Analysis'of'Stockholm,'Sweden
Paper'2:'Rebound'Effects'of'Transitioning'to'a'EEV'Fleet:'Analysis'of'
Stockholm,'Sweden
Paper'3:'Effect'of'Different'Government'Incentives'on'EEV'Demand'and'
Pricing:'International'Comparison
Summary'of'Findings'and'Conclusion
Approvals/Agreements/Applications 
QUTWKTH'Double'PhD'Agreement'Negotiations
Intellectual'Property
Ethics
Scholarships
Grants'in'Aid
AutoCRC'Contract
Conferences/Workshops/Summer Schools/Outputs
eddBE2011'Sustainable'Wellbeing'Conference,'QUT
Sustainable'Transport'and'Development'Workshop,'Columbia'Uni,'New'York
Kuhmo'Nectar'Summer'School'in'Transportation'Economics,'DIW'Berlin
Sustainable'Transportation'Summer'School,'Aalto'University,'Helsinki
Centre'for'Transport'Studies'Seminar'Series,'KTH
hEART'Conference,'KTH
Australasian'Transport'Research'Forum,'QUT
Kuhmo'Nectar'Conference'(Transportation'Economics),'Toulose
Royal'Geographic'Society's'Annual'International'Conference,'London
AutoCRC's'3rd'Technical'Conference,'Melbourne
Transportation*Research*Part*A:*Policy*and*Practice*(Article*I)
Transportation*Research*Part*A:*Policy*and*Practice*(Article*II)
Journal*of*Environmental*Economics*and*Management*(Article*III)
!
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Appendix C 
ASSESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE DOUBLE 
PHD PROGRAM BETWEEN QUT AND KTH 
I admit, when I first started this Double PhD program – between two 
universities that lie on opposite sides of the world – the magnitude of the 
environmental consequences of my actions during this candidature were not 
immediately apparent to me. Within the first 12 months of starting the 
program – a particularly emissions-intensive 12-month period that happened 
to include one and half round-the-world trips – I started to converse with 
several different people about my work, my ambitions, but more 
importantly, the environmental consequences of my own actions. 
I thought - sure it’s great to write a thesis on a topic that hopefully will make 
a difference in the public policy arena of my own country, and around the 
world, but is it enough to bank on these potential successes offsetting the 
environmental impacts of my research efforts undertaken in the course of 
producing this thesis? Being the modest person that I am, I wasn’t convinced, 
and so I started to reassess how I lived my life and what I could do 
differently in order to reduce my own environmental footprint. 
I’ve always been of the belief that the best leaders in society, lead by 
example. As my mum would say – practice what you preach – it’s just that 
simple. It’s unreasonable, as researchers, if we preach to policy-makers and 
the general population that they need to make all of these revolutionary 
changes in their lives in order to help us move towards a more sustainable 
society, but are unwilling to “take some of our own medicine” and assess the 
impacts of our own behaviour. 
This final appendix has been included in my PhD thesis to shed some light 
on my own personal experiences in trying to reduce my environmental 
footprint – a footprint largely expanded through my research activities – in 
the hope that I can inspire other researchers, and like-minded individuals, to 
do the same in their own lives, and to practice what we preach. So just how 
significant has the environmental impact of my research efforts been? 
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C.1.  MY CARBON EMISSIONS 
In order to assess the environmental impact of my actions, I logged all 
of my predominantly research-related trips, and calculated the associated 
emissions. As mentioned previously, the first year of my candidature was a 
particularly emissions-intensive year, with a total production of 9.4 tonnes of 
CO2 equivalent through the course of travelling 69,182 kilometres around the 
world. To put this into perspective: this is over double the average transport 
emissions per capita in Australia in 2011 (3.8 tonnes of CO2 per capita) and 
almost double the average global carbon emissions of 4.9 tonnes of CO2 per 
capita (Olivier, Janssens-Maenhout and Peters 2012) – and this is only 
considering my flight emissions.  
On the basis of requiring a 50% cut in the 1990-levels of carbon 
emissions by 2050, in order to prevent the most catastrophic effects of climate 
change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2013), it has been 
calculated that personal carbon emissions need to be reduced to 1 to 1.5 
tonnes of CO2 per capita per annum (Marc 2007). These figures lie in stark 
contrast to the emissions produced through my own research activities. 
Initially I was shocked at just how disproportionate the impact of my own 
activities were on the global environment compared with that of the global 
average – and even worse, compared with emissions levels deemed to be 
‘sustainable’. Immediately I started to think about ways I could reduce this 
impact and developed a three-pronged approach through which I would aim 
to reduce my own personal carbon emissions. These three main initiatives 
were:  
Approach 1. Adopting a personal carbon budget to track my own 
transport emissions, and endeavouring to reduce my 
flight emissions by 10-15% year-to-year;  
Approach 2. Assessing other emissions generated in my day-to-
day life and determining ways in which these could 
be reduced through changed behaviours; and finally, 
Approach 3. Donating funds to organisations working on 
sustainable development projects, particularly in 
developing countries, in order to offset my flight 
emissions. 
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When I first presented these initiatives to my colleagues and friends, they 
asked – but if you are offsetting your emissions completely (Approach 3), 
then why would you reduce your travel emissions (Approach 1) or change 
any other behaviour (Approach 2)?  
My simple answer is – Approach 3 is the rich, developed-country persons’ 
excuse. To only adopt Approach 3 would be like saying – I have the financial 
capacity to ‘offset’ my emissions, without having to change any of my 
behaviour (unlike the rest of the world), and that is enough. Well for me it 
simply wasn’t. At the very least I wanted my research efforts to be as close to 
carbon neutral as possible – regardless of whether they resulted in carbon 
reductions through public policy development – and simply ‘paying’ to have 
the excuse to pollute made me uncomfortable.  
I sense the economists cringing as I write my point of view, but in my mind, 
the economy is not the be-all and end-all of our society. It is a tool that we 
can use to achieve many fantastic things – including encouraging the uptake 
of energy efficient vehicles – but at some point we all need to step back and 
reflect on our own behaviour, and the consequences of our own actions – not 
use the financial wealth we are lucky enough to gain, in order to make 
excuses for our behaviour. 
The tracking of my own personal emissions is detailed further in Section B.2. 
The other initiatives I have adopted in order to reduce my day-to-day 
emissions are also discussed in Section B.3, whilst the details of the carbon 
offset programs are provided in Section B.4. 
C.2.  TRACKING MY RESEARCH FLIGHT EMISSIONS 
I have included the tracking of my research-related flight emissions in Figure 
13. As can be seen, by the conclusion of this program in early 2015, I should 
have come close to reducing my emissions, year-to-year, by 10-15%. Of 
course it was harder to reduce my flight emissions further during this 
program, given a return trip between Australia and Sweden equated to 5.5 
tonnes of CO2 – and, as selfish as it was, I wasn’t willing to give up the PhD 
program in order to reduce my footprint further in the short-term. 
It should be noted that my initial reaction upon discovering the extent of my 
personal carbon emissions in 2011 resulted in a dramatic decrease in 2012, 
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however, this level of travel could not be maintained in order to attend 
various conferences and workshops around the globe and to be adequately 
present at both QUT and KTH during the course of the program.  
 
Figure 13 – Tracking of my flight emissions between 2011 and 2015 
Despite some level of improvement in my flight emissions, the 
environmental impact of this program has nonetheless been significant. 
Precisely, it has resulted in the production of 27.7 tonnes of CO2 over the 
course of 4 years (6.9 of CO2 tonnes per year on average) generated through 
203,987 km of travel (50,997 km per year on average) or just over 5 trips 
completely around the world. Clearly reducing emissions year-to-year 
would not be enough, and as such, I changed my life in other ways to further 
reduce my personal emissions. 
C.3.  OTHER WAYS TO REDUCE MY PERSONAL EMISSIONS 
The true consequences of our actions in life are not always immediately clear. 
At the beginning of this program, in 2011, I considered myself as an 
environmentally conscious individual who generally tried to minimise my 
waste and consumption. I hadn’t seriously considered, however, how my 
lifestyle choices were really impacting on the environment. 
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I owned a four-wheel drive – a small one by general standards – but 
nonetheless, not the most environmentally-efficient vehicle on the market. I 
consumed about the average amount of electricity, but simply purchased this 
energy from the cheapest provider – regardless of where it was sourced. I 
also was a regular consumer of meat and dairy, and hadn’t really ever 
considered how this was affecting the environment. All of these actions, 
however, were having real consequences. 
In 2011, I sold my four-wheel drive, and adopted to use public transport or 
cycle – using my parent’s small car for non-standard trips. This immediately 
reduced my footprint, but was much more difficult to maintain in Brisbane, 
as compared to when I was living in Stockholm – purely due to the fact that 
the level of public transport offered there far outclassed what was available 
in Brisbane. I maintained a car-free life until early 2014, however, reneged on 
my change and purchased a small, low-emission vehicle. This move was 
somewhat forced through a change in personal circumstances, however, was 
a backwards step in my journey. Today, I try to avoid driving as much as 
possible, but with family living all over the city – and Brisbane’s transport 
network still severely limited in how it addresses suburb-to-suburb, round-
city transit, it is not possible to get by without it. In saying this, I hope to 
purchase an electric vehicle in the next 12-24 months. 
Moving to electricity consumption. Immediately on returning to Australia in 
2012, I replaced all light fittings in my property with LED lights; installed 
energy-efficient appliances and purchased accredited 100% renewably-
sourced electricity. My electricity bill in fact was reduced by 10%, despite the 
increased cost of purchasing green energy, due to the significant increases in 
energy efficiency – as well as a more conscious effort on my own behalf to 
minimise my energy consumption. 
Finally, we come to the issue of meat and dairy products. Experts ranging the 
former World Bank chief economist Lord Stern, to the chief of the United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have warned that meat 
and dairy production, and in turn consumption, is having a massive effect on 
the global environment. Agriculture accounts for 15% of global greenhouse 
gas emissions, half of which comes from livestock – and this does not include 
the emissions produced through the transport of meat, dairy and derivative 
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products (Eshel et al. 2014; Ripple et al. 2014). Some studies have found that 
meat is having such a significant impact on the environment that 
consumption will need to be cut by 50% by 2050 in order to avoid the worst 
predicted climate change scenarios (Davidson 2012). 
Beef consumption, in particular, has significant environmental effects – 
requiring 28 times more land and producing 5 times more GHG emissions 
compared with pork or chicken; or 160 times more land and 11 times more 
GHG emissions compared with potatoes, rice or wheat (Eshel et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, it has been found that the average meat-lovers diet leads to 
double the greenhouse gas emissions of the average vegetarian diet, and two 
and half times that of the average vegan diet (Scarborough et al. 2014). 
Taking a look at my own behaviour, in light of this mountain of evidence 
exposing the environmental impact of meat and dairy consumption, it was 
apparent that cutting out meat and minimising dairy would be a tangible 
behavioural change I could make, that would substantially contribute 
towards reducing my own environmental footprint. As such, I ate my last 
piece of meat in January of 2012, became a vegetarian and haven’t looked 
back since. In terms of dairy, I’m not quite ready to give up Camembert just 
yet, but I minimise my consumption of dairy through the use of dairy-
substitutes, such as: almond milk, rice milk, coconut cream, oat cream and 
vegetable oil-based butter substitutes – just to name a few.  
Although I have not tracked the precise change in my environmental 
footprint in terms of general lifestyle changes over the course of this PhD 
program, I have estimated that my personal carbon emissions in 2014 (today) 
are 50% less than compared with 2011 (including flight emissions), with 
average year-to-year decrease of -20.9% - see Table 4. 
Table 4 – Change in personal carbon emissions from 2011 to 2014 
Annual CO2 Emissions 
[tonnes] 2011 2014 Difference % 
% Year 
–to-Year 
Electricity Consumption 3.2 0.0 -3.2 -100.0  Vehicle Use 2.2 1.3 -0.9 -40.9  Food/Diet/Waste 2.8 1.4 -1.4 -50.0  Sub-total excluding Flights 8.2 2.7 -5.5 -67.1 -30.9 
Flight Emissions 9.4 6.0 -3.4 -35.8  Total 17.6 8.7 -8.9 -50.4 -20.9 
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Despite these efforts, my personal carbon emissions in 2014, at 8.7 tonnes of 
CO2, were still higher than the global average. 69% of these emissions, 
however, were produced through my research-related flight activity. Given 
my emissions, whilst somewhat reduced, are still reasonably high, the final 
approach I took in order to reduce the environmental impact of my research 
activities was to offset my flight emissions through carbon offset and 
development programs. 
C.4.  CARBON OFFSET PROGRAMS 
Various carbon-offset programs exist on the market, offering ‘rich’, 
developed-country persons the opportunity to offset their behaviour. I 
apologise for the cynical tone in which I write this, but this really should be a 
last resort when an individual considers how to reduce their personal 
environmental impact. 
In my case, given emissions generated through my research activities were 
inevitable, I needed to take additional measures to offset the emissions that 
could not be eliminated i.e. flights between Australia and Sweden. As 
mentioned previously, however, I did not simply want to just pay for my 
pollution and use my financial means to excuse the consequences of my 
actions. If I was to pay to offset some of my emissions, I wanted to ensure 
that this money went towards helping those most vulnerable in society – 
who do not have the financial means to excuse their behaviour – develop 
sustainable infrastructure. This is why I principally purchased carbon offset 
through Climate Care, a firm that invests funds in sustainable development 
projects in various developing countries around the globe. 
Some of my flights were also offset by Scandinavian Airlines through The 
Carbon Neutral Company, and by Qantas and Jetstar through programs 
accredited with the Australian Government’s National Carbon Offset 
Standard. In total, I have spent approximate AU$ 450 during the PhD 
program on carbon offset credits. 
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C.5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We all have a responsibility to reflect on our actions in society and ensure the 
consequences of our behaviour do not impede upon the ability of others 
today, and into the future, to support themselves on this planet. I am part of 
the problem, and this is specifically the reason as why I have included this 
Appendix.  
If we truly are to avoid the worst possible climate change scenarios, and 
move towards a more sustainable society, we all have a part to play – and no 
one, including researchers, are exempt. Researchers, in particular, travel 
frequently for conferences and workshops, and although many of us in the 
sustainability field hope our research ultimately will play a part is moving us 
in the right direction; it is easy to lose sight of the fact that our very actions in 
doing so, could in fact have a greater impact on the environment than we 
could ever expect our research to offset. As such, it is critical we take this into 
consideration with our activities, find new and innovative ways to not only 
live our lives, but also to conduct research in a sustainable manner. 
My story is just one example of how a researcher might consider reducing 
their environmental impact. Whilst I still have much work to do in this area, 
and am by no means anywhere close to a sustainable level as of yet, I hope 
that this final contribution to my PhD thesis inspires others to consider the 
consequences of their own actions and behaviour, and to do something about 
it. 
After all, we only have one planet – what’s the point in researching 
sustainability if your own research activities ultimately jeopardise the very 
thing you are trying to save. 
 
 
 
